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ABSTRACT 
The Treasury's report "Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: A Review" 
(the Myners Review) suggested in 2001 that various sectors of the UK equity market 
may be suitable for active investment management, tacitly assuming that some sectors 
are efficient whilst others are not. The validity of this assumption is tested against 29 
industrial sector indices within the FTSE All Share index. Sector efficiency is, taken to 
be that index values reflect information correctly (strong efficient) or to the point 
where benefits do not exceed costs (weakly efficient). Existence of a sector index 
following a random walk is used to identify strong efficiency with the subsequent 
conclusion that passive management would be appropriate. Where the time series is 
not random, forecasting gains less than the management costs of active trading 
indicate weak efficiency with the corollary that passive management is still 
applicable. Industrial sectors where the index can be forecast with gains in excess of 
costs are not efficient and are appropriate for active management. 
The indices are tested for stationarity: none are stationary in levels but all reject the 
Dickey Fuller null hypothesis of a unit root in their first difference, the logarithmic 
return. Tests for randomness are based on pure random walks and random walks with 
drift and/or trend. Non-random time series are examined for maintained regressions 
based on AR, MA and ARMA. Where appropriate, ARCH is applied to the variance, 
utilising GARCH, Threshold GARCH, GARCH-in mean, Exponential GARCH and 
Component GARCH. Additionally there is a test for cointegration. All potential data 
generating processes' residuals are tested for independent identical distributions using 
the BDS test. If the maintained regression produces residuals that are III) then that 
series is assumed to be explained. 
The results show that four indices are strong efficient and five are weak; giving nine 
sectors that should be managed passively. Only one sector is found where there is 
scope for active management to make an abnormal gain in excess of costs. Nineteen 
of the indices had GARCH, which indicated a possible lack of efficiency but no 
decision on management style. One index was unexplained. Thus the Myners 
review's suggestion of active management where appropriate was valid, but limited 
solely to the Personal Care & Household Products sector. 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Myers Review 
1.1.1 Context 
In March 2001 the Treasury published "Institutional Investment in the United Kingdom: 
A Review" (subsequently referred to as the Myners Review). Instigated by the Rt Hon 
Gordon Brown MP and submitted by Paul Myners, the Review set out a blueprint for 
change in the UK savings and investment industry. Its main analysis was based upon 
studies of: 
pension fund trustees; 
investment consultants; 
asset allocation; 
herds and peer group benchmarks; 
performance measurement timescales; 
broking commission. 
It is the third of this list, namely asset allocation, that is central to this doctoral study, 
exemplified by Myners' letter submitting the Review where he suggested that "asset 
allocation- the selection of which markets, as opposed to which stocks, to invest in- is an 
under-resourced activity" (p. 1). The importance of this is reflected in its inclusion in the 
proposed Principles, which refer to "the attention devoted to asset allocation decisions 
(which) should fully reflect the contribution they can make to achievingthe fund's 
investment objectives" (p. 15). The main research hypothesis of this thesis is set out in a 
later chapter but this Introduction will pre judge that discussion by giving greater focus to 
asset allocation and market efficiency and less emphasis totrustees, commission and the 
like. Unless otherwise specified, all quotations or paraphrasing set out in the Introduction 
are from the Myners Review of Institutional Investment, 6th March 2001. 
The Myners Review defines fund managers' core service as one of "... investing client 
assets in order to generate superior returns for a given level of risk or the lowest level of 
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risk to achieve a targeted return" (p. 73); in effect, to move within the feasible set towards 
the efficient frontier or on to the appropriate position of the Capital Market Line in the 
mean-variance space, as posited by Markovitz (1952). Much of the Review locates this 
core service within the strategic asset allocation decision, as exemplified by the following 
examples. 
Firstly, peer group benchmarking (where the trustees delegate the strategic asset 
allocation decision) was recognised as being in decline, (but still encompassing a 
significant proportion of funds under management) and was regarded as a matter of 
concern with the Review believing "... that this way of managing pension funds has no 
satisfactory justification" (p. 56). Peer group total fund benchmarks have asset allocation 
"... driven by historic consensus... " (p. 55) resulting in slow changes in asset allocation, 
high uniformity across funds and convergence of strategic asset allocations over time. 
Secondly, customised total fund benchmarking, a process with asset allocation decisions 
made by the trustees, results in extensive reliance on their advisers (often investment 
consultants or consulting actuaries). The Review argues that these consultants are in turn 
both small in number and use similar asset-liability modelling techniques, hence causing 
funds to reject certain asset classes (for example private equity) and to conform to the 
fairly generic advice of the advisors. Thus the outcome for customisation is similar to that 
of the peer group method, with high concentration, low switching between advisors and 
similar models all conspiring to "a commonality of investment policy among pension 
funds" (p. 70). This is contextualised by two statistics set out separately and not 
conflated within the report, namely that only 1.5 basis points out of a total of 47 in the 
annual costs of the value added chain go to the consultant for asset allocation, but that 
"... investment policy dominates investment strategy..... explaining on average 93.6% of 
the variation in total (pension) plan return". (Brinson et al, 1986, cited in the Review, p. 
60. ) To offset this commonality of strategic asset allocations, or rather the need to 
encourage "greater diversity of asset allocation policies"(p. 5) the recommendations urge 
more open competition by providers, formal assessment of their performance and 
allocation of fees to reflect contribution to performance. 
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Trends identified by the Review throughout the nineteen eighties and nineties show a 
gradual decline in the use of in-house management. In addition there is a switch from a 
balanced basis (one manager responsible for all asset classes) to much greater use of 
specialist mandates (separate managers responsible for different asset classes), combined 
with the growth of foreign firms in the UK fund management market and the continued 
growth in funds under management. This same period also saw growth in passive 
investing, with the report (disparagingly) alluding to "... passive investing seek(ing) to 
free-ride off the more or less efficient capital allocation of active fund managers"(p. 81). 
Additionally, in a brief history of the fund management industry, reference is made to 
"... the ability of managers to `beat the market"' (p. 81). The Myners Review would seem 
to view the UK equity market as inefficient in its pricing in relation to information 
available! This conclusion is then rejected or down played, in that when supporting or 
encouraging investment in venture capital, the recommendation is justified on the basis 
that "it is precisely among poorly researched asset classes that greater opportunities for 
enhanced return are likely to exist" (p. 59). 
Market efficiency is similarly covered in some of the recommendations related to fund 
managers. They centre around capital market efficiency at the asset class level and 
address two main issues. In relation to actual indices, funds are urged to ensure that their 
selected index benchmarks are appropriate and that they have set divergence limits that 
are appropriate. This in contrast to the Review's later opinion that "pension funds are 
paying fees for active management when its true style is becoming increasingly passive: 
adding less and less value, and offering less and less stock selection strategies" (p. 10). 
Additionally, that for each asset class, it is necessary to consider "... whether active or 
passive management would be more appropriate... " (p. 22) and to allow those deemed 
to be appropriate for active management to have "-sufficient freedom for genuinely 
active management to occur" (p. 22). These recommendations are supported by emphasis 
on the need for clarity over the performance measurement period. It is this view about the 
potential additional or abnormal gain to be achieved from active management that forms 
the basis for the thesis. There has long been a tension or debate between theory and 
practice, or academics and fund managers, as to whether the UK equity marketis 
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efficient (or not) and hence whether it should be managed passively (or has scope for 
abnormal gain from active management). This thesis continues and contributes to that 
debate. 
1.1.2 Focus of Thesis 
The intended aim of this research is to examine or test certain aspects of the Myners 
Review's underlying precepts and recommendations in relation to the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis. This will not be a broad-brush approach as it will ignore issues such as 
broking commission, trustees and consultants. The main focus will instead be on asset 
allocation, herds or peer group benchmarks and performance measurement. In particular, 
this thesis will consider if UK asset classes as defined by FTSE All Share industrial 
sector indices are efficient. This is central to the Review, which assumes lack of 
efficiency in its vision of "a better-functioning system" with: 
a greater richness and diversity of benchmarks (so that) active mandates would be 
given where there was good reason to believe that active management could 
deliver outperformance ... 
(allowing) successful active managers (to) manage with 
greater conviction (p. 17). 
The framework for the research will therefore be the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(defined later, but basically the assumption that share prices reflect information to the 
point where the benefits do not exceed the costs) as it could be argued that the growth of 
tracker funds and peer group benchmarking is tacit acceptance of market efficiency by 
the fund management community. Thus it is telling that the Myners Review is applying 
pressure to move the industry towards more active fund management, in effect rejecting 
the concept of efficiency, stating specifically that funds should "consider explicitly for 
each asset class invested whether active or passive management would be more 
appropriate" (p. 87). In recent years much has been published on stock selection. This has 
been based on stock picking techniques, fundamental analysis, technical analysis, 
Economic Value Added or more theoretical Portfolio Theory models. Over the same 
period, very little has been published in finance on asset allocation, i. e. decisions of 
percentage allocation of a fund to domestic versus international investment, or equity 
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versus fixed interest stock, property, cash and all other asset classes. Thus the research 
area is relatively unexplored, surprising in that some research indicates that asset 
allocation has a significantly greater impact on performance variance than the individual 
stock selection process. 
Fund managers involved in active management warranted further consideration by the 
report in relation to commission to the sell-side. Fees paid by the pension funds to the 
fund managers were viewed as transparent but dealing and research is more opaque. The 
soft commission could be responsible for the actual or perceived "inefficiencies and 
complexities" (p. 96) which would be removed by greater transparency. Thus it was 
recommended that costs of external research, information and trading costs be 
incorporated in the fee paid to the fund manager. This view has strong resonances with 
current definitions of efficiency, in relation to weak efficiency rejecting active fund 
management on the grounds of cost. 
Table 1 Percentage ownership of UK equities 
1963 1969 1975 1981 1989 1994 1999 2004 
Overseas 7.0 6.6 5.6 3.6 12.8 16.3 29.3 32.6 
Insurance companies 10.0 12.2 15.9 20.5 18.6 21.9 21.6 17.2 
Pension funds 6.4 9.0 16.8 26.7 30.6 27.8 19.6 15.7 
Individuals 54.0 47.4 37.5 28.2 20.6 20.3 15.3 14.1 
Unit trusts 1.3 2.9 4.1 3.6 5.9 6.8 2.7 1.9 
ITCs* 11.3 10.1 10.5 6.8 1.6 2.0 1.9 3.3 
Other financial* 1.1 1.3 5.1 10.7 
Charities 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 
Industrial/commercial 5.1 5.4 3.0 5.1 3.8 1.1 2.2 0.6 
Public sector 1.5 2.6 3.6 3.0 2.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 
Banks 1.3 1.7 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.4 1.0 2.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*Shown as one value to 1981. 
Source: ONS, "Share Ownership: a report on the ownership of shares at 3 1St December 2004. 
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The report's contextual background to institutional investment is introduced by outlining 
the main types of institution and their proportionate holdings in UK equity. An expanded 
version of the Review's statistics is set out in Table 1 above. (The expansion is both in 
terms of time and type, relative to that given in the Review. ) Although the Review's title 
infers that the original intent was to cover all institutions shown in the table, it should be 
noted that the main focus is on pension funds, given that with regard to life funds "... the 
review finds that investment performance is far from the main focus of 
competition.... which fall beyond the remit of this review, and which I propose the 
Government should investigate separately" (letter, p. 2). 
Other pooled institutional investment is covered briefly in the review, but only to the 
extent that it applies to the same recommendations as that of pensions. The main 
recommendation relating to pooled investments being that it should be included in a 
proposed review of personal investment products. Thus the primary category of 
institutional investor considered by the review is the occupational pension fund generally, 
although this is split into defined benefit and defined contribution schemes, with the chief 
category being LTK company pension schemes. Consideration is also given to local 
authority pension funds, although this is very much a sub-set of the main company 
approach. The concentration on pension funds, when allied to the concern to increase 
active management and give greater attention to the strategic asset allocation processis 
paradoxical, in that one of the main drivers in pension fund investment is asset liability 
matching. A process that could be seen as dominating the investment policy of the 
pension fund to a greater extent than any other type of investment fund. 
For the purpose of this research, the salient points within "Institutional Investment in the 
United Kingdom: A Review" are that funds should move away from benchmarking and 
be more dynamic in terms of changing asset allocations. Passive management is seen 
somewhat negatively as a free-ride whereas active management is more aspirational, 
resting on the ability of managers to achieve abnormal returns or to beat the market The 
focus of this being not with timing or stock picking, but in the under-utilised area of 
strategic asset allocation with the key assumption being that active management should 
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be used for those asset classes where there is scope for abnormal gain. The asset classes 
or rather the strategic asset allocation choices are viewed as "the overall spit between 
real and monetary assets" or "domestic and overseas fixed income and equities" or 
"specific segments, defined either by geography, sector, size or style"(p. 51). 
This flies in the face of the concept of market efficiency. Definitions of efficiency or the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis are considered in considerable detail in the literature review, 
but the analysis will be based upon an asset class being strong efficient, weakly efficient 
or not efficient. Strong efficiency being viewed as when the asset class is always the 
correct level; returns are not forecastable as they are white noise. Weakly efficient asset 
classes will have some forecastable ability, but the cost of obtaining that benefit will 
exceed the benefit: returns are coloured noise. Non-efficient asset classes" will be 
forecastable and capable of generating abnormal returns. 
Given that the majority of UK investors invest within the UK (see the Literature Review 
for discussion of home country bias) and that the Myners Review has an institutional 
focus in particular in relation to equities, then this thesis will seek to test the assumption 
of the Review; namely to establish if the various UK equity industrial sectors are strong 
efficient, weakly efficient or not efficient. In effect, are individual sectors / asset classes 
candidates respectively for passive management, or marginal passive/active or active 
management? 
1.1.3 Other aspects of the Myners Review 
The following is a brief summary of the other Myners Review recommendations. It 
should be noted that they do not relate to this research study's core area of strategic asset 
allocation and so their inclusion is for background interest only. 
Given the trust structure of most UK pension funds, the performance of the trustees was a 
natural starting point and the discussion was informed by a survey of many trustees. Lack 
of training and knowledge, lack of time and lack of support were issues identified as 
major detractors to the achievement of their responsibilities. Hence the report's 
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recommendations were for trustees to consider their own effectiveness, to seek training or 
delegation so as to make decisions "... with the skill and care of someone familiar with 
the issues concerned" (p. 14). To support this, the sponsor company should provide 
sufficient in-house staff and should increase trustees' training. Good practice was set out 
to include the use of investment sub-committees and (where appropriate) to pay trustees. 
Decision-making by the pension fund trustees was viewed as three-fold: asset allocation; 
security selection; and choice of (followed by review of) advisers/consultants and fund 
managers. Asset allocation was further split between insured and self-administered 
schemes. Other than recognising this split, the insured scheme (i. e. scheme obligations 
and management being passed to an insurance company) was ignored for the rest of the 
review. Within the sphere of self-administered schemes, considerable emphasis was 
placed on the choice between peer group benchmarking, where the trustes delegate both 
asset allocation and security selection to the fund manager, and customised total fund 
benchmarks, where the trustees retain the asset allocation decision but delegate security 
selection. Recommendations in relation to decision-making were fairly limited, 
encompassing the need for explicit fund objectives linked to coherent fund managers' 
objectives, allied to clarity in who takes what decisions. 
As a separate area of debate, shareholder activism was considered. Pension fund trustees 
were recommended to "... incorporate the principle of the US Department of Labor 
Interpretative Bulletin into fund managers' mandates" (p. 93). In effect, to participate 
more in voting and other shareholder activities that could be seen as having an impact on 
the share's value. 
The following additional issues within the Review are included for comprehensiveness 
but do not have any direct bearing on the main thrust of this review. 
Defined contribution schemes came under scrutiny, resulting in recommendations such 
as: 
9 Collection by the National Association of Pension Funds of more comprehensive data 
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" Default options should have objectives and expected risks/returns 
" Investment options should offer a range reasonable for most scheme members 
" The full range of investment opportunities should be considered 
" Government should keep under close review the contributions and implications for 
retirement incomes. 
Within defined benefit schemes, the report was concerned over disputes relating to the 
ownership of surpluses, seeking clarity via requesting a review by the Law Commission. 
Additionally there was a recommendation for the tax rate on withdrawal of surplus to 
match the rate of corporation tax. 
The Minimum Funding Requirement was an important part of the Myners review and 
much of the issues were set out in an open letter in November 2000. The key 
recommendation that the MFR should be replaced has already been acted upon by the UK 
government and thus is of no direct relevance to this discussion. 
Private equity was a specific part of the Review's brief and the report naturally identified 
a variety of recommendations. These are not considered here as they relate to just that 
one asset class. 
Local authority pensions were examined but the Review did not identify "... any issues 
specific to local authority funds...., (nor) to suppose that the broader analysis in the 
report does not apply" (p. 199). Thus although there were local authority pension fund 
specific recommendations they fall in with the generality set out above. Finally, there was 
a set of recommendations on Principles, namely: 
" Pension funds' Statement of Principles should explain their adherence to the 
Review's principles 
" That legislation should follow if the industry does not adopt the principles voluntarily 
" The Government reviews the effectiveness of the principles in two years (i. e. 2003) 
" The planned review of personal investment products develop similar principles 
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1.2 Outline of the Thesis 
1.2.1 Format 
The structure of this thesis follows the recommended model as set out by Ryan, Scapens 
and Theobold (2002). This suggests generic sections and approximate sizes (for research 
based on empiricism) of: 
Introduction 5,000 words 
Literature Review 25,000 words 
Methodology 5,000 words 
Research Problem 5,000 words 
Method 5,000 words 
Results 25,000 words 
Conclusion 5,000 words. 
The Literature Review of Chapter 2 begins with consideration of the development of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis and associated tests. This initially is partly historical and as 
such tends to be descriptive rather than critical. The focus then shifts to a summary of 
forty years of testing for efficiency, including links with asset pricing models, serial 
correlation (as a test for weak form efficiency), event studies (the main methodology fcr 
the semi strong form), anomalies and the more recent approaches to testing. This includes 
consideration of the growth of behavioural finance. It is then extended to encompass 
efficiency type analysis that is linked to fund managers and the fund management process 
(for instance, active versus passive management and performance persistence) and then 
more specifically to strategic asset allocation, so as to give greater focus to the issues 
developed within the Myners Review. This is then contextualised by a brief examination 
of actual strategic allocations by high level asset classes. Finally the topic moves to a 
more sectoral view in the consideration of share indices and random walks as this forms 
the basis of much of the techniques used within the analysis. Little has been written on 
efficiency tests at the industry sector level, so this final section of the Literature Review 
is perforce somewhat limited. 
Chapter 3 on methodology locates the research approach within various research 
paradigms. The main areas of discussion are particularly those that relate to the 
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predominantly quantitative nature of this research, butthis chapter also includes more 
detailed consideration of the views of Hayek. 
His work helps to inform development of the research problem as set out in Chapter 4, 
(the Research Problem), the main area already having been briefly identified above. This 
sets out the centrality of market efficiency to this research, chiefly through the tests for 
randomness in indices' time series and its application to UK industrial sectors 
Similarly, this is combined with the relevant parts of the Literature Review to describe in 
Chapter 5 the appropriate research method and its attributes and critical problems. This 
includes an introduction to the use of the BDS test. Many statistical or econometric tests 
and techniques are well known and commonly used: these are taken as givens and little 
time or space is devoted to their explanation. For the BDS test the opportunity is taken to 
give greater explanation. 
The results section is in three separate parts. Chapter 6 begins the analysis by testing for 
stationarity and random walks. Chapter 7 seeks to estimate regression equations that 
describe the data generating processes for the various industrial sector share irrlices. 
Chapter 8 attempts to test the validity of these processes by means of forecasting out of 
sample values of the share indices' returns. 
Chapter 9 concludes, with discussion of findings, impact for the fund management sector 
and for government policy. Finally there is the identification of further research. 
1.2.2 Doctoral requirements 
The Quality Assurance Agency (2001) suggests level descriptors for undergraduate, 
masters and doctoral qualifications. For a Doctor of Philosophy the requirements are 
the creation and interpretation of new knowledge, through original research or 
other advanced scholarship, of a quality to satisfy peer review, extend the 
forefront of the discipline, and merit publication; 
a systematic acquisition and understanding of a substantial body of knowledge 
which is at the forefront of an academic discipline or area of professional practice; 
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the general ability to conceptualise, design and implement a project for the 
generation of new knowledge, applications or understanding at the forefront of the 
discipline, and to adjust the project design in the light of unforeseen problems; 
a detailed understanding of applicable techniques for research and advanced 
academic enquiry. (part 2) 
These are interpreted within the Bournemouth University Research Awards Handbook 
(2001) as, inter alia, a critical investigation and evaluation resulting in an independent 
and original contribution to knowledge. This manifests itself in this thesis in three main 
ways. Firstly, although there has been a vast amount of research over the last thirty years 
into market efficiency, there has been very little activity in relation to efficiency by 
industrial sector share indices. Typical studies have tended to be: a) at the individual 
company/share level, or b) aggregated up to a total market index, or c) non-sector specific 
groupings by various attributes such as size or return. The examination of efficiency by 
sector indices thus represents a new and original extension of an alreadydensely 
researched field. Secondly, many research papers on efficiency, particularly those 
concerned with weak form efficiency, test for randomness in the share index. The 
majority of these papers just concentrate on a pure random walk and so ignore random 
walks with drift or random walks with trend. The tests for randomness/stationarity within 
the analysis of this paper are applied to the full range of random walks with/without drift 
and/or trend. This is not new or innovative, but it is much more comprehensive than the 
majority of papers, even at a market level, let alone by sector. Thirdly, all possible data 
generating processes that are considered as being potential forecasting mechanisms for a 
share index are tested using the BDS test (covered in detail in later chapters). dis test is 
relatively new and although it has been used before in efficiency testing, does provide a 
third strand that makes the analysis an original contribution to knowledge. 
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CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Development of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
2.1.1 Outline 
This literature review is in six main sections. The first is solely based upon the efficient 
market hypothesis. This uses the work of Fama as its main thread, not because he was 
the sole arbiter on market efficiency, but merely as aformat to follow the development 
of the theory. Tests of market efficiency over the thirty five years of its existence are 
then considered, to examine its validity or (in extremis) its dogma. By necessity, this 
section also brings in the background to models of asset pricing. The third section looks 
at issues surrounding fund management in relation to market efficiency, which then 
logically progresses in section four to consideration of fund management's strategic asset 
allocation. To conceptualise this, section five gives some high level aggregations of 
descriptive data in relation to actual asset class allocations. Finally the sixth section looks 
at sector level research and tests of efficiency. 
2.1.2 Theory development 
It was Fama (1965) who introduced (or at least gave the name to) the concept of the 
efficient market hypothesis. Prior to this seminal paper, prices of investments were to a 
large extent seen to change as if following a random walk pattern. From the early work, 
such as Bachelier (1900, cited in Fama 1965) through to Samuelson (1965) the perceived 
wisdom developed towards the view of a random walk hypothesis. In this model, returns 
of assets (typically but not only equity) are assumed to be independent and to have 
constant distributions over time. Thus the return in any one period has no relationship 
with returns in prior periods. Commonly linked with this hypothesis was the use of the 
roulette wheel analogy, for instance Roberts (1959, cited in Fama, 1965) stated "If the 
stock market behaved like a mechanically imperfect roulette wheel, people would notice 
the imperfections and by acting on them, remove them" (p. 98). Similarly Elton and 
Gruber (1995) reason "Each period the wheel is spun, and the return for the next period 
is read from the wheel. The outcomes ... are unrelated through time... 
". (p. 405) 
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Samuelson's (1965) "enigma posed" (p. 41) concerned the fair game or martingale 
property of an unbiased random walk. In this type of approach, Xt (a stochastic variable 
such as American stock prices as used in his paper) follows such a random walk if 
Xt+i= 8 +Xt +Et+i (2.1) 
where 8 is a drift parameter ands t+l is an independent random error variable. 
If 8=0, then Xt follows a random walk without drift and Xt+l - Xt is a fair game. This 
can apply to both discrete and continuous variables, such that: 
Discrete Continuous 
P; >_ 0 and E pi =1f f(X) dx =1 
First moment µ= E(X) µ=EP; X; µ=fX f(X)dx 
Second moment 62 = Var(X) o2 =EP; X; 2 - (E(X))2 a2 = 
$X2 f(X) dx 
Within the properties of a random walk, the higher conditional moments (e. g. Var (X) ) 
are assumed to be statistically independent whereas with a martingale they are not so 
restricted. Thus 
Et (E t+i) =0 (2.2) 
and Et (E a. sb1 Xt) =r 62 
I a=b 
Lo I a#b 
(see Cuthbertson 1996) 
Given that the c are independent for t, then the conditional function for a#b applies to 
any linear and non-linear relation between E; a and Sb. Therefore in relation to 
Samuelson's reference, changes in stock prices are unpredictable but E(s t+i 
I Xt ), the 
conditional variance, may be a function of past prices if a martingale, but not if a random 
walk. In effect, in a fair game the information available at time t is of no use in achieving 
abnormal returns in time t+l. Unfortunately this approach was not extended to include 
the third version of random walks, namely a random walk with trend. 
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Although there are close links between a random walk model and the (weak form of the) 
efficient market hypothesis it was interesting that Roberts assumed stationarity in the 
time series of the returns (not directly necessary in Fama's work) and used the concept of 
arbitrage ("... people would notice.. "), again a factor not applicable to efficient markets. 
At the same time there was little or no focus on the role of information, a central part of 
the efficient market hypothesis. 
Informational efficiency in security prices as an economic construct thus began with 
Fama (1965) and is currently interpreted to mean that the price of a security reflects all 
information that is available. The first version of the hypothesis has however evolved 
through a series of expansions or more specific definitions. The original approach saw 
Fama (1965) define an efficient market such that: 
a situation where successive price changes are independent is consistent with the 
existence of an "efficient" market for securities, that is, a market where, given the 
available information, actual prices at every point in time represent very good 
estimates of intrinsic value. (p. 90) 
Thus at this stage there were no links with the various later `forms' and the main thrust 
was a review of the extent to which the history of prices or returns are an indicator of 
future returns. 
Fama's initial paper began with a review of random walks, specifically price change 
independence and the allied probability distributions. Perfect independence was rejected 
as not being "... an accurate description of reality... " (p. 35), but possibly a forerunner of 
the 1991 version of strong/weak efficiency with the dependent gain lost in transaction 
costs (see below). The more relaxed independence was seen as consistent with shares' 
intrinsic value such that s was viewed as noise. With regard to the probability 
distributions, this was described as the less important of the two factors (distribution and 
independence) with the main concerns being empirical evidence raising doubts about 
normality (or Gaussian) models resulting in support for Mandelbrot's (1963) hypothesis 
of empirical leptokurtosis. 
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In a paper submitted in 1966, but not published for another three years, Fama, French, 
Jensen and Roll (1969) (FFJR) reviewed efficiency in relation to new information. The 
research approach was based on event studies, specifically the returns of securities 
surrounding the announcement of share splits. In their conclusion FFJR stated: 
the information implications of a split are fully reflected in the price of a share at 
least by the end of the split month but most probably immediately after the 
announcement date. (p. 20) 
This focus shows how the emerging hypothesis had moved from the latent weak form of 
historic prices towards the semi-strong form and the impact of current information. Also 
evident is the importance or relevance of the `speed' with which the new information is 
assimilated. 
The use of speed of reaction to news as a definition of market efficiency did not detract 
from the earlier (1965) approach of independence and was seen as giving no scope for 
abnormal return "... unless of course, inside information ... 
is available" (p. 21). An 
allusion to the later forms of efficiency. 
In 1970 Fama reviewed the body of empirical work based upon the first version of the 
efficient market hypothesis and gave greater focus to the role of information. In particular 
it was assumed that an efficient market was one where security prices always fully 
reflected available information, at the same time making this conditional on there being 
no trading costs, costless information and all participants interpreting the information in 
the same way so as to reach the same conclusion. It was at this stage that the hypothesis 
was sub-divided (as posited by Roberts) into three nested sets: 
Weak form all information contained in historic prices is fully 
reflected in current prices 
Semi-strong form publicly available information is fully reflected in current 
prices 
Strong form all information (public and private) is fully reflected in 
current prices. 
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The review referred back to the original paper by stating that "a market in which prices 
always `fully reflect' available information is called `efficient'. " (p. 383). It that 
considered all the available evidence, collated into tests for weak, semi-strong and 
strong. As well as bringing the three nested forms into the hypothesis, the paper reached 
conclusions as to the strength of the efficiency. These were summarised by Famaas: 
weak form tests are the most voluminous, and it seems fair to say that the results 
are strongly in support. (p. 414) 
semi-strong form tests... have also supported the efficient markets hypothesis. (p. 
415) 
for the purpose of most investors the efficient markets model [strong form] seems 
a good first ... approximation to reality. 
(p. 416) 
Referring back to the earlier random walk models, expected return theories were 
described as 
E(EPp, t+i 
I (Dt) = pj, t (1 + E(Erj, t+i 
I ot)) 
where p is the security price 
r is the return, based on (pj, t+l - pj, t) / pj, t 
I is the information set 
E assumes randomness when viewed from t. 
(2.3) 
The expected return approach implied a fair game and is attendant properties and was 
then extended into a sub-martingale with the assumption 
v 
E(EPp, t+i (Dt) ý Pj, t 
(2.4) 
in effect that E(Erj, t+l 
I (Dt) >_ 0. This non-negativity implies that investment decisions 
linked to active trading cannot have abnormal expected profits. Future return 
independency (the random walk model) was stated as 
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E(Er1, t+i 
I (D) = E(Err, t+i) (2.5) 
thus distinguishing the martingale's distribution of is independence of t from that of a 
random walk where all the distribution is independent of Ot. 
Following criticism that the definition of market efficiency was tautological, Fama 
revised the hypothesis in 1976. The main change being that the market participants 
correctly use all available information. In effect the hypothesis was now in the three 
nested forms and assumed what is currently referred to as market rationality, i. e. that 
prices reflect fundamental values. 
In parallel to Fama's work on market efficiency, a growing body of work developed in 
the sphere of information economics. In his review of the development of stock market 
efficiency, Ball (1992) views this information economics as being distinct from Fama's 
hypothesis in terms of the users of the information. He emphasises that the efficient 
market hypothesis of Fama assumes that it is the market that is efficient in terms of the 
information set. The market is an entity. This distinguishes the hypothesis from the later 
information economics models in that they place the interpretation of data with the 
individual and then aggregate up to the market. 
By the mid 1970's the concept of market efficiency was well established and had a 
considerable body of empirical evidence supporting Fama's theory. At its core was the 
definition of an efficient capital market being one where security prices reflect all 
available information. This rather rigid definition is subdivided into the three forms of 
weak, semi-strong and strong, which in turn gives rise to concern over the speed at which 
the market assimilates new information. This definition of the theory has not changed 
greatly in subsequent years, although the focus has become more concerned with security 
returns instead of their absolute prices. Subsequent research has chiefly been concerned 
with testing the various forms, or seeking extensions to the concept of the original 
hypothesis. 
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By the end of the 1980's there had been a huge volume of papers on the efficient market 
hypothesis, the various asset pricing models and their relationship. Fama (1991) 
attempted to replicate his 1970 paper in terms of a review of the literature, recognising 
that "The literature is now so large that a full review is impossible... " (p. 1575). Market 
efficiency was simply taken to be that security prices fully reflect all available 
information, although a (different to the original) split posited two versions: 
strong: where information and trading costs are zero, and 
weaker: where prices reflect information to the point where the benefits do 
not exceed the costs. 
The evolution of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, albeit with extensive simplification, 
can thus be viewed as follows. 
Pre 1965 price changes viewed as 
1965 price changes viewed as 
and 
1969 price changes viewed as 
and 
independent over time (random 
walk) 
independent over time 
price = value 
independent over time 
price = value 
and rapid reaction to new information 
1970 price changes viewed as independent over time 
and price = value 
and rapid reaction to new information 
and three forms in nested sets 
1991 price changes viewed as "fully reflecting all available 
information" (strong or weaker) 
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2.2 Tests of Market Efficiency 
2.2.1 Efficiency and asset pricing 
Tests of market efficiency have been numerous and extensive, with much ofthe earlier 
work being generally supportive. Examples from this vast body of work include most of 
the factors linked to efficiency or the model against which efficiency is tested. The 
following are thus not the seminal papers in this arena, but merely a sample of the 
approach taken and the specific results or conclusions. 
If market efficiency is to be tested, then the main approach is to compare actual prices 
with expected prices (or actual returns with expected returns). The growth in research 
into market efficiency had coincided well with the development of new models for 
predicting expected returns. In addition to providing the base for tests of efficiency in the 
sense of speed of response to new information, there was also an expectation that they 
would provide a test of market rationality in that any successful model should set 
expected returns in step with economic fundamentals. The most common of the models 
used in tests of market efficiency is that of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
developed independently by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). 
The Sharpe-Lintner model is a form of general equilibrium relationship in the market- 
place and although the original version had many unrealistic assumptions it has evolved 
over the years to encompass a variety of non-standard forms that attempt to reduce the 
assumptions and make the model more realistic. Many empirical tests have taken place 
with the model, for instance Miller and Scholes (1972) tested bias, nonlinearity, 
heteroskedasticity, errors in beta measurement and skewness in return distribution. Black 
et al (1972) undertook time-series and cross-sectional tests. Gibbons (1985) tested for the 
non-linear restrictions, as did Stambaugh (1982). Some of the findings rejected aspects 
of the model whilst others gave varied levels of support. Against this background Roll 
(1977) argued that the model was not testable in that the tests are solely tests of the 
researcher's market proxy. 
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The CAPM in its basic (unconditional) form assumes that rational investors hold mean- 
variance efficient portfolios and that the relationship between risk and return is: 
E(RU) = RF + ßi(E(RM) - RF) (2.6) 
where E(R; ) is the expected return of security/portfolio i and is a linear function of the 
risk free rate RF , the security's/portfolio's 
beta ß; and the excess return of the market 
over the risk free rate (E(RM) - RF). The beta being the slope of the linear regression line 
using time series data: 
Rat = ao + Pi RMt + it (2.7) 
The model is more commonly expressed using risk premia such that: 
E(rl) = ßiE(rM) (2.8) 
where r are the excess returns for security/portfolio i and the market. The conditional 
form expresses the basic risk/return relationship using risk premiums as: 
E(rit(Ot-i) = Ril(Dt-i(E(rMt) V(Dt-1) (2.9) 
with E(rj(Dt_1) the expectation (of any of the variables) conditional on data/information 
available at time t- 1. Thus the main difference from the unconditional model being the 
time-varying nature of the risk premium. 
Extensions to the original asset pricing model are numerous. One such enhancement is 
the two factor model of O'Brien and Dolde (2000), where the two factors are the global 
market portfolio and a currency index. This is an extension of a global CAPM, a single 
factor model criticised for not pricing systematic exposure to exchange rates. Similarly 
it 
goes further than an international CAPM which typically prices exchange rate exposure 
by utilising all the varying cross rates. O'Brien and Dolde suggest a two 
factor 
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international CAPM to circumvent the GCAPM and ICAPM problems. Their 
unconditional risk premium form is: 
E(RU)- r= Rim(E(Rm) - r) + ßýXCECRX) - r) (2.10) 
where expected returns are nominal returns in the pricing currency, r is the nominal risk 
free rate, the betas are bivariate regression coefficients of R; versus Rm (return on the 
unhedged global market portfolio) and RX (return on an index of currency deposits and 
the change in the currency value relative to the pricing currency) and R} is the return on 
asset i including currency change. 
Many tests of market efficiency attempt to compare actual returns with a theoretical 
return as suggested by an asset pricing model. Unfortunately the joint test problem 
means that any results that may indicate lack ofefficiency could instead be put down to 
the bad model problem. This has resulted in a plethora of attempts to improve the pricing 
models. The Journal of Finance took advantage of the millennium to review the status of 
some of the central areas of finance theory and the contribution of Campbell (2000) on 
asset pricing is a good summary of the (then) situation. Campbell's extensive paper can 
be broken down into various sections, namely the stochastic discount factor, factor 
structure, cash flows, consumption and portfolio choice, equilibrium models and other 
issues. It is not the intention of this literature review to consider asset pricing in the same 
level of detail as market efficiency, but their inter-relationship is such that some 
consideration should be given. Campbell's review provides a useful vehicle for this, 
although not all of his above listed sections will be included. 
The context of asset pricing is introduced with the emphasis on the impact of uncertainty 
on investors' behaviour and stock prices. Thus the link with market efficiency is 
immediately established. Against this, Campbell feels that "... the evidence for 
predictability (of aggregate stock returns) survives at reasonable if not overwhelming 
levels of statistical significance" (p. 1523). His view being that, at least in terms of the 
US market, the majority of financial economists accept a predictable element in returns. 
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This ties in with weak form autocorrelation tests of EMH which confusingly is not that 
part of efficiency tested using asset pricing models. The basic factor model is credited to 
Sharpe and Lintner (op cit), with investors showing rational expectations, being 
homogeneous mean-variance optimisers and with a linear beta relationship. As with 
efficient markets, the early empirical work was broadly supportive of CAPM, although it 
is interesting that the anomalies identified by Campbell are in effect the same as those for 
EMH. These include the size effect, the value effect, failure to set the correct market 
proxy and time effects. 
Whilst some if not all of the anomalies can be laid at the door of CAPM it is argued by 
Campbell that they do not provide "genuine evidence against a broader rational model in 
which there are multiple risk factors" (p. 1528). There have been many post 
Sharpe/Linter models put forward to cope with the underlying assumptions (eg with tax, 
with friction, conditional versus unconditional, international, etc) and similarly there are 
many multi-factor models. Campbell focuses on Fama and French (1996) and theirthree- 
factor model (see below). An alternative view put forward is that the anomalies are not a 
function of a risk factor omitted from the model, but instead are mistakes that "disappear 
once market participants are aware of them" (p. 1528). 
Three asset pricing puzzles are addressed by Campbell in relation to asset pricing 
models, although yet again these can also be viewed as market efficiency puzzles. The 
equity premium puzzle whereby market return is too high to be explained by an asset 
pricing model. To compensate for this, it has to be assumed that risk aversion at a market 
level must be higher than has been assumed in recent years. The market volatility puzzle, 
whereby market volatility is too high to be explained by the asset pricing model. 
There is 
no obvious solution to this, with Campbell concluding that "volatility of stock returns 
must be explained by changes in the equity premium itself' (p. 1545). 
Finally the risk- 
ftee rate puzzle whereby elasticity of inter-temporal substitution 
(EIS) is very low, 
resulting in a theoretical high real rate of interest. To compensate, 
it is argued that high 
risk aversion resulting from the equity premium puzzle allows the EIS to move away 
from an equilibrium value. 
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A more recent and UK-specific consideration of the Capital Asset Pricing Model using 
ARCH was undertaken by Morelli (2003). Both unconditional and conditional versions 
of the model were tested using a UK data set for the period 1980 to 1999. The main 
findings were a negative but not statistically significant coefficient on average market 
premium when using unconditional betas and a positive but not statistically significant 
coefficient when using conditional betas. Years of high market volatility when viewed in 
isolation produced statistically significant positive risk premia. The general conclusion 
being a "failure to accept the CAPM (although) the ... model... 
has value in periods of 
relatively high volatility" (p. 222). 
Pastor (2000) put asset pricing models in a Bayesian context, assuming that investors 
facing portfolio selection choices have "a certain belief in an asset pricing model. In the 
extreme cases of complete confidence and complete scepticism about the model" (p. 
207). These beliefs effect the optimal allocations and, as argued by Pastor, ha\e less 
extreme values. This applies particularly to home country bias (see later) but is less 
important in relation to the Fama and French three factor model (also see later). Prior 
beliefs also have a resonance with behavioural finance, so Pastor's model could be 
viewed as integrating many facets of asset pricing puzzles. 
In parallel to Campbell's millennium review of asset pricing, an equivalent consideration 
of continuous time methods was undertaken by Sundaresan (2000). This wide-ranging 
paper chiefly addressed derivatives but did include consideration of asset pricing, 
including Merton's (1973) Intertemporal CAPM. The main efficiency implication being 
that "dynamic consumption-portfolio behaviour (indicate) empirical evidence that equity 
returns show long-term memory" (p. 1571). 
Much of the earlier literature on efficiency and asset pricing assumes that returns are 
normally distributed. A current practitioner-based approach making this assumption is 
the use of risk-based metrics such as Value at Risk (VaR). In fact its acceptance is 
exemplified by the use of VaR in the Basle Accord for capital adequacy. Against this is 
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empirical evidence of non normality from the earliest days of modern portfolio theory 
such as Mandelbrot (1963) through to Harris and Kucukozmen (2001). The latter paper 
argues that long time horizons seem to approximate to a normal distribution but that in 
the short to medium term there is strong evidence of leptokurtosis and skewness. Their 
approach is to model returns using a wide range of probability density functions, 
including a review of Paretian, student t, Box-Tiao, logistic, Poisson and chiefly 
exponential generalised beta and skewed generalised-t. 
Recent research in this field such as Hsia et al (2000) or (say) Faff et al (2000) casts 
doubt on such models. For instance, Faff et al , using UK data, conclude that "... market 
model betas are unstable and systemically time-varying" (p. 551). If market model betas 
are unstable then much of the received wisdom on asset pricing is suspect. 
2.2.2 Predictability and serial correlation 
The original tests for weak form efficiency were based on serial correlation. This is still 
utilised, either as tests of the efficiency hypothesis itself, or as applied by Laurence et al 
(1997) as tests of specific markets, with the underlying assumption that emerging 
markets are not efficient, but that with growth and greater international exposure, 
efficiency will increase. Laurence et al test the four stock exchanges in China from 1993 
to 1996 and find evidence of significant serial correlation in all four of the markets. The 
conclusions are that the Chinese markets are not weak form efficient, that opportunity 
for abnormal gain exists , 
but that over the review period efficiency was increasing, with 
the suggestion that "... the four Chinese markets are gradually being integrated into the 
global economy" (p. 306). 
Likewise there have been many tests for randomness in share prices. Typical (but fairly 
recent) is the work of Kavussanos and Dockery (2001) who use a cross section of prices 
from the Athens Stock Exchange to test for predictability. If efficient there should be no 
pattern "and prices should follow a random walk process, or at least be a martingale" (p. 
575). They establish that prices are not stationary, whereas returns are, but are unable to 
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confirm that the market is efficient, possibly caused by low liquidity and limited 
transparency in the market. 
Weak form efficiency is also tested by examination of trading rules. As an example, 
Goodacre et al (1999) examine the UK market looking at technical analysis methods 
such as volume, relative strength, moving averages and particularly the CRISMA trading 
rule (a filter system, based on Cumulative volume RelatIve Strength Moving Average). 
Using the FTSE 350 index over 1988 to 1996, extracts from their conclusions strongly 
support the concept of Fama's 1991 definition of weekly efficient in that: 
in general, the UK results were not impressive.... Overall, the promise of the 
CRISMA trading rule does not seem to be fulfilled in the UK market.... any 
conclusions reached on the efficacy of technical analysis, or on weak form 
market efficiency, based on US data needs careful replication using local data 
before such conclusions can be considered valid in the UK. (p. 466) 
Thus, Goodacre et al give a moderately current and firm support of the UK market being 
weakly efficient. 
One corollary of market efficiency is that volatility linked to news should exist but not to 
any overly significant extent. Existence of high levels of volatility being argued as a 
rejection of EMH. At one extreme can be seen consideration of the market crash of 1987. 
For instance Cheung (2000) argued that "... US stock volatility played a leading role in 
the transmission of stock volatility to other major stock markets... " (p. 771). This was an 
extension of numerous papers on the crash, concerned with causality tests and New York 
stock market share price spillover. At a more prosaic level, Hauser and Levy (1998) 
show that for the Tel Aviv stock exchange "... stock prices overreact to new information 
and noise trading... " (p. 133). 
A family of tests are based on the rational valuation formula. Typical of this is 
Cuthbertson et al (1997) who use VAR methodology to test for return predictability. 
Using a variety of models applied to UK data over much of the twentieth century they 
reject efficiency for the period 1918 to 1993 for some models but note that "the CAPM 
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model, (sic)... gave results that are closer to efficiency" (p. 1003). The inefficiencies, 
where they were identified, were attributed to short-termism. 
2.2.3 Event studies 
Semi-strong tests are normally concerned either with event studies or the performance of 
analysts. As an example, Barber et al (2001) considered analysts' recommendations over 
the period 1986 to 1996 for the American market and documented "... an abnormal gross 
return of 75 basis points per month... " (p. 533). Three possible arguments were put 
forward for this. Firstly, Fama's concept of data snooping, although they felt strongly 
that the robustness of their results precluded this. Secondly, the bad model reason was 
rejected (albeit on logical rather than empirical grounds) as it would imply that 
recommended companies were riskier than others. Thirdly, and their most preferred 
reason, that the market is semi-strong inefficient. In common with many of these types of 
tests the abnormal returns were before trading costs, but after adjustment for this none of 
their strategies linked to analysts' advice generated an abnormal net return reliably 
greater than zero. This was reflected by Fama in his 1991 review when the nested sets of 
three forms were to an extent replaced by the strong version of the market efficiency 
hypothesis such that security prices fully reflect all available information with zex 
information and trading costs. This is in contrast to the weaker form whereby "... prices 
reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information... do 
not exceed the marginal costs" (p. 1575). 
Closely linked to event studies is the overreaction hypothesis whereby new information 
(e. g. positive) causes share prices to overshoot a new equilibrium level due to optimism 
by market participants. This then results in a (hypothesised) predictable price reversal. 
This was tested for UK data by Dissanaike (1997), on the basis that "if investors 
routinely overreact to news, past stock market losers should become winners, and past 
winners should become losers" (p. 43). The conclusion did seem to suggest an anomaly 
which "adds to the growing body of evidence that the EMH plus CAPM joint hypothesis 
is, at best, a highly simplified representation of the working of equity markets". (p. 43). 
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A fairly recent and comprehensive review of event studies as a test of semi strong 
efficiency is that of Binder (1998). This summary of event study methodology covered 
the period 1969 to 1998 and is more concerned with the validity of the process than the 
results of the research. Binder's conclusion is that 
Regardless of which variant of the methodology is employed, it is expected that 
the event study, given its demonstrated statistical power and broad applicability, 
will continue in the future to be widely used in business and economics 
research... (p. 126) 
2.2.4 Anomalies 
Whilst much of the more recent research has had a propensity to cast doubt on market 
efficiency, there have been instances of taking the concept further rather than merely 
setting out to disprove the hypothesis. As an example, Brown et al (1988) formulated the 
Uncertain Information Hypothesis (UIH) in relation to the market's over-reaction to 
news. If markets do over-react to news then this would be an extension to the excessive 
volatility refutation of market efficiency. The UIH instead argues that initial response to 
news is based on the fact that the ultimate effect on prices of that news cannot be 
immediately determined. Thus for (say) bad news, prices will fall to reflect both the bad 
news and the increase in risk caused by extra uncertainty. As the company develops a 
strategy to cope with the event the uncertainty reduces and some of the price fall is 
recovered. 
A more recent and UK based use of the Overreaction Hypothesis is that of Clare and 
Thomas (1995) who follow the same methods as the original US paper by DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985). Their results were less clear cut than the US paper, such that "the 
difference in performance [winners versus losers] is probably insignificant" (p. 971). 
Similarly, doubt has been cast on market efficiency due to the size effect (particularly 
when linked to the January effect). Various imperfect capital market theories have been 
proposed to explain asymmetries. For instance, Perez-Quiros and Timmermann (2000) 
suggest that "... firm size matters in determining stock returns because it acts as a proxy 
for some unobserved, omitted risk factor" (p. 1230). In their approach small firm risk 
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asymmetries are generated in times of recession and expansion. The volatility of the 
returns are sensitive to interest rate changes to a much greater extent that that of larger 
firms. Whether this is evidence of failure of market efficiency is subject to debate, but 
Perez-Quiros and Timmermann discuss the various asymmetry models as an implication 
of capital market imperfections. A fairly recent review of the size effect in he UK is 
Dissanaike's (2002) study who noted that: 
... 
in summary, although we have found a size effect within the FT500 sample 
and although it tended to be higher in the same periods when the winner-loser 
effect was higher, it was still very much smaller than the winner-loser effect. 
Further, the size effect is not, overall, significant at the 5% level... (p. 143) 
The weekend effect mentioned above has also been subject to much research. Whilst this 
and other time effects have been regularly quoted as examples of non-efficiency this 
conclusion is not always clear cut. For instance Coutts and Hayes (1999) note that little 
research has been done in relation to the UK market and so test the FT30 index over the 
period 1987 to 1994, finding some evidence of a weekend effect, partly explained by a 
stock exchange settlement effect, but confirming earlier research that transaction costs as 
low as 0.5% would outweigh any benefits from the effect. Their conclusion is that there 
is no profitable strategy linked to the UK weekend effect and that "this conclusion is of 
course entirely consistent with the notion of market efficiency" (p. 70). Recent 
equivalent work on American markets has also identified a `reverse' weekend effect, e. g. 
Brusa et al (2000) who dispute the stability of the anomaly. 
Another common possible temporal indicator of market inefficiency is the January 
effect. Early research papers often attributed this to a tax selling hypothesis, but Ackert 
and Athanassakos (2000) who confirm existence of the January effect suggest that it is 
less to do with size (an earlier theory) than visibility with "highly-followed firms 
earn(ing) negative abnormal returns" (p. 476). Their concept of visibility is taken to be 
more important than the more normal suggestion of the size effect driving the January, in 
that small firms are less visible than large ones. 
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Speed of market response to news is considered by Eldridge et al (2001) with the 
assumption that cash and futures markets should react simultaneously to news. They 
refer to early work of this type indicating lags of up to forty minutes between the two 
markets, whereas with market efficiency there should be no lead or lag by either market. 
Using non-linear Granger causality tests, albeit only applied to the Australian merket, 
they find that there is: 
no significant support for the need to account for non-linear effects (beyond the 
second order moment condition) in order to explain any causality. The EMH, an 
assumption that underlies the Cost of Carry model, seems appropriate once first 
and second order moment effects are accounted for. (p. 1) 
2.2.5 Recent developments in testing 
Typical of the many tests of weak form efficiency is Al-Loughani and Chappell (1997) 
who test the time series for IID (independent and identically distributed) as residuals 
should be random variables. Using Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) applied to the FTSE 30 share index over the period 1983 to 
1989 they conclude that "the weak form of the efficient markets hypothesis is certainly 
not valid" (p. 176). Unfortunately, like many of the tests on efficiency, the apparently 
clear conclusions are in fact not so. In a comment on this particular approach Milionis 
and Moschos (2000) agree that the 1997 paper suggests thatthe random walk hypothesis 
be rejected, but argue that the weak form of market efficiency cannot be rejected. 
A similar approach based on UK and US evidence was produced by Groenewold and 
Fraser (2001). This again tested the IID-normal assumption in relation to unconditional 
CAPM (the original model) and the conditional CAPM, where the market portfolio is not 
assumed to be observable, hence to an extent "removing the problem of joint tests of the 
model and the chosen proxy" (p. 776). Their conclusions were less rigid/more pragmatic 
than those discussed above, with the simple observations that a) the sensitivity of IID- 
normal tests of asset pricing models does (sometimes to a large extent) affect probability 
values, ie transgressing the normality assumption, and b) there was greater variation in 
the testing when applied to US data compared to UK data. 
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Yet another strand of efficiency and/or market tests is based upon return reversal or 
mean reversal. A much cited paper by Chelley-Steeley (2001) examined whether UK 
portfolio returns mirrored the US experience where up to 25% of monthly variation 
could be linked to the previous month's return behaviour. On a month by month basis the 
autocorrelations allowed up to 9% of portfolio variation to be predicted. If the months 
were broken down so that greater weighting could be given to the later (most recent) 
weeks, then the predictable component rose to 15%. 
Arnold and Baker (2003) criticise the "... US-centredness ... " (p. 3) of much of the mean 
reversion work which shows strong empirical evidence of reversal (the overreaction 
effect) in US exchanges. Their study of overreaction is also based upon UK shares over 
the period 1975 to 2001 and has numerous conclusions. Firstly they claim support to the 
view that "there are systematic valuation errors in the (London) stock market caused by 
investor overreaction" (p. 19). Secondly that there is evidence of the size effect, but that 
this is not the cause of the return reversal and thirdly that risk is not the cause of the 
overreaction. In considering possible causes, they regard the outcome as "... a serious 
challenge to the efficient markets advocates (and that) the phenomena ... seems to 
lend 
more support to the behavioural finance school of thought" (p. 21). 
The 1990's saw a parallel stream of research developing, where attention switched away 
from efficiency tests, with the anomalies instead being a function of the asset pricing 
model. Typical of this was Fama and French with a series of papers over the period 
1992-1996. A fairly recent summary of this approach was Fama and French (1996) 
where many of the anomalies were, in their opinion, explained by a three factor asset 
pricing model. Specifically: 
R; -Rf=a; +b; (RM-Rf)+s; SMB+h1HML+EI (2.11) 
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where R; - Rf is the typical excess return over the risk free rate, a; is the intercept (in 
their analysis not significantly different from zero), b (RM - Rf) is the normal single 
component of CAPM and s and h are the factor sensitivities of SMB and HML. The two 
factors are the difference between the returns of a portfolio of small stocks and a 
portfolio of large stocks (i. e. Small Minus Big), to capture the size effect, and the 
difference between the returns of a portfolio of high book to market stocks and a 
portfolio of low book to market stocks (i. e. High Minus Low). Despite numerous 
contrary papers Fama and French conclude that the model explains returns and also 
copes with return reversal in the long term. They admit however that the model fails to 
explain short term return reversal. 
A UK based application of the Fama and French three factor model by Lee, Liu and 
Strong (2003) produced contrary results, concluding with "... we clearly reject the 
hypothesis that the Fama-French model completely explains the cross-sectional return 
regularities examined... (such that) the factor explanation cannot fully explain the size or 
book-to-market premiums" (p. 28). This UK test has similarly been performed on data 
for a variety of other countries, many of which find equal lack of explanäion. Like many 
of the more recent papers on asset pricing (and thus market efficiency), there is a 
concluding allusion to lack of investor rationality and a suggestion of behaviour induced 
systematic biases. 
A fairly current history of market efficiency is provided by Dimson and Mussavian 
(1998) which briefly visits many of the issues discussed so far. In their conclusion they 
observe that: 
The efficient market hypothesis is simple in principle, but remains elusive, .. 
At 
became the dominant paradigm in finance during the 1970s,.... (despite) an 
onslaught against EMI-I... it is remarkably hard to profit from even the most 
extreme violations of market efficiency. (It) continues to provide a framework 
that is widely used by financial economists. (p. 100) 
The question Dimson and Mussavin address is to a large extent spurious as nowhere is 
the suggestion made that efficiency is bi-polar. In such a world, the existence of one 
successful test showing inefficiency would result in the conclusion that the hypothesis 
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does not hold. A review of finance text books shows that market efficiency as described 
by the EMH is still current in the academic community and regarded as an important 
component for the syllabus of finance courses. 
It is true that many tests have identified flaws based on possible instances of excess 
volatility, non-normality of distributions of returns, asymmetry of return, serial 
correlation, speed of response, lack of conforming with fundamentals. Likewise, many 
alternative hypotheses have been proposed, including informational economics, 
behaviour theory and imperfect capital market theories. Cuthbertson (1996) concludes a 
review of market efficiency and its tests by stating that 
In general, failure of the EMH in empirical tests may be due either to a fälure of 
informational efficiency (RE) or an inappropriate choice of the model for 
equilibrium returns or simply that the EMU does not hold in the `real world'. 
(p. 114) 
In effect, he come to no single conclusion. Ball (1998) is similarly ambivalent and in 
answering the question are stock markets efficient, concludes "yes and no" (p. 15). He 
argues that EMI is like all theories in that they are always in themselves imperfect and 
limited, but against that, it has allowed "... insights into stock price behaviour that were 
previously unimaginable" (p. 15). A survey of empirical evidence concentrating on 
stock and foreign exchange markets (Beechey et al 2000) is slightly less ambivalent, but 
with a similar approach to Ball. In concluding they state that "the efficient market is 
almost certainly the right place to start when thinking about asset price formation" (p. 
23). This is then tempered in that the EMH... 
cannot explain some important and worrying features of asset market behaviour. 
More importantly for the wider goal of efficient resource allocation, financial 
market prices appear at times to be subject to substantial misalignments, which 
can persist for extended periods of time. (p. i) 
A more extreme position is taken by Ryan et al (2002). In this text the focus is on 
research methodologies generally and Kuhn's relativism specifically, but they use EMH 
as an example. The discussion is about how replication of earlier experiments is used 
continuously to monitor what should be in or removed from "... the accepted canon of 
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scientific knowledge" (p. 25). They consider that the number of papers in the late 
nineteen eighties which identified flaws with capital market efficiency were sufficient to 
throw a shadow of doubt over the efficiency hypothesis such that its rejection was 
"... confirmed to the satisfaction of most scholars working in the field" (p. 25). 
If the definition of market efficiency is taken to be that prices fully reflect all available 
information, then there can be no doubt that the hypothesis has been and continues to be 
of great value to our understanding of finance and the capital marketplace. This despite 
the fact that certain tests have, and no doubt will continue to cast doubt on the total 
validity of EMH as set out above. Much of the inefficiency evidence is in itself suspect 
due to the bad model problem, flawed methodology or just our flawed understanding of 
asset prices. Conversely, there is much evidence that would imply similar flaws in the 
concept of efficiency. This does not mean that the hypothesis is no longer of use, for as 
Ball (1992) concludes: 
It is helpful to distinguish the statement `for some purposes, it is useful to 
describe the market is efficient' from the statement `the market is efficient', even 
though the latter sometimes is used as shorthand for the former. (p. 34) 
2.2.6 Behavioural finance 
One of the strands of tests or arguments against efficiency has been collected under the 
generic title of behavioural finance. It is not the intention of this literature review to 
consider this field in depth, but its growth and its acceptance in some areas is such that it 
cannot be ignored. Much of the work is based around investor rationality and one 
example is that of Odean (1998). In a survey of US trading records from a large 
brokerage house Odean uses Kahnemann and Tversky's (1979) disposition effect on 
investors sales of equities. The disposition effect is part of Prospect Theory and assumes 
an S-shaped utility function (but on gains and losses rather than absolute wealth) 
whereby the curve is concave for the utility of gains but convex for the utility of losses. 
Odean claims that based on his analysis investors do exhibit the disposition effect, in that 
they tend to sell winners, i. e. the shares that have achieved gains since purclase, but are 
reluctant to realise losses on their losers, i. e. the shares that show a loss since purchase. 
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This pattern exists for most of the year, but for December there is no disposition effect, 
suggesting that "tax-motivated selling prevails" (p. 1797). Although not included in the 
analysis, the disposition effect is also apparent in property (Case and Shiller, 1988). 
Odean suggests that the disposition effect in equity trades can have a variety of 
implications (although it is recognised that the analysis was only performed on 
individual investors) in that: 
(disposition effects)... would appear inconsistent with mean reversion,... would 
stabilise falling prices below a reference point... and would slow down price 
rises above a reference point. (p. 1795) 
At the professional investor level, De Bondt and Forbes (1999) examine UK analysts' 
forecasts, finding evidence mirroring US experience (Aronson, 1992, Devenow and 
Welch, 1996) of optimism, overreaction and herding. Their findings show that earnings 
are over-estimated by 17% and that this was most pronounced during 1991 to 1993 (a 
period of UK economic recession). In addition "... the dispersion and range of forecasted 
earnings is alarmingly small given the typical magnitude of the forecast errors" (p. 158). 
It is suggested that the conformist view is predicated on regret theory (Janis and Mann, 
1977) where the need to conform increases at times of ambiguous situations. 
Irrational optimism or irrational exuberance is seen by Dimson et al (2003) as having 
petered out. Set against the bear market of the first three years of this millennium they 
point out that some investors (including many institutions) are still optimistic about long 
run equity returns, an optimism that is irrational. Whilst recognising that equities are an 
important part of any well diversified portfolio, their advice is that real returns over the 
last century were lower than normally considered and should not be viewed as a safe 
investment. 
Yet another behavioural theory is suggested by Daniel et al (1998) in that attribution 
theory could suggest cognitive dissonance. The hypothesis being that an individual will 
reject information that disagrees with their own interpretations/decisions and similarly 
will regard supporting information as validation of their interpretations/decisions. This, 
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referred to as biased self-attribution, is argued as being a cause "of short run momentum 
and long term reversals" (p. 1842). This biased self-attribution is linked to 
overconfidence to produce a model that they argue "suggests a positive relationship 
across international markets between the strength of the momentum effect and that of 
post-earnings announcement drift" (p. 1865). 
Wagner (2001) attempts to combine behavioural theory with portfolio selection, 
contrasting behavioural choices with "the concept of rational portfolio selection under 
uncertainty" (p. 55). Regret Theory is utilised to specify a utility function whereby actual 
return outcomes are compared with the alternative foregone choice; regret being 
experienced when the former is less than the latter. In order to try and obviate this 
possible distress, the portfolio selection process may become flawed, resulting in sub- 
optimal decisions! 
Much of the work on behavioural finance is pulled together by Shleifer (2000). Although 
most of the text addresses issues such as those discussed above, they are grounded in his 
discussion of three strands of conceptual flaws in financial market efficiency, namely 
rationality, random irrationality and arbitrage. Investor rationality is challenged in three 
ways. Firstly, investors' attitude to risk is not rational as they do not "... follow the 
precepts of von Neumann-Morgenstern rationality" (p. 11), hence the earlier behavioural 
finance use of prospect theory. Secondly is the individuals' conscious or unconscious 
systematic rejection of the rules of probability generally and Bayes' rule particularly. 
Thirdly the way individuals make different decisions, depending on how a problem is 
presented to them. These irrational investors are thus labelled as noise traders or 
unsophisticated or as basing beliefs on heuristics and as such following sentiment. 
The second strand of Shleifer's flaws is to dismiss the concept that although there may 
be irrational behaviour, this tends to be random, such that A's irrational beliefs will be 
compensated by B's equal and opposite irrational belief. Unsophisticated investors are 
viewed as not random but highly correlated in their irrationality. They behave socially 
(Shiller, 1984) and trade using `common judgement errors' to such an extent that there is 
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no scope for A's error to be offset by that of B's. The initial supposition is that it is the 
non-professional investor who is irrational, but the argument extends to assume that 
professional investors are also susceptible to human failings. Hence the existence of 
herding and other indications of irrationality, such that "in some situations, they [the 
professional investors] may be the relevant noise traders" (p 13). 
Finally the third strand of serious flaws is discussed, namely that of arbitrage. It is argued 
that arbitrage could counteract the irrationality and the herding problems of efficiency, 
but against this are put a variety of factors. Not the least of these is that arbitrage 
opportunities do not always exist, so that "broad classes do not have substitute portfolios, 
and are therefore ... mispriced" (p. 13). Similarly, even when there are arbitrage 
opportunities, there still remains fundamental risk. In addition, a high level of 
irrationality in the market can generate noise trader risk which cannot be arbitraged 
away. Shleifer's conclusion is rejected in a recent paper by Coval and Shumway (2005) 
who undertook a highly detailed analysis of proprietary traders at the Chicago Board of 
Trade. Whilst they did find evidence of irrationality they also concluded that "any price 
impact resulting from traders' behavioural biases dissipates extremely quickly..... (such 
that) limits to arbitrage do not appear to delay the elimination of behaviourally indited 
mispricing" (p. 33). 
A superficial view of investor irrationality could be that noise traders are naive or 
uninformed or uneducated. One strand of research questions this and is typified by Jenter 
(2005). Jenter examines the trading by top managers in their own company's shares: a 
group of investors who should be financially literate, rational and well informed. 
Interestingly he "finds little evidence that managers use valid inside information in their 
trades" (p. 1906) and that, after adjustment for size and book to market, the educated and 
informed manager achieves excess returns that "are indistinguishable from zero" (p. 
1906). Whilst this could be seen as obliquely supportive of market efficiency, it does not 
support market rationality. Rather, the conclusion that Jenter draws is that managers have 
contrarian views, that their views are not randomly distributed and that they suffer from a 
perception of mispricing. 
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Whilst Jenter (2005) felt that informed investors can suffer from irrationality, Elton et al 
(2004) set out to test the rationality of investors purchasing one of the most simple 
investments, S&P index funds; a group of products so similar that they can be viewed as 
a commodity. They identified various predictors for the funds that (in their assumption) 
would be used by rational and informed investors to select the best fund, but found that 
"a large amount of new cash goes to the poorest performing funds" (p. 286). Their 
observation was that decisions were based on the marketing activities of the funds, rather 
than their historic performance, tracking error or expenses. The conclusion to this was 
that: 
Much of the financial and economic literature assumes the law of one price holds. 
As we show in this paper, in markets where arbitrage is not available, the law of 
one price need not hold. It will only hold if all investors are rational. (p. 286). 
A delightful summary of one view (or rather five views) of the (then) state of market 
efficiency took place at the 2001 European Financial Management Association 
Roundtable Discussion on "The Rationality of Capital Markets" (Doukas, 2002). The 
discussion started with the recognition that numerous recent papers had cast doubt on 
market efficiency, (termed by the panel as the rational market hypothesis) and then 
opened the debate to Ray Ball (RB), Kent Daniel (KD), Kenneth French (KF), Stephen 
Ross (SR) and Jay Shanken (JS). 
RB's contribution was put in the context of Hayekian economics, in that no single person 
can obtain and analyse all the information relating to a company that is embedded in its 
share price. In effect contrasting rational liberalism, "the belief in the ability of 
individuals to rationally determine outcomes" (p. 230) with a more Hayekian view that 
"order arises from spontaneous unplanned actions of individuals" (p. 231). When 
applied to efficiency he returned to the issues he addressed in 1992 (op cit), claiming that 
in the last few years "a whole generation has come... to confuse this model of efficiency 
(i. e. EMH) with the concept of an efficient market" (p. 231). As such he was restating his 
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earlier opinion that despite anomalies and despite our ignorance of how aggregation 
processes work, the notion of efficient markets "... has a lot going for it" (p. 232). 
Using the recent internet valuations as an example KD was of the opinion that many of 
the identified anomalies were in fact mistakes. The difference being that anomalies 
persist but that mistakes either are transient or are not capable of an arbitrage opportunity 
so as to make abnormal return. The mistakes he alluded to were seen as being generated 
by `irrational capital' or rather investors who act in an irrational manner. The lack of 
arbitrage and the lack of persistence, he argued, was such as to keep the market efficient 
as there is also sufficient `rational capital'. This fairly extreme view was tempered by the 
recognition that "... there is a lot more irrational money out there than there is 
rational,... that there are some profit opportunities out there probably, but they are very, 
very hard to find" (p. 232). 
KF's view of behavioural finance was that "it is more about behaviour than it is finance" 
(p. 235). He also introduced a light-hearted survey where observers' views of the level of 
efficiency can be subjectively measured on a scale of 100 (all prices are always right) to 
0 (all prices are always wrong). He placed himself at 87.3 and estimated Fama at 91 or 
92. Despite accepting a rather spuriously accurate 12.7% inefficiency he agreed with KD 
in that in trying to take advantage of this, it would still be "an incredibly hard thing to 
do" (p. 235). This was backed up by reference to the Japanese market, where traders 
knew (were of the opinion) that prices were too high, but were unable to take advantage 
of this. 
In his opening comments SR stated "When I hear a good alternative hypothesis 
(to 
EMH), then maybe I'll start to think there's a serious contender for some throne 
in 
finance" (p. 240). In his closing comments SR stated "I think that behavioural finance 
will be a growing area, but that seems to me to say a lot more about the 
irrationality of 
economists than it does about the irrationality of markets" (p. 240). A passionate 
viewpoint, but not underpinned by any detailed analysis. 
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A more serious consideration came from JS (with the growth in behavioural finance 
causing him to drift from 87 to 83! ). He argued that many of the behavioural 
models/theories were either a) anomalies/mistakes that should have been identified 
earlier (e. g. confusion between over-reaction and momentum) or b) suffered from bias- 
attribution, in that evidence is being ignored or dismissed. He addressed excess volatility 
as possibly being a function of learning. The volatility being generated not by new 
information, but by the market `learning' and that in itself producing perfectly rational 
price changes. 
Behavioural Finance has grown in recent years and could be seen as threatening the 
dominant hegemony of the efficient market, perhaps even replacing it. It could be 
tempting, when writing a finance doctoral thesis at this time in a `paradigm shift' to go 
deeper into behavioural aspects, but the above concerns temper that view. It could even 
be argued that in fact there is no `shift'. A good example being the work of Durham, 
Hertzel and Martin (2005) who "find scant evidence that investors behave in accordance 
with the (behavioural) model" (p. 2551) of investor sentiment. Their paper took an 
earlier work of Bloomfield and Hales (2002), (which was based on experiments with 
regime-shifting beliefs), but was more analytical, more empirical and reported 
"experimental results that support ... the prevalence of past trend reversal as an 
indicator 
of the likelihood of future reversals" (p. 398). Bloomfield and Hales had argued that they 
had demonstrated that both momentum and mean reversal could be attributed to the 
behavioural factors of cognitive psychology, in particular that of conservatism (ignore 
new evidence that does not support initial beliefs) and representativeness (accept new 
evidence that superficially reinforces initial beliefs). Durham et al not only found 
conflicting evidence going against Bloomfield and Hales specifically, but also that their 
results did not support a behavioural model generally. One possible cause being that "the 
evidence we document is wholly consistent with the normal random variation in price 
changes that we should expect to see with efficient capital markets" (p. 2553) Perhaps 
the (current) last word on behavioural finance is well stated by Fama (1998, cited in 
Durham et al) which refers to: 
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The `daunting task' of replacing market efficiency with better, more specific 
models of price formation. (p. 2567) 
2.3 Market Efficiency and Fund Management 
2.3.1 Efficiency and passive investment 
The preceding two sections give a review ofmarket efficiency, allied asset pricing 
models, tests and anomalies. One factor that seems to be common among the papers is 
that the analysis is (almost) always based upon portfolios built up from individual 
company shares. Thus the analysis assumes that a portfolio is constructed on a bottom-up 
basis, irrespective of whether this aggregates to the whole market (or a proxy of it), or 
segmented portfolios using size or book-to-market as the portfolio parameter. This 
section of the literature review will be more focussed by examining papers that consider 
fund management performance in terms of market efficiency. 
Passive investment has two main forms, a buy and hold strategy, which will be ignored 
here, and indexing. Indexation or index tracking is the production of a portfolio that in its 
component parts exactly or closely matches a chosen index. There are a variety of ways 
of achieving this and there are obviously a variety of indices that can be tracked. 
Irrespective of the approach there will be tracking problems caused by reinvestment of 
dividends, or dealing costs, or delays in rebalancing if and when the index constituents 
change. Despite these problems, passive investment has grown significantly over the last 
20 to 30 years and is seen as a tacit acceptance, not so much of the efficient market 
hypothesis as the belief that the market is efficient. The logic being that an active 
manager engaged in stock picking must assume that the market is not efficient, such that 
his/her stock selection ability allows the fund to outperform the market by generating 
abnormal returns. The obverse to this being that a passive (tracking) fund manager will 
recognise market efficiency as meaning that active management less its greater costs will 
fail to achieve the market return, whereas indexation will allow the fund to match the 
market return more closely and at a lower cost. 
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Gupta et al (1999) in analysing US fund managers found that it was more difficult "for 
domestic asset class managers.. . to outperform their respective benchmarks than it is for 
international asset class managers" (p. 33). The only exception being small-cap funds. To 
a large extent they felt that tracking error was the cause, rather than efficiency issues, but 
they did find evidence of performance persistence. 
Despite the growth in attacks on market efficiency, Malkiel (2003) presents a strong 
defence of passive investment and states that "recent attacks on the efficient market 
theory do not... weaken the case for indexing" (p 1). If markets are efficient thenit is 
argued that no trading strategy will consistently produce returns that exceed a passive 
strategy. If market efficiency is generally the case, but there are anomalies, then it is 
suggested that a) the anomalies tend to be small (less than transaction costs) and so of no 
use, or b) patterns identified from research tend to collapse as soon as they are identified 
and are thus of no use. In addition, when and if investors do not act rationally, there is no 
scope for arbitrage opportunities to take advantage of systematic valuation errors. 
Even if the US market is not efficient, Malkiel argues that index tracking should still be 
the preferred strategy. This being chiefly due to his assumed 140 basis points for active 
management costs versus 20 basis points for passive. The difference of 120 basis points 
being the cause of below average performance by the stock pickers, with the implicit 
assumption that active management cannot generate this 120 point additional return. This 
is further reinforced by active management being exposed to higher taxes, brokerage 
costs, bid-offer spread and negative market impacts from block trades. In support of this 
viewpoint, fund management statistics are used to verify that passive investment 
outperforms active management. For instance: 
for the period 1991-2001,71 % of active funds under-performed the largest US 
passive fund; 
the median active fund had returns more than 170 basis points below the index; 
only five of 15 8 active funds had superior performance to the index fund; 
superior active funds could not maintain their superiority over time. 
53 
Similar results were identified for the 1980s and the 1970s, with the conclusion that "the 
record of professional equity investors certainly does not suggest that sufficient 
predictability exists in the stock market to outperform a passive portfolio with equivalent 
risk" (p. 10). 
The above conclusions apply to US mutual funds and are replicated in many but not all 
US based studies. A more up-to-date survey on the European markets by Otten and Bams 
(2002) finds contradictory results. Offen and Bams (OB) analysed mutual fund 
performance in five European countries and measured outputs using Carhart's four- 
factor model (see below) for the expected return and the Jensen alpha for overor under 
performance. Differences between the European and US mutual fund characteristics 
were noted, although OB do not suggest that these have a direct impact on performance. 
Specifically, the European sector is only half the size of its US counterpart, but the 
number of individual funds is greater. Thus the average European fund is significantly 
smaller than the American. In addition, the typical US fund had a much greater 
percentage of assets invested in equities compared to the higher European dependaice on 
bonds, although the last ten years has seen a growth in equity at the expense of money 
market funds. Thirdly, when comparing the size of the mutual fund equity holdings to 
the total market the US percentage was over twice that of Europe. 
In terms of performance of the European mutual funds, the main findings were as 
follows. Firstly, small cap funds outperformed their benchmark, secondly, four out of 
five countries generated positive alphas, (Germany being the exception) but only the UK 
achieved significant out-performance and thirdly there was little evidence of persistence 
in performance, again except for the UK. The conclusion by OB is that "contrary to most 
US evidence, the majority of European funds seems to be able to find and implement 
new information to offset their expenses, and therefore add value for the investor" (p. 
99). Possible reasons for this may lie with the smaller size and lower importance of the 
European mutual fund market. 
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2.3.2 Performance persistence 
The above conclusions generally support two earlier papers. Brown et al (1997) 
examined performance persistence in UK pension fund management. Having adjusted 
for any survivorship, and using risk adjusted returns, they considered whether "... above 
average performance should be a major criterion for appointing and retaining fund 
managers" (p. 175) or whether "consistent performance ... 
is a chimera that is unlikely to 
be realised" (p. 176). Their conclusion lay between these two extremes, highlighting 
"limited evidence of persistence" (p. 176) although it should be noted that they identified 
only one large fund manager as consistently successful. A similar paper from Allen and 
Tan (1999) mirrored this work but examined unit trusts rather than pension funds. They 
also adjusted for risk, albeit only recognising two categories of high and low variance, 
giving some doubt about their conclusion's validity that there was evidence of 
performance persistence. 
OB's results, particularly the success of the UK mutual fund managers in out performing 
the market, are out of step with a 2003 survey by the Investment Management 
Association (IMA). Although this looked at all funds under management rather than just 
unit trusts, the startling (in terms of OB's conclusions) result was that nearly 80% of 
funds were managed under contracts "requiring index tracking or a close approximation 
of it" (p. 1). There may be many reasons for the 80% but it is interesting that the UK 
mutual funds are shown to outperform the market by OB but the aggregated picture 
shows very large reliance on tracking with the underlying assumption that either the 
trustees ask for tracking or the managers prefer tracking. 
In addition to the above survey, the Investment Management Association (or Association 
of Unit Trust and Investment Funds, as was), commissioned reports on persistency to 
support their argument to the Financial Services Authority (FSA) that fund marketing 
should include past performance measures. These reports were produced by Charles 
River Associates Limited (CRA), the first (2002a) being a literature review and the 
second (2002b) an empirical analysis of persistence in the UK equity based unit trust 
funds. The data for their analysis was extensive, possibly the largest utilised in 
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persistency tests with UK funds, and was used to revisit conclusions on prior surveys for 
the FSA. These were Bacon and Woodrow (1999) and Rhodes (2000). The Bacon and 
Woodrow paper had concluded that, on the basis of its review of the literature, past 
performance should not be a FSA recognised performance indicator. The analysis by 
Rhodes similarly concluded that there was no requirement for past performance 
measures, stating that "... the conclusion ... 
is that repeat performance (if there is any) is 
both small in effect and short-lived" (cited in CRA p. 13). 
The empirical analysis of CRA (2002b) concluded the opposite, stating: 
Performance broadly persisted in UK equity based unit trusts between 1981 and 
2001. 
... 
it is possible. . . to use this 
information to aid... investment decision-making. 
(Persistency is) strongly significant only in the short term for funds in the Equity 
(and) Bond Income and Smaller Companies sectors. However it is significant 
over all time horizons for the UK All Companies and UK Equity Income funds. 
Choosing a top quartile fund... will, on average, add to an investor's potential 
return. (p. 1) 
Their overall conclusion being that "there appears to be very little doubt that investors 
can derive useful evidence from past performance data" (p. 52). 
In response to the CRA paper's conclusions, the FSA commissioned an analysis of the 
CRA research by Blake and Timmermann (2003). Whilst acknowledging the quality of 
the data collected by CRA, the report and its conclusions were viewed as flawed on a 
variety of grounds. Firstly, CRA calculated their performance statistics on a "raw" or 
non-risk-adjusted returns. Blake and Timmermann (BT) viewed this approach as 
unjustified. In fact it is surprising that CRA had chosen that raw approach, considering 
that risk adjusted returns are so common in academic research on performance, if not so 
common in the market place. Secondly, given that persistent high raw returns would be 
published, BT felt that investors could achieve the same result with a geared tracker 
fund. Thus raw returns need not be published. Thirdly, BT were critical of the lack of 
cross-dependence in the analysis. This lack casting doubt on much of the statistical 
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significance of CRA's findings. Although they recognised that the analysis should be 
repeated on a risk-adjusted basis, BT felt that persistence was experienced only in the 
poorly performing funds and that there was 
a good case for the FSA publishing risk-adjusted past-performance data in the 
comparative tables, not because we believe that superior risk adjusted 
performance can be sustained over long periods, but because poorly managed 
funds can be exposed more quickly. (p. 40) 
This has immediate implications for our view of UK market efficiency in that there is no 
case to support the view of consistent abnormal performance by investment 
professionals. Whilst there is persistent bad performance, this does not necessarily 
invalidate efficiency. In effect, for the UK market over the last thirty years there have 
been no `hot hands' but several `cold hands'. 
An earlier US study of hot hands in mutual funds by Carhart (1997) was based upon a 
four factor asset pricing model. This was the Fama and French three factor model, as 
discussed previously, with an additional factor to adjust for the momentum effect. The 
conclusions are in step with the UK viewpoint of BT above. Using an extensive US 
database, adjusted for survivor bias, Carhart's paper demonstrated that persistence does 
not support the concept of hot hands or well informed managers, the only persistence 
being concentrated in the worst performing funds. His conclusions that are relevant to 
this discussion being strongly in line with Fama's (1991) review, namely: 
Overall, the evidence is consistent with market efficiency... 
The top decile funds earn back their investment costs... 
Most funds earn back their investment costs... 
The bottom decile firms underperform. (p. 80) 
In extending the discussion to a wider indirect asset class he noted that "... these results 
are not confined to mutual funds... (others) reach qualitatively similar conclusions about 
pension fund performance" (p. 80). 
Both Carhart's (1997) and Blake and Timmermann's (2003) conclusions were rejected 
by Tonks (2005) in examining pension fund manager persistence. Using a large sample 
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and with a different approach to survivorship from earlier studies, and basing abnormal 
returns on three and four factor models of asset pricing, he concluded that "... the 
results... suggest that there appears to be a role for active fund management of pension 
funds" (p. 20). A conclusion that supports the Myners Review's suggestion of active 
management where a benefit can be gained. The research by Tonks ignored fund 
management costs but he observed that the benefit identified of 1.48% per annum 
exceeds the Myners Review estimate of fund management costs, thus suggesting lack of 
strong and also weaker efficiency. Although fund management costs will be followed up 
later, it should be noted that Malkiel (2003) assumes 140 basis points for active 
management. If this applies to the UK market then Tanks' 148 basis points makes the 
UK pension fund active management very close to being weakly efficient, with a benefit 
of only 0.08% per annum. In fact, even at 148 basis points, Tonks recognises that "... it is 
less clear how pension fund trustees could take advantage of this fact" (p. 21). 
2.4 Strategic Asset Allocation 
2.4.1 Background 
Over the last fifty years much has been written on asset allocation in terms of the mean 
variance analysis as developed by Markowitz (1952). The same period has seen 
surprisingly little finance research produced on strategic asset allocation. The approach of 
the mean variance analysis is well known and is not covered here, other than to note that 
the production of an efficient portfolio and the combination of this with a riskless asset 
allows an investor (in theory) to be located at an appropriate position on the capital 
market line. The desired position on the market line for any investor is merely a function 
of their attitude to risk. One of the outcomes of the theory is that if all investors seek 
mean variance efficiency, then they will all hold the same risky portfolio. Their sole 
choice is to change the balance between the market portfolio and the riskless asset. Thus 
at its most simple level, the strategic asset allocation decision is merely a function of risk 
or utility of the investor. This was addressed by Tobin (1958) in his mean variance model 
of asset demands, where the investor is faced with the choice of just two assets, cash as 
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the riskless asset and bonds as the risky asset. His mutual fund theorem being that for all 
investors, the proportions of risky assets are constant. 
The following attempts to bring together much of the more recent work on strategic asset 
allocation. The first part considers nomenclature as this is not yet standardised. The 
second takes a retrospective view of strategic asset allocation via attribution analysis. The 
third part considers theoretical approaches to allocations and the fourth briefly reviews 
international asset allocations. 
2.4.2 Nomenclature 
The relatively low level of interest in the topic of strategic asset allocation has meant that 
nomenclature has taken some time to be established. Statman (2000) addressed this 
briefly and his use of terms will be used here. Strategic Asset Allocation is taken to be the 
absolute or percentage allocation or weights of a portfolio to individual asset classes. 
Similarly Dybvig (1999) sees asset allocation as a strategic decision of "how much ... to 
place in various broad asset classes, such as domestic equities, foreign equities, and 
government bonds" (p. 49). This differs from early work on asset pricing models such as 
Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) which either did not mention the issue or referred to it 
as grouped data. It was called fixed vwight asset allocation by Jahnke (1997) and has 
often been referred to as tactical. In his extensive review of asset pricing at the 
millennium Campbell (2000) alludes to it once in that 
(long term investors) may seek to hedge their exposures to wealth productivity 
shocks and this gives rise to intertemporal hedging demands for financial assets. 
Brennan (et al) have coined the phrase `strategic asset allocation' to describe this 
farsighted response to time-varying investment opportunities. (p. 1537) 
This link between strategic asset allocation and the long term is supported by Grinold and 
Meese (2000) in that it "... captures the essence of long-term investment policy" (p. 53). 
Likewise, Davis (2002) sees strategic asset allocation in relation to pension funds as "the 
long term decision on the disposition of the overall portfolio" (p. 4). Possibly the 
first 
research based book on strategic asset allocation is that of Campbell and 
Viceira (2000) 
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who do not define it but interpret it as "broad asset classes... and say nothing about the 
choice of individual assets within these broad classes" (p. 2). They do however also 
position strategic asset allocation as a long term concept. 
Asset allocation is split by Jahnke (1999) into two main categories, fixed asset allocation 
and active asset-allocation. The latter group being further split into the three sub-groups 
of active, dynamic and strategic. The rather tautological definition of that final sub-group 
being "the strategic school: those who invest mainly in index funds and engage in 
strategic active asset allocation" (p. 29). Alternatively, Brinson et al (1986) saw the need 
for performance measurement to decompose the investment management process into 
"investment policy, market timing and security selection" (p. 39) with investment policy 
being the strategic asset allocation process/decision. 
The professional bodies do not add any great clarity to the discussion. For the UK, the 
Securities Institute's (1999) basic text sees asset allocation as "the process ... of a top 
down approach to selecting investments, whereby a set of desired percentage holdings in 
various economies, sectors or industries are established at the outset" (p. 63). For the US, 
the Research Foundation of the Institute of Chartered Financial Analysis publication by 
Karnosky and Singer (2000) follows the same naming as Brinson et al (see below). 
Strategic asset allocation rarely warrants significant mention in finance texts, often totally 
ignored and occasionally alluded to under a variety of names. Loftlnuse (2001) covers it 
well, identifying four main methods of establishing the long term allocations: firstly, by 
following asset pricing models and mirroring some form of world index; secondly, the 
use of benchmarking or following the median manager; thirdly, mean variance 
optimisation to select an efficient portfolio relative to the investors' risk profile; and 
finally there is the use of asset liability modelling. 
As is to be expected, there is a greater level of interest in strategic asset allocation wihin 
the actuarial profession, especially in relation to investment for pensions or life 
assurance. The actuarial approach will not be considered here as the focus is on finance 
and extensions to mean variance, asset pricing and market efficiency. The Mynas 
60 
Review (2001) does however consider asset allocation, recognising that it is "by no 
means a precise term" (p. 51), but suggesting firstly it is the equities/bonds split, then 
sub-division by domestic and overseas, followed finally by geographic, sector and 
(interestingly) size and style. 
Tactical asset allocation is generally seen as a short term shift in weights away from the 
strategic asset allocation levels and has an implicit assumption of lack of short term 
market efficiency. Again using Statman's (2000) definition "it involves shifts in 
allocations... in an attempt to benefit from divergence of current values asset classes from 
their correct or rational levels" (p. 129). This is termed market timing by Brinson et al 
(1986) but De Stefano (1999) takes a different view in that "tactical asset allocation, in 
combination with strategic asset allocation, is not market timing" (p. 168). This fairly 
extreme view is not generally accepted. For instance, Blake et al (1999) "distinguish 
between short-term market timing and long-term strategic-asset-allocation decisions" (p. 
430). The short term focus is similarly supported by Jahnke (1999) and Brennan et al 
(1997) who see it as "a single-period or myopic strategy" (p. 1378) where the investor 
has "a mean-variance criterion defined over the one period rate of return on the portfolio" 
(p. 1377). They see its genesis in the development by Markowitz of portfolio theory such 
that 
tactical asset allocation (is) the systematic allocation of investment portfolios 
across broad asset classes such as bonds, stock and cash. (p. 1377) 
There is no automatic conclusion that tactical shifts away from strategic allocations are a 
function of market inefficiency. This is considered below where Campbell and Viceira 
(2002) regard long term decision making as producing logical or rational allocations that 
differ from myopic ones. 
Thus, if there is an emerging consensus of asset allocation nomenclature, then it would 
seem that strategic asset allocation is the process (if top down) or results (if bottom up) of 
allocating weights to a variety of asset classes. There is a tendency for it to be long term 
and there seems to be an implicit assumption of market efficiency, this later point being 
61 
in terms of asset classes but not necessarily individual investments. Tactical asset 
allocation is generally viewed as short term shifts in allocations away from the strategic 
position, thus assuming lack of market efficiency in single periods. Security selection is 
the choice of individual investments within any asset class. As such this selection process 
will not discussed here. 
2.4.3 Performance decomposition 
Possibly the first attempt to assess strategic asset allocation by distinguishing it from 
tactical asset allocation and security selection was the 1986 paper of Brinson, Hood and 
Beebower (BHB). This was less of a theoretical model and more of a post hoc 
mathematical decomposition of a portfolio's returns. BHB's approach was to have the 
strategic asset allocation or the "passive portfolio benchmark" (p. 40) as: 
E; (Wp;. Rp; ) (I) 
such that the strategic asset allocation return is the sum of the products of the strategic 
weights (Wp) and their asset class returns (Rn). The effect of this and timing or tactical 
asset allocation was then: 
Y-i(Wai 
" 
Rpi) (II) 
where the strategic and tactical return is the sum of the products of the actual weights 
(Wa) and the strategic returns. Security selection is similarly derived as: 
Ei(Wpi. Rai (III) 
so that the combination of strategic asset allocation and security selection is the sum of 
the products of the strategic weights and the actual returns (Rß) of the asset classes. 
Finally, the actual return is: 
Y-i(Wai 
" 
Rai) (IV) 
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giving a portfolio return as the sum of the products of actual weights and security 
selection returns. BHB's "calculation of active contributions to total performance" (p. 41) 
then being various differences, namely: 
"policy" or strategic asset allocation return =I 
"timing" or tactical asset allocation return = II -I 
"security selection" return = III -I 
"other" or residual return = IV -(III+II-I) 
Using US data, BHB analysed 91 large pension plans over the period 1974 to 1983 with 
mean annualised returns for each factor being 10.1 % for (I) the passi`e benchmark or 
strategic asset allocation, -0.66% for timing or tactical asset allocation, -0.36% for 
security selection and -0.07% for other. The importance of the policy or strategic return 
was noted and was expected, but an interesting outcome was the variance with 93.6%% 
explained by the strategic asset allocation decision. A followup paper by Brinson et all 
(199 1) repeated the exercise, with the following results. 
active return % of variation 
explained 
"passive" or strategic asset allocation 13.49% 91.5% 
"timing" or tactical asset allocation -0.26% 93.3%* 
"security selection" +0.26% 96.1 %* 
other -0.07% 
(p. 45) 
where * indicates percentage variation explained by strategic and tactical or strategic and 
selection. 
This decomposition or attribution analysis was extended by Karnosky and Singer (1994). 
The same approach was followed, but in addition there were four equivalent returns 
based on currency selection and hedging. These were the base currency equivalent of 
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passive weights and passive returns, active weights and passive returns, passive weights 
and active returns and active weights and returns. These four products giving the 
equivalent breakdown as set out above. When combined with the BHB decomposition the 
breakdown of a portfolio's added value is then: 
Market allocation return = (active-passive market weight) x (passive - index return 
premium) 
Currency allocation return = (active - passive currency weight) x( passive - active 
Eurodeposit return) 
Market security selection = passive market weight x (active - passive market return 
premium) 
Currency hedge selection = passive currency weight x (active- passive Eurodeposit 
return in base currency) 
A behavioural finance orientated criticism of the BHB attribution analysis came from 
Statman (2001), who saw strategic asset allocation as "part of the management of 
investors, (whereas)... tactical asset allocation and security selection are part of the 
management of investments" (p. 132). Whilst this was not supported by alternative 
models or detailed analysis of data, there are interesting resonances with the Myners 
Review (2001) in that Statman argues "investors believe that investment management 
(tactical asset allocation, timing or selectivity) offers more value than intiestor 
management (strategic asset allocation)" (p. 133). Simultaneously the Myners Review in 
its outline of how a better (UK) pension fund system could work suggested that 
"recognising the importance of the (strategic) asset allocation decision to investmalt 
outcomes, trustees would devote greater attention and resources to it" (p. 16). 
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A much more critical evaluation of the BHB decomposition was applied to UK pension 
data by Blake et al (1999). Their concerns with the arithmetic identity of the model 
included: residual values being small but of the same scale as selectivity; ex post rather 
than ex ante information on weights giving "only noisy performance measurement" (p. 
451); funds not being in a steady state and short time scales. Despite this, their results 
were not dissimilar to those of BHB, with "an economically small negative return from 
active portfolio management on average" (p. 456) whilst market timing was statistically 
insignificant. In comparison with the BHB strategic asset allocation explaining 93.6 % of 
US variation, the UK version (using two definitions for the normal weights (equation I)) 
produced 96%. 
Central to Blake et al's (1999) discussion was the move away from the accepted 
interpretation that 93.6/96% indicates firmly the need to focus on the strategic asset 
allocation decision. Instead it was argued that this conclusion is wrong, the counter 
argument being that the high percentage of variation is merely a reflection in both tests of 
a very low level of active management by fund managers. 
The same paper took an alternative view of decomposition, breaking down changes in 
portfolio weights into two components, that of return within an asset class and changes 
due to net cash inflows/outflows to/from that class. The decomposition took the form: 
A log (wit) - rat - rpt + NCFjt - NCFpt (2.12) 
where 0 jt is the portfolio weight of asset class j at time t, rjt and rpt are the returns in 
period t of the asset class and the value weighted return of the portfolio as a whole 
respectively and NCFjt and NCFpt are the net cash flows in the period of the asset class 
and the value weighted portfolio. Implicit in this approach was the assumption that the 
net cash flows occur at the end of the period. 
The application of this to UK pension fund data over 1986 to 1994 showed that "the only 
asset class for which differential returns contributed positively to its asset allocation was 
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UK equities" (p. 433), with all other changes attributable to net cash flows. Analysis on 
cross-sectional data suggested that: 
cash flows are used to stabilize the actual asset allocation around a common (and 
possibly dynamically changing) strategic asset allocation.... (such that funds) 
exhibit a tendency to rebalance toward their strategic asset allocations when 
relative asset returns move out of line. (p. 448) 
Finally, the data would indicate that at an individual fund level there is evidence of mean 
reversion "towards a commonly changing strategic asset allocation" (p. 448). Blake et al 
make the important point (not reflected by BHB), that both approaches ignore the 
matching of assets and liabilities, an issue that is of importance in pension funds. 
The Net Cash Flow variable in the previous model differs to the approach taken in work 
by Ferson and Schadt (1996). Although this paper looks at US mutual fund performance 
they note that "on average, funds invest about 62 cents of each new dollar in the 
concurrent month, while 38 cents goes into cash" (p. 456). In addition there seems to be a 
negative relationship between new funds (Blake et al's NCF) and fund betas. Whilst 
Ferson and Schadt make this observation it is not central to their main analysis, which is 
fund strategy in changing economic conditions. This is one of many papers that consider 
fund performance without any decomposition by asset class. The closest they come is 
brief discussion on performance linked to investment policy or strategic asset allocation, 
whereby naive strategies used as a comparison commence with set allocations of "65% 
large stocks, 13% small stocks, 20% government bonds, and 2% low-grade bonds" (p. 
442). Unfortunately there is no indication of the sources of this naive allocation. 
Similarly, fund managers' timing ability is examined by Bollen and Busse (2001). As 
with Ferguson and Schadt (op cit), they focus solely on efficiency issues but do generate 
synthetic funds with eight asset classes. In common with many papers of this type, such 
Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Henriksson (1984) or Graham and Harvey (1996), the 
strategic asset allocation is to a large extent ignored. Likewise, there are numerous 
studies of herding (for instance Wermers, 1999) where some papers find evidence of 
herding and others fail to confirm this. These are solely concerned with short term 
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herding and do not regard commonality of strategic asset allocations as herding. Typical 
reasons for herding include reputational risk, correlation of information and its 
interpretation, following perceived well-informed trades and common demand. 
Interestingly it is often the case that such herding is seen as bad, whereas common 
approaches to strategic asset allocations, which could also be defined as herding, is either 
ignored or viewed as common sense. 
Attribution analysis has to a considerable extent shifted from academic analyss to a 
commercial product. For instance, the Spaulding Group's 2002 survey of attribution 
products, contrasting various commercial providers' models. These encompass arithmetic 
and geometric approaches (additative and multiplicative) and logarithmic, optimised and 
smoothed. Links do however continue to exist with more academic approaches: as an 
example, Carino (1999) published the Frank Russell Company's proprietary model, 
setting out a multi-period approach utilising log normal returns to allocate residuals 
across the allocation, selection and interaction attributes, thus allowing addition of the 
components. 
Slightly more recent was a paper by Bridgeland (2001) who described Bacon & 
Woodrow's product "SimlAn". This took attribution analysis further in that it attempted 
to "analyse the evidence of skill being employed in the different decisions involved in a 
portfolio construction process" (p. 247). Part of the proposal was the assumption that 
index tracking was the logical fund management style for a low risk fund (tracking being 
viewed as `safe') whereas active management was the preferred approach if higher levels 
of risk could be tolerated. The latter case is seen as having `hope' as the driving emotion. 
The model measures excess return (over the benchmark) and breaks this down into 
influence (e. g. style or research process), control (constraints which may limit active 
management) and stock selection. 
Attribution analysis is a retrospective study of different causes of the performance of an 
investment portfolio. It does not suggest models for ex ante decision making. In 
developing a continuous time model of portfolio selection Merton (1969) showed how 
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the decision is independent of utility and derived a formula for the optimal proportion of 
the risky asset, but this was in the world of just one risky asset. The model extended to 
many risky assets, but in common with several papers of this type there was no concept 
of asset groups. Although it could be argued that strategic asset allocation is just the 
aggregation by asset class of all the assets identified by such a process, Merton in a later 
paper (1971) assumed that "all assets are of the limited liability type" (p. 377), thus 
excluding this view. 
Whilst Merton (1969) rejected the role of utility in portfolio selection, it was included in 
an interesting refutation of the BHB attribution by Kritzman and Page (2002). They set 
out to decide which was the more important, strategic asset allocation or stock selection, 
and came down firmly on stock selection. Their approach was two stage, initially using 
bootstrapping to build random equity portfolios to argue that "random variation among 
individual securities... causes substantially more return variation than does random asset 
allocation among (asset classes)" (p. 207). Unfortunately this conclusion was based on 
raw, non-risk adjusted returns so returns were then ranked by log utility and similar 
conclusions were drawn, although it should be recognised that logs is only one version of 
utility functions and utility is not the typical method for risk adjusting returns. Their 
second stage was to use a version of the Black Scholes option pricing model to value a 
theoretical option "to exchange median performance for top quartile performance" (p. 
209). This was performed both for asset allocation and security selection and showed 
security selection always having the higher value! 
2.4.4 Asset classes and strategic asset allocation 
Whilst much has been written on asset allocation using mean variance analysis, little 
exists on the strategic asset allocation problem. One attempt to fill this gap is the 1997 
paper of Brennan, Schwartz and Lagnado (BSL). For computational ease they focus on 
just three asset classes, namely bonds, shares and cash, although recognising that 
"extension to additional asset classes is straightforward so long as the expected returns 
... can 
be expressed in the same set of state variables" (p. 1379). The raison d'etre of their 
68 
model is that mean variance analysis is single period or myopic and as such lactical asset 
allocation is flawed, firstly because the expected returns by class are typically internal 
rates of return estimated over long periods, with the assumption that the one period return 
is proportional to the long run rate; an assumption they reject. The second flaw is that 
evidence of predictable returns imply that single period allocations are "appropriate only 
if the investor has a logarithmic utility function" (p. 1378). In effect, the single period 
model cannot cope with a long term investor facing long term shifts in expected returns, 
variances and covariances. 
The model of BSL is based on three state variables that predict expected returns, namely 
the short term interest rate for cash, the yield on consol bonds for bonds and the dividend 
yield on common stock for shares. The three state variables are assumed to follow a joint 
Markov process and form the first part of the model. Values for US data over the period 
1972 to 1991 are used and expected returns are viewed as linear functions of tle state 
variables. The resulting outputs from this first stage were "sufficiently well behaved to 
provide a useful input to our model" (p. 1390). The second stage was to allocate weights 
to the three asset classes based on the state variables and to maximse utility over three 
separate strategies: a myopic or one month strategy: a rolling 20 year strategy; and a 
declining period initially of 20 years but with a fixed time horizon. 
The results showed a variety of proportions for the three asset classes andthe three 
strategies. Myopia usually had a higher cash position than the other strategies, as cash 
was assumed to be riskless for the myopic investor but not in the long term. The equity 
proportion was much higher for the rolling 20 year strategy and always exceeded the 
myopic equity holding, assumed to be a function of share price volatility growing "less 
than proportionately with time, so that stocks are less risky for those with a long horizon" 
(p. 1395). For the bond holdings there was less consistency in the results, close to zero, 
then high, then low, and with no consistent bond weighting such that any one strategy 
was always different from the others. The conclusion being "the difference in the bond 
allocations is highly variable over time, suggesting that rules of thumb to adjust tactical 
69 
asset allocation portfolios to account for a longer horizon are unlikely to be successful" 
(p. 1396). 
The stochastic model of BSL has three domestic asset groups, a somewhat unrealistic 
view of the world. Broadening the asset class universe to include an international 
investment dimension is covered by Grinold and Meese (2000). Despite claiming the 
long term nature of their strategic asset allocation model they utilise a single period mean 
variance format, immediately falling foul of BSL's long term non-single period analysis. 
The fairly simple study compares allocations between domestic assets, unhedged 
international assets and hedged international assets and compares one step and two step 
approaches. Their one-step strategic asset allocation maximises the portfolio's expected 
return less its variance times a risk aversion parameter, subject to no short sales. The two- 
step procedure initially only allocates to domestic assets and unhedged international 
assets. The resultant domestic weight is then fixed and the second step allocates the 
balance between hedged and unhedged international assets. Their conclusion being that 
(with one exception) "the two-step procedure will always put as much or more in 
domestic assets as the one-step procedure" (p. 55). Similarly, "the one-step procedure 
will hedge more or at least the same as the two-step procedure" (p. 56). Their 
conclusions, which are applied also to liability matched portfolios, are a little oblique but 
in effect claim that most strategic allocation decisions made by funds are two-step, but 
that one-step would achieve better results. 
A more rigorous and empirical paper by Blake and Timmermann (2002a) considers 
international asset allocation but is chiefly concerned with the market timing ability of 
UK pension funds rather than with longer term strategic asset allocations. Their data set 
consisted of the WM Company universe of 247 pension funds' investments in overseas 
shares allocated to Japan, North America, Europe (excluding UK) and Asia-Pacific 
(excluding Japan). Expected returns were modelled by region in relation to common state 
variables. Their focus was short term/tactical so they assumed 
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linear projections of portfolio weights on first and second conditional moments as 
an approximation to a relationship between portfolio weights and conditional 
moments that could be both more complex and vary over time. (p. 9) 
As that paper was more concerned with short term tactical changes in international asset 
allocations it is not covered in any depth here, although some of the conclusions are of 
interest as a comparison to the BHB-type approach. Central is the conclusion that 
international asset allocation (be it strategic or more likely tactical) is "highly correlated 
with time-varying expected returns, volatilities and conditional covariances... " (p. 21). 
There was weak evidence of market timing skills with an average of -0.2% per annum. 
In a parallel paper Blake and Timmermann (2002b) extend their consideration of UK 
pension funds' activities in international markets. Although their main concern is again 
the success or failure of active management, they do base the analysis on four different 
suggested decompositions. The first is an extension of BHB: 
(onijt =Z (0aijt / T (2.13) 
with w,,; jt the weight of the i'th fund in region j at time t, a being actual and n the normal 
or strategic asset allocation. The second decomposition assumes: 
(Onijt = (0aij I+ (t/T) ((OaijT - COaij 1 (2.14) 
thus allowing "benchmark portfolio weights (to) increase (or decrease) linearly in time" 
(p. 7). The third decomposition assumes normal weights at the average of the cross- 
section. With data on 247 funds this gave: 
(J)nijt = 1/247 Z walzt. (2.15) 
The fourth was "simply... these equal to the world market weights" (p. 7). Whilst these 
decompositions give useful and additional insights to pension fund management and their 
efficiency in terms of international market timing (poor), they do little to suggest either 
the process of setting weights or a model of strategic asset allocation. 
The papers discussed so far have an institutional investor focus. An alternative approach 
based on the individual investor is typified by Viceira (2001) where the asset allocation 
decision includes labour income. Extending the work of Bodie, Merton and Samuelson 
(1992), Koo (1995), Kimball (1993) and Gollier and Pratt (1996) amongst others, Viceira 
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constructs a stationary model to show life-cycle impacts on asset allocation, with the two 
states of the life-cycle being receiving income as the yield on human capital whilst at 
work and receiving income from a portfolio of investments upon retirement. Although 
this is an asset allocation decision, the model has only two investment classes: a riskless 
asset with a constant log return and a risky asset with a one period log return. Despite 
these limitations the conclusions are informative. Once in retirement, Viceira argues that 
the asset allocation decision collapses to Merton's (1969) closed form solution (11439, 
see above) and is subject to "the myopic portfolio rule" (p. 442). During the employed 
state the model is more complex although some outcomes are intuitive. For instance 
"employed investors are willing to assume riskier portfolios than retired investors" (p. 
442) as their employment income can compensate for shocks to financial asset returns. 
As an alternative to this, significant holdings by the employed investor in savings results 
in employment income being less important. In common with `real world financial 
advice' the weight given to risky assets is relatively high early in the life-cycle. Finally, 
an increase in employment income risk tends to shift asset allocations away from the 
risky asset to the riskless one. 
A totally different approach is taken in papers such as Trojani et al (2002). In this type of 
analysis the strategic asset allocation is taken as a given, or is selected via some type of 
discursive process. The issue is how to shift an extant portfolio with its own asset 
allocation weights to the proposed allocations with minimum costs, whilst also coping 
with specific or regulatory constraints. Referred to as the "Three-Portfolio Matching 
Problem" it provides an interesting insight for financial intermediaries but does not add to 
consideration of the establishment of the strategic weights, other than definitions. Trojan 
et al in this respect define an asset class as "specific sets of securities having at least one 
common characteristic" (p. 516). Although they do not support or expand on it, they 
claim that "if the asset classes are well diversified, a well diversified optimal asset 
allocation follows" (p. 516). 
As briefly mentioned earlier, some asset allocation decisions may be taken in isolation, 
whereas others may be linked to the need to match liabilities (see below). Instead of 
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liabilities, Dybvig (1999) considers the link between strategic asset allocation and the 
need to protect spending. Whilst being an extension of Merton's (1971) approach, it adds 
little to the strategic asset allocation discussion as it only considers the two basis classes 
of risky and riskless investments. The need for certain types of funds to relate assets to 
liabilities gives rise to portfolio insurance. For instance Constant Proportion Portfolio 
Insurance is considered by Black and Perold (1992) where asset classes are viewed as 
active and reserve. Active assets are those that are relatively risky and a reserve asset is 
safe to the extent that "it closely tracks a liability stream" (p. 404), thus it may iuctuate 
in value/return/volatility and as such cannot be classed as risk free in the traditional 
sense. 
A different view of strategic asset allocation is taken in Blake and Timmermann (2002c) 
in a more general consideration of benchmarks. In this study: 
An appropriate benchmark recognises formally that the strategic assert allocation 
or SAA (i. e. the long-run division of the portfolio between the major categories of 
investment bassets, such as equities, bonds and property) is a risk decision relative 
to the liabilities, rather than an expected return decision. In other words, the SAA, 
properly interpreted, is not an investment decision at all: instead it is determined 
largely by reference to the maturity structure of the anticipated liability cash 
flows. In contrast, the stock selection and market timing (i. e. tactical asset 
allocation) decisions are investment decisions and it is the fund manager's 
performance in these two categories that should be judged against the benchmark 
provided by the SAA. (p. 110) 
This is a very rigid picture of strategic asset allocation. It should be (or is partly) true in 
relation to certain pension funds, but the paper's title refers to institutional investors and 
it is difficult to tie down asset and liability matching so tightly to portfolios that are not 
pension funds. In fact this is recognised by Blake in a later paper (2003) where SAA will 
"depend on both the characteristics of individual schemes and those schemes' sponsors' 
attitude to surplus and contribution risk" (p. 3). 
The Myners Review (2001) noted with some concern that UK institutional investors 
tended to ignore venture capital as an asset class in the strategic asset allocation process. 
Little research is available on this aspect, but Chen et al (2002) analyseUS 
data and 
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recommend that "an allocation to venture capital of 2% to 9% is warranted for an 
aggressive portfolio" (p. 83). Unfortunately their process is less of a strategic asset 
allocation model and more akin to the inclusion of venture capital in the equities 
universe, albeit with a different method for calculating historic returns. 
The role of international investment for pension funds is well reviewed by Davis (2002), 
although the existence of domestic liabilities can cloud the general applicationto all 
investors. This paper splits the initial strategic consideration into two activities, firstly "to 
choose the asset categories to be included in the portfolio" (p. 4) and secondly to make 
two strategic choices: active versus passive management and tlC strategic asset 
allocation. Part of this mean-variance based approach is to consider the impact of 
immunisation, such that greater emphasis is placed on the portfolio value at the end of a 
holding period. Thus for a pension scheme with liabilities in the domestic currency there 
is an immediate shift away from international or non-domestic asset allocation. Similarly 
there will be asset allocation issues based upon matching/duration and the need to 
balance the assets and liabilities risk/return profiles. One additional special case in 
relation to pensions is the issue of tax. Asset allocation for a pension fund may seek to 
maximise weights in asset classes where there is "the highest possible spread between 
pre-tax and post-tax returns" (p. 6). 
The benefits of international diversification are well identified, not only by Davis (op cit) 
but also Solnik (1998), Baxter and Jermann (1997), Reisen (1997) and many others. 
Despite this there exists a home asset preference which may be due to domestic 
liabilities, inefficient overseas markets, currency risk, information and costs. Although 
the link is not made, one possible cause of the home bias may be found in sampling errors 
for mean variance efficient portfolios. Britten-Jones (1999), in trying to establish 
estimates of weights for an international portfolio concludes "These results provide no 
statistical support for the proposition that there are benefits to global diversification for a 
US investor" (p. 666). This contrasts with Solnik (1998) who sees strategic currency 
allocation as an important part of global asset management. The strategic currency 
allocation is akin to strategic asset allocation in that it is long term and linked to a 
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suitable benchmark. Tactical currency allocation is short term variationto take advantage 
of fluctuations in expected returns and risks in the currencies. 
Gratcheva and Falk (2003) link these issues together, with a model that attempts to apply 
mean variance theory to the strategic asset allocation decision when faced with aglobal 
portfolio. Using 14 asset classes (equity and bonds from seven countries) the model 
proposes the percentage allocations and suggests appropriate limits for tactical asset 
allocation. Based on optimisation and with many constraints it recognises that "Global 
asset markets offer significant opportunities to improve investment returns" (p. 1644). 
The model does however ignore efficiency or the results of various attribution analysis 
processes in that it assumes that: 
A tactical asset allocation process may offer good opportunities to enhance long- 
term portfolio return. The evidence suggests that active shifts of asset weights do 
lead to higher returns on average than with a static allocation. 
(Consequently) ... the 
investor, however, should control the degree of risk the 
deviations produce by defining specific constraints. (p. 1645) 
Solnik's paper virtually takes the benefit of international diversification as a given, unlike 
Britten-Jones, and instead considers the hedging decision, with the conclusion tha: 
If the plan sponsor sets a benchmark for a very long-term horizon (say, fifty 
years) then it should probably be unhedged... (whereas)... if the plan sponsor has 
in mind a shorter strategic horizon (say, five to ten years), the ideal currency 
allocation is, and will remain, a question open to debate. (p. 51) 
In their book based on the Clarendon Lectures at Oxford, Campbell and Viceira (2002) 
expand much of their research on strategic asset allocation. This tends to be focused on 
the individual investor (compared to much of Blake's work on pensions) and includes an 
extension of Viceira's already discussed paper on labour income. Unfortunately the work 
ignores international investment, although this does not detract from much of the 
interesting conclusions. Their initial consideration of myopia in strategic asset allocations 
is that under certain assumptions "the investment horizon is irrelevant for investors who 
have only financial wealth and who face constant investment opportunities" (p. 17). This 
view they recognise as being diametrically opposed to typical advice of long term 
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investors having the scope to invest in a more risky portfolio. Relaxing some of the 
assumptions they argue that the shift from short to long term allocations significantly 
increases the importance of bonds. This is based on cash (i. e. money market investment) 
ceasing to be riskless due to future refinancing, with indexed bonds consequently 
becoming less risky. Not only this, but also nominal bonds should replace much of the 
equity holdings of risk averse investors if inflation risk is seen as low. 
This view of the investor's optimal allocations contrasts, they argue, with Siegel (1994) 
who regards equity as giving reduced risk once the time horizon extends towards the long 
term. Their argument being based on Siegel assuming mean reversion in equities' returns 
supporting a buy and hold strategy, whereas if there is scope for market timing (a big "if' 
according to BHB, Blake, et cetera) then high equity holdings would be sub-optimal. 
Less contentious conclusions from their analysis include life cycle issues such as "risky 
investments should be extremely attractive to typical young households with many years 
to retirement" (p. 219). Finally there is the unsurprising conclusion that "time preference 
and risk attitudes can have large effects on optimal portfolios" (p. 220). 
Their work on optimal consumption and portfolio choice is extended in Campbell et al 
(2003), with the investor being infinitely long lived and having Epstein-Zin utility. 
Although fairly esoteric, their extensions to the work of Campbell and Viceira (2002) 
conclude that: 
Dividend yields, interest rates, yield spreads, inflation and other variables that 
predict asset returns... have substantial effects on optimal portfolio allocations 
among bills, stocks and nominal and inflation indexed bonds. These effects are 
strategic... rather than merely tactical effects on myopic optimal portfolios. (p. 
64). 
Campbell and Viceira's use of intertemporal hedging is also considered by Grafland and 
Nilsson (2003) in relation to dynamic portfolio hedging. They find that "taking... specific 
regimes into consideration has a strong influence on the portfolio decision" (p. 199), 
when regimes are differing views of the state of the economy. This paper, like so many of 
those concerned with portfolios, has just two asset classes, is domestic in scope and does 
not add to discussion of strategic asset allocation. 
76 
It is often the case however that a fund has constraints on asset classes available to the 
manager. These can be regulatory or a choice of the plan sponsor. The impact of these 
constraints is considered by Kendal et al (1995) and Wang (1998). Wang observes that 
mean variance maximisation can generate short positions that "are difficult to implemalt 
in practice because finance professionals often face constraints on their portfolio 
holdings" (p. 360). The impact of this when analysed in relation to a NYSE-AMEX 
market portfolio is that the "... market portfolio is inefficient when portfolio weights are 
constrained... but the degree of inefficiency is found to be much smaller than in the case 
with unconstrained portfolio weights" (p. 373). This is a somewhat surprising conclusion 
in that the constraints increase the efficiency. It only applies however to ore type of 
transaction, that of short sales, and so does not add much to the strategic asset allocation 
discussion. 
The current UK perspective of strategic asset allocation is well set out in the Myners 
Review (2001). Although its title is concerned with institutional investment it is 
unfortunate that the main focus is on pensions, to the exclusion of other indirect 
investment vehicles. For self-administered (i. e. non-insured) schemes the allocation 
decisions are split between peer group total fund benchmarks, where the trustees delegate 
strategic asset allocation and security selection, and customised total fund benchmarks, 
where the trustees make the strategic decisions and then delegate security selection. 
Within defined contribution schemes an additional facility may exist whereby the 
member has a lifestyle-type choice in the allocation process. The peer group method of 
Strategic Asset Allocation is criticised in the Review as generating distorted allocations 
with "a [sic] historic industry consensus... serving the interests of the beneficiaries 
poorly" (p. 61). At the same time, the customised approach is over-reliant on trustees 
receiving allocation advice from a limited number of advisers. One of the principles 
therefore proposed by the Review is to increase the recognition of the importance of the 
strategic asset allocation decision, partly by measures to widen the range of asset classes 
under consideration and partly by reflection on the contribution that Strategic Asset 
Allocation can make. 
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2.5 Actual Strategic Asset Allocations 
A comparison of weights for the pension funds in a variety of countries is set out in 
Table 2. The importance of domestic equities in the US and UK (greater than 50%) is 
immediately obvious and contrasts strongly with (say) Germany, Japan or Netherlands. 
Possibly reasons for the differences are cultural or regulatory or just the size of the 
domestic market. Foreign assets show a generally lower spread in allocations but are 
possibly less a function of portfolio choice and more linked to regulatory constraints. 
Table 2 International comparison of pension fund percentage allocations 1998 
liquid loans domestic 
bonds 
domestic 
equities 
property foreign 
assets 
Australia 14 4 12 43 6 18 
Canada 5 3 38 27 3 15 
Chile 15 17 44 21 3 4 
Denmark 1 0 59 23 6 11 
Germany 0 33 43 10 7 7 
Japan 5 14 34 23 0 18 
France 0 18 65 10 2 5 
Italy 0 1 35 16 48 0 
Malaysia 24 27 32 18 1 0 
Netherlands 2 10 21 20 7 42 
Sweden 0 0 64 20 8 8 
Finland 13 0 69 9 7 2 
Singapore 28 0 70 0 0 0 
Switzerland 11 0 29 17 26 17 
UK 4 0 14 52 3 18 
US 4 1 21 53 0 11 
Source: National flows of funds balance sheets, cited in Davis zuuZ. 
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A comparison for mutual funds is set out in Table 3, although this is split not by the 
internal weights but by types of funds. The wide choice of types of fund (greater than 
shown in the table) raises the interesting question of efficiency. A tacit assumption of all 
of the above discussion is the need to produce an efficient portfolio, with an allocation 
process that will encompass all asset classes. If a fund company holds assets in all classes 
but parcels these up to sell funds that exclude certain classes, then the customer will by 
definition be holding an inefficient portfolio. 
Table 3 International comparison of mutual fund percentage allocations 1998 
Equity Bond Balanced Money Other 
US 55 15 7 23 
Europe 40 31 12 16 1 
France 18 26 24 31 1 
Italy 18 50 8 19 5 
UK 84 8 8 
Spain 20 37 18 25 
Germany 43 40 3 14 
Netherlands 54 27 8 9 2 
Source: FEFSI statistics, cited in Otten and Barns 2002. 
The Investment Management Association's Fund Management Survey (2003) looked at 
assets managed in the UK. This gives a confusing picture as it includes member firms 
managing investments within and outside the UK and also member firms with clients 
within and outside the UK. Asset allocation aggregated from the 55 member firms who 
participated in their survey, as at June 2002 is set out in Table 4. Little can be concluded 
on strategic allocations from this survey. Of interest however, is the concern expressed in 
the survey that "nearly 80% of UK assets are managed on a `passive' basis" (press 
release, page 1). 
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Table 4 Allocations of assets managed in the ITV ac at _T»no hm 
Fixed Interest % % 
Gilts and overseas government debt 12.7 
Corporate bonds 8.2 
Index-linked bonds 1.9 
High yield bonds 1.2 
Total-all bonds 24 
Equities 
UK 20 
Overseas 
North America 10.6 
European 5.8 
US 12.2 
Japan 3.0 
Emerging markets 1.7 
Other 0.7 
Total overseas 34 
Money Market 12 
Property, venture capital and other 10 
Source: Investment Management Association, 2003. Fund Management Survey 2002. 
To put these strategic or tactical weights in context, UK asset classes' actual weights by 
market capitalisation are shown in Table 5. Long term trends for UK pension fund 
weights are shown in Table 6. Significant changes over this 21 year period are the growth 
and then decline of domestic equity, contrasted with fairly regular growth of overseas 
equities. At the same time there has been a major reduction in domestic bonds in the first 
half of the period followed by some growth towards the latter end, which also coincides 
with the growth of overseas bonds. 
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Table 5 Market capitalisation of UK asset classes as at 31St December 2001 
Asset class Market 
capitalisation 
£bn 
Market 
capitalisation 
% 
UK money market securities 541 22 
UK fixed-income government bonds 204 8 
UK index-linked government bonds 71 3 
UK index-linked non-government bonds 5 0 
UK equity 1,482 61 
UK investment property 130 6 
source: rnivi r reasury, ivierrui Lyncn, London Mock Exchange, Investment Property Databank, cited in 
Blake 2003. 
One of the problems with these comparisons is the selective nature of the data. Table 6 is 
the WM Company pension fund universe, one of the two main UK providers of this type 
of information. The other main provider is CAPS, whose equivalent data is set out in 
Table 7 for comparison. As can be seen by comparing 2000, there are similarities 
between the two sets of information, but also some not insignificant differences. 
Table 6 UK pensions WM All Funds Universe, asset allocations 
`82 `84 `86 `88 `90 `92 `94 `96 `98 `00 '02 
UK equities 43 47 51 53 54 58 54 53 51 48 39 
Overseas equities 14 16 20 16 18 22 22 22 21 23 25 
UK bonds 19 17 13 10 6 4 6 6 9 10 12 
Overseas bonds 1 3 4 3 3 4 3 4 
UK indexed 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 5 6 6 9 
UK property 18 13 8 10 8 6 6 5 5 5 7 
Overseas property 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Cash/other 3 4 4 6 7 
11 
4 4 6 6 4 3 
Source: The WM Company. 
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Table 7 UK Pensions CAPS asset allocations. 2000 
Asset class % 
Cash 3 
UK equities 48 
UK property 2.8 
UK index-linked 7.7 
UK fixed income bonds 13.2 
International equities 22.2 
International fixed income bonds 3.1 
Source: CAPS pension fund average portfolio, cited in Blake (2003) 
A summarised version for US pension fund asset class weights is given in Table 8. 
Observations on comparisons between these and the UK position in Table 6 include: 
lower use of domestic equities and considerably lower use of overseas equities; much 
greater use of domestic bonds but slightly less use of overseas bonds; lower use of 
property, both domestic and overseas; and higher cash/other allocations. 
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Table 8 Aggregate portfolio weights for US pension funds. 
1986 1990 1994 
Domestic equities 45.6 42.1 44.8 
International equities 2.6 4.5 8.3 
Domestic bonds 37.8 38.9 34.2 
International bonds .0 .0 2.0 
Index bonds .0 .0 .0 
Cash/other 7.8 9.8 7.5 
Domestic property 6.2 4.7 3.2 
International property .0 .0 .0 
Source: Greenwich Associates, as cited in Blake et al (1999). 
None of these actual allocations show a weight for overseas equities anywhere near 
those proposed by Britten-Jones (op cit) for US based investors. These are shown in 
Table 9. 
Table 9 Estimated Global Tangency portfolio weights from viewpoint of US 
investor 
1977-1996 1977-1986 1987-1996 
Australia 12.8 6.8 21.6 
Austria 3.0 -9.7 22.5 
Belgium 29.0 7.1 66.0 
Canada -45.2 -32.7 -68.9 
Denmark 14.2 -29.6 68.8 
France 1.2 -0.7 -22.8 
Germany -18.2 9.4 -58.6 
Italy 5.9 22.2 -15.3 
Japan 5.6 57.7 -24.5 
U. K. 32.5 
- 
42.5 3.5 
U. S. ----ý 59.3 F 27.0 107.9 
Source: Britten-Jones (1999) 
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The concept of strategic asset allocation has been ignored to a large extent by the 
finance community. For over 50 years research has been undertaken on mean variance 
analysis, market efficiency and other areas of finance, but only in the last decade or so 
has long term asset allocation started to emerge. There would seem to be a growing 
consensus that SAA is a long term decision on weights of different asset classes for a 
portfolio. This has chiefly been driven by the need for asset-liability matching for 
pension funds, a requirement that is not so necessary, or not quite so overt for other 
types of investors. Actual allocations would seem to show high levels of convergence 
within a country or fund type, but there are major differences by country. The focus 
and recommendations of the Myners Review would indicate that greater attention in 
the UK will be placed on the strategic asset allocation decision, particularly in terms 
of pension funds. 
2.6 Market Segmentation 
2.6.1 Sectoral efficiency 
This is the last of the sections that comprise the formal literature review. The first and 
second were a fairly descriptive "history" of the growth of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and some of its tests. The conclusion was somewhat vague or mixed, with 
a fairly general recognition that it is not perfectly efficient but at the same time there 
is no strong evidence that it is sufficiently inefficient so that investors can consistently 
make abnormal gains. Some polarization of views or opinions does take place, as 
many practitioners, academic researchers and regulators take fairly dogmatic views, 
with statements that the market is or is not efficient. These positions seem to be 
predicated on two extremes: firstly based on tests at the level of the equity market, 
resulting in the UK market as measured by the FTSE 100 index being described as 
efficient or not, (in effect a top down approach) and secondly a consideration, often 
using fictitious portfolios ranked by performance, that aggregate up 
from individual 
shares to the market as a whole, but again indicating efficiency or the 
lack of it. 
The third, fourth and fifth sections of this literature review chapter looked at strategic 
asset allocation. Again there is no large body of literature that examines sectors. 
There 
is much on performance attribution and, as above, a range of views on efficiency, 
but 
84 
no great focus on the role of the various sectors in the strategic asset allocation 
process. 
The aim of this final section is to pull together the very limited number of research 
papers in the finance literature that sit somewhere between the two polarized positions 
described above. In terms of strategic asset allocation, it would be rare for a fund 
manager of a domestic fund personally having to decide the percentage strategic 
allocations to a single class called "equity". (Although this could be feasible with a 
well diversified international or global fund. ) This view is supported by Francis 
(1986), Bing (1971) and Cuthbertson et al (1999) who take the view that it is more 
common for the allocations to be at the sector level. This section therefore considers 
the available literature that examines sector level efficiency. 
2.6.2 Efficiency and market sectors 
It is very common for research papers on efficiency, particularly with a method based 
on tests for randomness, to take a single index as the proxy for the market. Examples 
of this are numerous, including Chelley-Steeley (op cit), Dimson et al (2003), Clare 
and Thomas (1995), Dissanaike (2002), Ferson et al (2003), Milionis (2004), Mills 
and Jordanov (2003) and Summers et al (2004). For the UK the choice of appropriate 
index tends to depend on the time scale and/or frequency that is being examined, 
resulting in use of the Financial Times Industrial Ordinary Index or the FTSE All 
Share, the Barclays de Zoete Wedd equity stock price index or the FTSE 30; the 
alternative approach being to generate portfolios from the bottom up, usually based 
upon randomly selected shares. 
Of particular interest and relevance is Groenwold and Fraser's 2001 study of IID- 
normal assumptions. For the UK (although the paper also considers the USA) the 
monthly data is from the Datastream Global Indices series but broken down by the 
Financial Times actuary classifications for constituent industry sectors, resulting in 
five sectors comprising Resources, General Industries, Consumption Goods, Services 
and Financials. The study is concerned with asset pricing models and the validity of 
the underlying assumption of IID-normal returns and so is only obliquely related to 
efficiency, but it does highlight a limited number of differences by sector, for example 
"... there was evidence of considerable ARCH in many of the sectors- both for the US 
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and the UK" (p. 786). Similarly there was "... some evidence of AR in the Financial 
sector for the US and the General Industries sector for the UK and evidence of 
ARCH... in the Resources sector for the UK" (p. 788). In tests of Conditional CAPM 
they also show: 
For both markets, the money growth rate variable in the Resources and 
General Industries sectors... is statistically insignificantly different from zero. 
... 
(T)he intercepts... are, individually, statistically significant at conventional 
levels, while in the UK case, only for the Financial sector are we able to reject 
the null hypothesis. (p. 791) 
Thus, although not the concern of the paper, Groenwold and Fraser show that there 
are significant differences by sector. Differences that will be lost or unobserved when 
efficiency tests are performed on a single, market based index. 
In an equivalent paper Fraser and Groenewold (2001) model mean variance efficiency 
in a GARCH format for the Australian market using sector portfolios based upon 
Mineral Extraction, General Industries, Consumption Goods, Services and finally 
Financial. They find evidence of ARCH effects in General Industries and Services, an 
"absence of higher order correlation in the residuals of Mineral Extraction and 
Consumption Goods" (p. 66) and residuals that are non-normal for all sectors except 
Services and Financials. Thus there is strong evidence that sectors have differing 
attributes. 
A paper that was more concerned with sectors or market segmentation was that of 
Cuthbertson et al (1999). This was a multi-variate study of asset pricing models and 
so had some relevance to market efficiency, for instance "Clearly, rejection of the 
EMH based on aggregate data may be due to mispricing in only a sub-sector of the 
market" (p. 217) although the question was whether "... rejection of [CAPM] at the 
aggregate level [can be traced] to a failure of the CAPM to hold in specific sub- 
sectors of the market" (p. 218). Their industrial sector classification followed a similar 
structure to that of Groenwold and Fraser, examining five groups: Industrials (with 
and without Oil); Financial Services; Capital Goods; Consumer Goods; and the 
balance of the market defined as Other Sectors. No support was found for CAPM at 
the sector level but there was a range of results in covariances between the sectors. If 
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each sector is defined as "the market", then there was a range of sectoral results with 
VAR parameters close to 5% rejection for Capital Goods and Consumer Goods and 
The null hypothesis that returns in excess of equilibrium cannot be rejected at 
the 5% level for Capital Goods, Consumer Goods and Other Sectors. However 
(sic), for the remaining sectors, the reduction in the Wald statistics is not 
sufficient to give unequivocal support to the own variance model. (p. 231) 
Their conclusion is that "there seems to be some support for the... variance model 
within certain sub-sectors of the market" (p. 231), (their italics). As with Groenwold 
and Fraser, the very clear conclusion is that disaggregation of an index acting as a 
proxy to the market into a set of sector indices produces a range of results by sector. 
This immediately casts doubt on the many research papers that support or reject 
market efficiency at the market level, even though these two papers are not directly 
concerned with specific tests of the EMH. 
The only research identified in the literature search that uses the same sector level 
segregation as proposed for this thesis is an unpublished conference paper by Yu and 
Stark (2004). This is chiefly concerned with the use of style strategies in the UK; style 
being viewed as value, growth, small/large capitalisation, momentum, contrarian and 
high-tec. Their analysis is a comparison of style in relation to micro-factors such as 
book to market value or leverage but part of the paper focuses on the same 29 sectors 
taken from Datastream as are utilised here. Some of their observations (p. 31) are: 
" Growth stocks are overweight in Pharmacuticals & Biotechnology, Software, 
Media and IT 
" Value style has a bias towards Steel, Utility and Diversified 
" Small capitalisation tends towards Steel, Household Goods & Textiles and 
Diversified 
" Small capitalisation favours Oil & Gas, Pharmacuticals & Biotechnology and 
Telecoms 
Their conclusions are less sector-specific but it is interesting that different style 
investors tend to adjust their weights away from the market index weightings with a 
focus on sector. Of course, there is no suggestion that it is the sector itself that is 
selected, rather it is the aggregation by sector of the stocks selected on a style basis 
that produce the results. 
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Despite extensive searches, no other sector-level papers with a link to efficiency tests 
were identified, although there is a separate strand that seeks either cointegration, 
correlation, and transmission of shocks between markets at an international level or 
high level asset classes such as equity versus bonds or real estate within a domestic 
market. A good example of this type of methodology is Payne and Sahu (2004) who 
compare global real estate markets with the US equity market. They test the various 
markets for the random walk hypothesis using the unit root tests of Dickey Fuller and 
Phillips Perron and a variance ratio test. Cointegration is examined by means of the 
Johansen Juselius cointegration analysis and the transmission of shock is measured by 
a VAR model and Granger Causality tests. This methodology will be reviewed later, 
but at this stage their conclusions are of interest in that the three markets exhibited the 
behaviour of a random walk and they were not cointegrated. The conclusion is 
The random walk hypothesis and cointegration results suggest that investors 
can derive diversification benefits through the domestic and world real estate 
markets and the world stock market in both the short and long 
run. . . 
Moreover, the absence of cointegration provides support for the 
efficient market hypothesis... (p. 207) 
The most common research on cointegration is that of comparison between different 
equity markets. Examples of this include Europe versus the US by Gerrits and Yuce 
(1999), central European markets by Gilmore and McManus (2003), African markets 
by Smith et al (2002) or eclectic mixes of countries by Heimonen (2002). Their 
conclusions, often based on different methodologies, are generally that there is 
conflicting evidence. For instance, Gerrits and Yuce find cointegration between some 
but not all market under examination; Heimonen identifies convergence of ex post 
returns between some but not all markets; Smith et al identify some African markets 
as efficient but not others; and Gilmore and McManus concludes that some markets 
do reject random walk behaviour whilst others do not. 
This mix of results at an inter country comparison level, when combined with the 
domestic but sector level analysis provide strong support for the consideration of 
efficiency within the UK domestic equity market by sector. 
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2.6.3 Summary 
Market efficiency, or the efficient market hypothesis or the rational market 
hypothesis, has been the subject of a vast amount of research in the past forty years. 
From its inception it very rapidly generated extensive work that was to a large extent 
highly supportive. Its growth coincided with the development of asset pricing models, 
so enabling tests of the hypothesis. Some time in its first two decades it became the 
dominant paradigm in this particular area of finance and gained wide acceptance 
within the academic community. This academic acceptance is evidenced by its almost 
compulsory inclusion in any text book on finance or financial management. 
Acceptance in the financial market place was slower. This was possibly due to active 
fund managers, analysts and the like possibly not wishing to admit their failure to 
beat the market. 
The second two decades of its life has seen growth in evidence that the efficiency is 
not perfect. Issues such as the size effect, time effects, mean reversion and numerous 
other potential flaws have been identified and well documented. These have tended to 
coalesce under the heading of behavioural finance, but to date the lack of a single, 
unifying model has not completed a paradigm shift and market efficiency still 
appears in the text books of finance courses at all levels. At the same time the market 
place has tacitly accepted the impossibility of beating the market, as evidenced by the 
continued growth of overt and covert index tracking. 
It is fairly evident that the efficient market hypothesis does not hold true for all 
investments in all asset classes in all market places all of the time. Despite this, it is 
recognised by many that the flaws or anomalies or mistakes, whilst existing, do not 
allow any great scope to achieve abnormal returns to be achieved. It is similarly 
evident that no successor to the efficient market hypothesis has yet been accepted by 
the academic community. 
There are numerous areas for further research in strategic asset allocation. Firstly 
much of the current analysis has had pension fund allocation as its focus. This needs 
to be extended to encompass all indirect investment vehicles, including life assurance, 
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unit trusts, investment trusts and also the direct investors, both commercial and 
individual. Secondly, where research does consider strategic asset allocation this tends 
to be a secondary issue with papers on efficiency or market timing or selectivity 
alluding to strategic allocations. There is much scope for the analysis to switch to 
consideration of the impact of asset class selection on portfolio performance. Thirdly, 
although it is growing, the use of international components (equities and bonds) is 
very low. There may be regulatory and behavioural reasons for this home bias and 
there equally may be implications for risk-return inefficiencies generated by the 
domestic preferences. Fourthly there is the possible concern that a finance house has, 
in aggregate, an efficient portfolio, but that by offering specific products other than 
balanced funds the clients' fund will be sub-optimal. Fifthly there seems to be no 
accepted approach either a) to hedging the overseas component of a fund or b) to 
including foreign currency as an asset class in its own right. Finally is the acceptance 
of the long term nature of strategic asset allocation versus the myopic portfolio choice 
of a mean variance approach. 
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CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
A research study based on one aspect of the Myners Review, namely strategic asset 
allocation, almost invariably has to address market efficiency. Had this study taken 
place in the 1970s or 1980s the topic would have been seen as highly current and the 
concept of the rational market hypothesis would have labelled the underlying research 
philosophy as accepting the then dominant paradigm. The last twenty years however, 
have seen a shift. Unexplained anomalies, combined with the growth in research into 
behavioural finance have moved market efficiency away from the limelight. At the 
same time, there has been a further shift, this time in research style, with qualitative 
research, case study based research and grounded theory being seen as the new 
dominant (or at least growing in popularity) approaches. These two shifts are 
addressed in this chapter on research methodology, as is a third issue: the growing 
trend in UK based finance research moving away from an American-centric 
quantitative empirical methodology towards a more pluralistic or less extreme/more 
central viewpoint. 
The chapter outlines the growth in modern Western philosophical attitudes to 
research, places greater emphasis on the work of Hayek, due to its relevance to 
rational markets, gives an up-to-date summary of some current thinking in relation to 
finance, economics and accounting and concludes with the links between this history 
and the study of the rational market hypothesis. 
3.2 Research Methodology: an overview 
3.2.1 Early views 
Many texts on (Western) research methodology and epistemology trace the origins of 
the philosophical approach to the Socratic method, as extended by Plato to the 
concept of the ideal forms method or alternatively to Aristotle's rejection of 
ideal 
form and the use of observation; Platonism being "the theory that abstract entities 
exist, ... 
(in fact they) are the only things that really or wholly exist... " (p. 665, 
Bullock and Trombley, 1999), whereas Aristotle visualised a set of general principles 
that could be interpreted or understood, based on observation (Mukherji, 
2000). These 
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two views are of some importance to any debate on epistemology, or the 
philosophical underpinning of how we define knowledge. Taking for example, the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, Plato's ideal form might include CAPM; Aristotle's 
explanatory principles may have generated the relationship between risk and return; 
and epistemology may see knowledge about CAPM as having being derived by each 
user, or knowledge having been learnt from a text book or knowledge of how to use it 
without any understanding of the underlying theory of CAPM. 
Over the centuries these debates have resulted in a tension or split between an 
empirical view of research and rationalism, an issue that still remains unresolved in 
discussions about the philosophical interpretation of knowledge to this day (Bernard, 
2000). Rationalism (originally the disbelief in the supernatural) has its roots in the 
work of Rene Descartes (1596-1650) and regards knowledge as being achieved by 
individuals via a reasoning process. There are `a priori truths' (hence the alternative 
name of apriorism) that become evident to the rational thinker, so rationalism can be 
seen to be the seventeenth century descendent of Plato's ideal form. It still "underpins 
much of modern continental philosophy (but) empiricism became dominant in 
Britain" (p. 12), (Ryan et al, 2002). The alternative epistemology of empiricism is that 
all knowledge is based on experience, hence David Hume's (1711-1776) conceit of a 
clean slate (tabula rasa) or Locke's blank sheet. Empiricism thus rejects rationalism 
and views it as transcendent or beyond physics and therefore metaphysical. 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) suggested a middle way between rationalism and 
empiricism in proposing that the existence of a priori truths is due to the way the 
individual's brain is structured. His `transcendental idealism' also addressed a further 
debate that was ontological rather than epistemological, namely that of idealism and 
realism. Realism being concerned with how do we know what is real?, compared to 
idealism where the mind or a mental state is the only thing that exists. 
Rather than continuing the debate between the two competing views or 
epistemologies, the sixteenth century also saw the start of the scientific method, albeit 
having greater links with empiricism than rationalism. Known as positivism, it was 
the idea that "it is a philosophy which both proclaims the suitability of the scientific 
method to all forms of knowledge and gives an account of what that method entails" 
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(p. 14, Bryman, 1988). Positivism was extended by Comte (1798-1857) who proposed 
that all knowledge is scientific in terms of describing phenomena. Comte is regarded 
as the father of sociology, but many of his ideas gained wider acceptance in other 
disciplines, resulting particularly in the development of logical positivism, 
particularly via the Vienna Circle (chiefly in the 1930's). 
3.2.2 Twentieth Century viewpoints 
At its core, logical positivism assumes that knowledge is based on experience, that 
metaphysical issues could not be explained by science and that it is only answerable 
questions that should be asked. Coming out of this is the work of Hayek, which has 
strong resonances with the rational market hypothesis and as such will be discussed 
later. The Vienna Circle also gave a strong thrust towards quantitative research and 
was highly influential "in American social science which took the form of 
legitimizing empiricism in the sense that quantitative data could be used to test 
theories" (p. 122) (Mukherji, 2000). Karl Popper was critical of this position and 
advocated critical rationalism as a replacement to or extension of the then orthodoxy. 
Popper's main argument was centered on his rejection of verification in the scientific 
method. Prior to his work, it was assumed that a theory or hypothesis could be 
verified by observation. Instead, critical rationalism turned this round, using his 
proposed principle of falsification, with the validity of a theory thus being `measured' 
by how well it withstood tests to disprove it. 
I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being 
singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense, but I shall require that its 
logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of empirical 
tests, in a negative sense; it must be possible for an empirical scientific system 
to be refuted by experience. (p. 41, his italics, Popper, 1959). 
There are obviously close links to the scientific method here, with theories always 
being conjectural in their nature and ultimately refutable, such that Ryan et al (2002) 
observe that "theories progress accumulating truth value through an almost Darwinian 
notion of survival of the fittest. Absolute truth is an almost unobtainable ideal 
but is 
the ultimate aim of all science" (p. 20). The early versions of this were such that a 
theory can or should be rejected as soon as there is evidence of falsification. This 
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rather rigid or strong position was later replaced by Popper with a more relaxed 
version, in effect that although evidence of falsification may cast doubt on a theory, it 
should not be fully rejected until it was replaced by a new theory (Delanty, 1997). 
Additionally, Popper's work was against the logical positivists' inductive approach, or 
the drawing of inferences based on observation, as there was no underlying 
hypothesis waiting to be falsified. Instead he suggested the hypothetico-deductive 
methodology as this obviated the inductive problem of not accepting the possibility of 
a theory being false. Popper's falsification and hypothetico-deductions were 
challenged in three ways, from Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. Positivism, logical 
positivism and falsification were rejected by Kuhn and replaced by what he called the 
prevailing intersubjective consensus of those researchers working, researching or 
teaching in that particular field (Mukherji, 2000). This is a more temporal approach, 
with the scientific community at times accepting normal science such that research 
and the development of new knowledge tends to accept the then current paradigms. 
Towards the end of the life cycle of the paradigm, persistent anomalies are identified 
and normal science is replaced by extraordinary research until a new paradigm 
achieves intersubj ective consensus. 
In a similar way Lakatos put forward the idea of research programmes (or 
aggregations of theories) and the commitment of the scientific community to that 
research programme. Over time the programme is seen as progressive if it identifies 
new discoveries and supports existing theories. Alternatively the programme is 
degenerative if it fails to achieve new developments and there is a new programme to 
replace it. In this respect, Barbour (1974) likens both Lakatos and Kuhn and their use 
of paradigms or research programmes in the scientific community as being equivalent 
to a religion. Feyerabend took this slightly further, with the view that when a 
theory/paradigm/research programme was losing general acceptance, then it is the 
language of observations that gains importance and that the theories become 
incommensurable. Research thus ceases to have any validity, all the various 
methodological approaches have flaws and there is anarchy. 
Although approached from a different direction, Feyerabend's conclusions find 
resonances with postmodernism and post-structuralism; the latter being evident 
in the 
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work of Derrida, where he argues that "there is no absolute foundation for beliefs and 
that no belief is more fundamental than any other" (p. 26) (Ryan et al, 2002); the 
former being a wide school, more aligned to the arts rather than science, but strongly 
against the philosophical debates on ontology, epistemology and methodology. 
3.3 Friedrich A von Hayek 
In the earlier overview of research methodology, brief mention was made of the work 
of Friedrich Hayek. Although not directly part of the Vienna Circle, and indeed not 
directly a philosopher proposing new paradigms on theories of knowledge, ontology, 
epistemology or methodology, his work is in fact of relevance to this doctoral thesis. 
Not all of his work is discussed here; instead, some of his reflections on the above are 
considered, particularly those that have a more specific link to markets, rational 
investors, price setting and the rationality of a market or its investors. 
Hayek's view of society and how it worked lay between two polarised positions: on 
the one hand is the natural or organic structure and on the other is artificial or man- 
made structure (physical, or more particularly, organisational). For instance, a market 
for trading shares did not exist before the need for a market and neither was a market 
invented. In effect a market grew or evolved because it brought benefits to its users, 
so giving unplanned order through thought of minds and actions of society. From this 
position, that of unplanned complex structures, he argues that it is "this interplay of 
the rules of conduct and of the individuals with the actions of other individuals and 
the external circumstances in producing an overall order" (p. 71, Hayek, 1969). 
There must however be some regularity in individual behaviour to allow stable order, 
these being defined by Hayek as 'rules'. Against this, not all individuals need to 
follow all the rules. Thus we can immediately see the link between this philosophical 
position and two aspects of investment, namely that a stock market can perform not 
because it was invented, but due to its unplanned albeit useful structure, and that 
investors will trade following individual behaviour which generates stable order. 
Although Hayek was putting forward a logical argument against planned economies 
his view of the market process was that market order was achieved precisely because 
it did not require planning or common aims or agreement on action. Again, this has 
resonances with market participants with differing goals and time horizons, various 
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liabilities to match, attitudes to risk, expectations of the future and all other factors in 
investment decision making. He expressed this well in The Mirage of Social Justice, 
stating: 
That interdependence of all men, ... not only is the effect of the market order but could not have been brought about by any other means. What today 
connects the life of any European or American with what happens in 
Australia, Japan or Zaire are repercussions transmitted by the network of 
market relations. (p. 57, Hayek, 1976). 
More specifically, his views applied to price setting, although he was writing about 
product prices rather than stocks and shares when, in Individualism and Economic 
Order, (1948) he referred to the price mechanism as a marvel. The price mechanism 
was based on all players' knowledge; knowledge which Hayek saw as subjective and 
which has to be found by and interpreted differently by all players. This is well 
explained by Butler (1983), where he discusses the ideas, beliefs or concepts that 
actually motivate people, a set of constructs that may be totally different from the 
explanation they give to the wider world for their motivations. In effect, individuals 
will react to new information about a share/company and reach different decisions or 
views about the impact of that news on their individual expectations. Hayek's work 
could therefore be seen as an adumbration of behavioural finance, with various 
theories of finance being the core to the `ideas' whereas the new work on subjective 
behaviour being the underlying subjective explanation. 
Hayek took this approach to greater detail in his "Studies in Philosophy, Politics and 
Economics" (1967), where he espoused Popper's hypothetico-deductive system (p. 4), 
taking it further to the idea that "science does not explain the unknown by the known, 
but, on the contrary, the known by the unknown" (p. 5). This assumes, according to 
Hayek, that individuals follow sets of rules (possibly an extension of Gestalt 
perception) that guide their actions, rules that are "known by none, and understood by 
all" (p. 85). This is extended to include sets of rules or patterns, which he calls 
rationalist constructivism, albeit recognizing that "reason is not the judge but an 
instrument" (p. 87). In this he is aware he is very much in line with Adam Smith's 
invisible hand, when he states: 
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The distinction between a spontaneous order based on abstract rules which leave individuals free to use their own knowledge... and an 
organization. . . based on commands is of central importance for the 
understanding of the principles of a free society..... By using its (spontaneous 
order) we can achieve an order of a much more complex set of facts than we 
could ever achieve by deliberate arrangement. (p. 162) 
Spontaneous unplanned order is referred to as catallaxy and applies equally to 
economic order as it does to justice or morality. Interestingly, this is tangential to 
comments by Maughan and Copp (2003) where they consider economic efficiency in 
relation to the role of law and the Old Testament, assuming that "(L)aws and rules, 
spiritual and temporal, implicit and explicit, are public goods" (p. 249). 
Gray (1984) sees Hayek as very much a post-Kantian, with the view that social order 
develops or grows in a spontaneous and unplanned manner. He highlights the 
confusion between an economy and a catallaxy, such that "order which is the product 
of conscious direction... itself always depends on a larger spontaneous order" (p. 35). 
In fact, he supports one of the key components of Hayek's work with the assertion 
that 
Hayek's conception of social institutions as vehicles for the generation and 
dissemination of knowledge in fact represents one of the most important 
paradigm shifts his work brings about in social theory- a shift from the 
criticism and evaluation of social institutions by reference to preferred 
principles of morality to an assessment of them in terms of their capacity to 
generate, transmit and use knowledge. 
Hayek states his conception of social theory, and of the central importance in 
it of undesigned or spontaneous orders, programmatically and with 
unsurpassable lucidity. (p. 28) 
Thus, at its most simple, Hayek's view of equilibrium in the marketplace is three-fold. 
Firstly there is the assumption that individuals follow a Gestalt-like set of rules, 
applying their own interpretation or views to new information. Secondly is the 
assumption that successful social institutions or organizations such as exchanges have 
evolved rather than been designed. Thirdly, is the difference between ideas of 
individual motivation and post-hoc ideas of explanation. 
97 
3.4 Finance and Economics 
3.4.1 Positive and normative economics 
This section reverts back to the earlier overview of research methodologies, bringing 
it more up to date and locating the main theme within the disciplines of finance and 
economics. It begins with consideration of Friedman's discussion of positive 
economics, then summarises the relevant parts of the most well known text on 
accounting methodologies by Ryan et al and concludes with Zingales' new theory of 
the firm. 
One of the seminal papers on economic research methodology is Friedman's The 
Methodology of Positive Economics (1953, but taken from Breit and Hochman, 
1968). As recognised earlier, logical positivism, or rather the interpretation of it set 
out by the Vienna Circle, was readily accepted in American social science research. It 
is not overly surprising therefore, that the underpinnings of logical positivism are 
reflected in Friedman's work. Similarly, Friedman's location at the University of 
Chicago has close physical connections with Fama's development of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis, also at the University of Chicago. Indeed, much of the 
collaborative developments and the huge amount of research supporting EMH was 
generated at Chicago and follows closely the view of Friedman's positive economics. 
The main themes of the paper were based round JM Keynes' view that `positive 
economics' is the knowledge of what is, whereas `normative economics' is 
knowledge of what ought to be. Two economic actors can thus agree on positive 
economics but disagree on what is the desired outcome of policy. Alternatively, two 
economic actors can agree on desired outcomes but disagree on the necessary positive 
theories needed to achieve those ends. Interestingly, Friedman used minimum wages 
as an example of this type of decision, and over fifty years later UK political parties 
still disagree on the positive economics of this, whilst agreeing on the normative aims. 
Friedman argued that "the ultimate goal of a positive science is the development of a 
theory or hypothesis that yields valid and meaningful predictions about phenomena" 
(p. 26). The theory is a mixture of two components, a language or set of tautologies 
and a body of hypotheses which "abstract essential features of complex reality" (p. 
26). Of the language, he recognizes the difficulty in application, using new 
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information which may affect a share's price as an example. For instance, does 
rumour of increased profits operate on the supply of equity on the market, or on 
demand for them? Of the body of hypotheses, he states that "theory is to be judged by 
its predictive power for the class of phenomena which it is intended to explain" (p. 
27). There is no direct concept of falsification here, tests of hypotheses are to be on 
the correctness of the predictions and a hypothesis is to be rejected if its predictions 
are wrong more often than those of an alternative hypothesis. 
In terms of underlying assumptions, Friedman welcomed parsimony in theories, 
stating that "a hypothesis is important if it explains much by little" (p. 30). He was 
happy for a theory to be `descriptively false' so long as it permitted valid predictions. 
As such, the role of assumptions is split into three different categories: description; to 
facilitate indirect testing of the theory; and a method of specifying the conditions 
within which the test of the theory should take place. This overall view of the 
philosophy, of the instrumentalist use of positivism was, according to Ryan et al 
(2002), the perception or definition of what constituted good research of the editors of 
The Journal of Accounting and Economics. 
Thus, it can be seen that there are close links between the Vienna Circle and Hayek, 
between empiricism and the American philosophical approach to research, and 
between economics and accounting research traditions. 
3.4.2 Critical and middle range thinking in the UK 
Ryan et al (2002) discuss this in detail in their text on research methodology in 
accounting and put forward what they see as the traditions of research in finance. At 
the heart of finance research is the concept of rationality, although currently being 
questioned by the growth of behavioural school of finance. 
Their main conclusion is that the dominant finance research framework is "the 
development of theoretical models which are then tested by ... empirical 
data" (p. 
51). The theory development is centered in "the neo-classical research programme in 
economics, (where): 
economic agents are, at the individual level, formally rational (and) 
financial markets are perfectly competitive (and) 
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information is freely available. " (p. 51) 
Additionally, investors are assumed to "have the ability to evaluate and rank choices" 
(p. 52) and individual investor behaviour is "often aggregated up to the market level" 
(p. 52). Rationality has often been questioned but "although the adoption of a 
different paradigm might alleviate some of the problems.. .a considerable 
body of 
knowledge could be lost" (p. 52). 
There is a hint of criticism in their review, of an over-reliance on empiricism, of an 
American led rejection of other non-positivist approaches to finance research and a 
slowly developing move of UK accounting research away from that embodied by the 
University of Chicago and the Journal of Finance. This is evident in discussion of 
Habermas and the `hermeneutic circle', addressing the theory dependence of 
observation and the feasibility of applying natural science methodology to the social 
sciences, the result being "problems which have become a major issue for accounting 
researchers" (p. 34). For instance, referring to Morgan and Smirich's 1980 
classification of ontological assumptions, much of finance research is objective and at 
one end of the continuum comprising "reality as a: 
Concrete structure (naive realism) 
Concrete process (transcendental realism) 
Contextual field of information (contextual relativism) 
Symbolic discourse (transcendental idealism) 
Social construction (socially mediated realism) 
Projection of human imagination (idealism)" (p. 36) 
This is extended in Hopper and Powell's 1995 taxonomy of accounting research, 
where mainstream accounting research is defined as functionalist by being both 
objective and regulatory. This compares to interpretive research (subjective and 
regulatory) and critical accounting research (applicable if either objective or 
subjective, but radical rather than regulatory). 
Ryan et al's (2002) text refers to Baker and Bettners' (1997) analysis of 
American 
accounting research. Using the above frameworks, plus that of Laughlin's 
1995 
classification of social research "they show that less than 1 per cent of 
(papers 
published in North American academic journals) can be classified as 
interpretive or 
critical research" (p. 48). Their conclusion is that accounting and 
finance researchers 
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must adopt a much more pluralist approach to methodology. Laughlin does not 
actually prefer pluralism, with his paper's `middle range'. He predicates his approach 
on "the developments in ... the generation of the efficient market hypothesis... (that 
have) created demands ... 
for accounting academics sympathetic to this thinking for 
empirical research" (p. 64); this being contrasted with a search for other 
methodologies by, inter alia, the behavioural school, resulting in increased diversity 
and tension in the literature. Research is, or rather, has been located in three 
dimensions of theory, methodology and change, with most attitudes being at one 
extreme of the various continuums. To reduce polarisation Laughlin therefore argues 
well for a general shift by all accounting researchers to a middle range in terms of 
theory and methodology and change. 
If Ryan et al (2002) and Laughlin (1995) reflect current thinking of UK accounting 
and finance, then the 2000 paper of Zingales gives one current American perspective. 
Here the proposal is less philosophical and more pragmatic. The study of corporate 
finance, namely capital structure, valuation, efficiency, and corporate governance has 
been "deeply rooted in an underlying theory of the firm" (p. 1623). This underlying 
theory has been highly successful through the twentieth century in having "a 
tremendous impact on the way we think about corporate finance" (p. 1624). Against 
this background, Zingales posits that the nature of the firm is changing: firms were 
asset intensive, vertically integrated and had tight control over employees. He sees 
firms at the turn of the century as now being loose conglomerates, with human capital 
as the crucial asset and with dispersed investors. 
Much of the discussion is based on power and authority and is not of direct relevance 
here, but one section is highly moot. Firstly, "what distinguishes the firm from the 
market is the web of specific investments" (p. 1645) and secondly the "fundamental 
difference between the working of the firm and the working of the markets" (p. 1646) 
which could result in the need for firms to specialise rather than diversify. One 
possible outcome from this viewpoint (not identified by Zingales) could therefore be 
for the investor to be less concerned with individual firms and instead achieve 
diversification by markets. This has immediate ramifications for strategic asset 
allocation. 
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3.5 Discussion 
3.5.1 Efficiency and the work of Hayek 
Research into the efficient market or the rational market hypothesis has taken place 
over the last forty years and has chiefly been based in the United States. Thus it is 
easy to see how it sits methodologically within that period's approach to research. At 
the most basic, the hypothesis is an abstract entity (Plato) and is subject to the 
scientific method and Compte's positivism. The influence of the Vienna Circle on the 
dominant research methodology of the United States is very evident and the vast 
amount of quantitative research on the hypothesis (with the commensurate almost 
total exclusion of other research styles) very much legitimized this non-qualitative 
testing of the hypothesis. Similarly, it is easy to see the early papers on rational 
market hypothesis testing as being verification, followed in later years by a greater 
acceptance of Popper and the growth in falsification tests using critical rationalism. 
When early anomalies were identified there was an attempt to reject the hypothesis on 
the basis of one failure, but as Popper switched to his later replacement of an old 
theory by a new one in his attitude to falsification, so there was a growth in 
recognition that EMH may be flawed but did not have a successor and so could not be 
rejected. Both Kuhn's and Lakatos' concepts of intersubjective consensus of the 
scientific community and research programmes also sit well with the last forty years. 
Market rationality and efficiency have regularly been seen in conjunction with 
Modigliani and Miller's work on capital structure and dividend theory, with Sharpe, 
Linter and Ross' work on asset pricing, Markowitz's mean-variance space, Black and 
Scholes with option pricing or Merton on stochastic processes. These pillars of 
finance are readily seen and accepted as an intersubjective consensus or an 
overarching research programme. 
The work of Hayek is particularly close to rationality, so it is surprising that in all the 
literature reviewed in the earlier chapters, it is only in one particular quote by Ray 
Ball that this link is made, namely the contrast between rational liberalism, "the belief 
in the ability of individuals to rationally determine outcomes" (cited in Doukas, 2002, 
p. 230) with his interpretation of Hayek's view that "order arises from spontaneous 
unplanned actions of individuals" (p. 230). This can be seen in much of Hayek's 
work: the use of rules in decision-making, but with individuals not all following all 
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rules; with the price mechanism based on economic agents' subjective knowledge; 
with buy and sell investment decisions possibly linked to a Gestalt switch and "reason 
being not the judge but an instrument" (p. 230) (op cit). Indeed the decision to use 
indirect rather than direct investment sits well with Hayek, if not with the view that 
laws are a public good, given that indirect investment has its own costs. Similarly, 
price-setting and the market structure is very close to Hayek's catallaxy and 
spontaneous unplanned order and indeed institutions' generation/transmission/use of 
knowledge. 
Further reinforcement of the centrality of research on efficiency is evident in the 
importance in American finance research of Friedman's view of methodology. Market 
rationality is positive not normative, EMH is a hypothesis that is parsimonious and 
yields valid and meaningful predictions. Whilst there are tests that cast doubt, and 
given that even its strongest supporters joke that it is (say) 85% efficient, it is still a 
central plank of finance. Within the UK there is probably more skepticism about 
investor rationality and market efficiency. This is despite the fact that its main 
contender, behavioural finance, has its origins in papers in America, the skepticism 
being based not only on quantitative and empirical tests of falsification/anomalies, but 
on the underlying methodologies. This is well evidenced in UK critical comments on 
the need for plurality in methodologies and the suggested move to middle range 
thinking. 
Therefore it is very easy to position the efficient market hypothesis as being a 
dominant paradigm in Western finance over the last four decades. It is equally easy to 
view recent years as indicating a beginning of change in the dominant paradigm or 
consensus or research programme, but with no successor. One layer higher/lower, it is 
easy to position the ontology and epistemology and methodology employed by 
scientific study of the hypothesis as being the dominant research paradigm of the last 
four decades. It is equally easy to view the recent UK based comments as indicating a 
beginning of change in the dominant research paradigm. These shifts thus make the 
positioning of this thesis interesting, both in terms of the view taken of the hypothesis 
and the underlying general methodology. What is clear though, is that it will be an 
empirical, logical positivist, Friedmanesque, quantitative set of hypothesis tests that 
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does not move towards the more pluralist centre ground of current UK finance 
research. 
3.5.2 Approach to analysis 
Much of this chapter has links with ontological and epistemological issues 
surrounding the growth of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, so it is worth ending with 
a consideration of the methodological debate surrounding the methods of testing 
theories. In Chapter Five the research method is set out, describing the extensive use 
of econometric techniques, numeric time series data and hypothesis tests. This locates 
the research epistemology within positivism and the allied views of deductivism (or 
the testing of a theory), rather than inductive (or the identification of a new theory). 
The approach of using secondary data, the daily values of various share indices, 
means that the research is quantitative rather than qualitative but also is dependent on 
the suitability and more importantly, the accuracy of that data. Problems arising from 
use of secondary data in this research are various. The data may not be correct, but the 
working assumption is that the data is valid. The data may not be comprehensive, as 
borne out later in that not all industry sector indices have full data sets for the period 
under review, resulting in only a sub set of the sector indices being tested. There may 
be gaps in the data, as evidenced by lack of index values for Bank Holidays. 
Additionally, the analysis is univariate and so there is no scope to identify other 
factors that may have predictive power in modelling share indices. 
All of the tests in the analysis chapters are of the hypothesis type, with a null and one 
or more alternatives. In all cases the `decision' is based upon 5% significance, so the 
conclusions could be different if (say) I% or 10% were used. Additionally, there 
is 
scope for Type I and Type II errors which could impact the conclusions arising 
from 
the analysis. The use of significance tests also has the scope to imply a spurious sense 
of accuracy, in that test results can be displayed to (say) ten decimal points 
The analysis is performed on a sample of daily data over a period of one year. 
Long 
term trends may thus be lost and equally, short term relationships may be missed 
if 
the data is not segmented or of higher frequency. These issues are discussed 
in more 
detail in a later chapter. 
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One of the many criticisms of quantitative research is that it ignores the role of people 
or individuals in the theories under consideration. To an extent this is countered by 
Hayek's views discussed above and to an even greater extent, by the growth of 
behavioural finance which is currently attempting to address that issue. This criticism 
could be taken even further, in that the choice of univariate data analysis and 
hypothesis tests means that all other research approaches are being rejected. Aspects 
of the Myners Review could be examined by case study, panel data, with a regulatory 
focus, using grounded theory, via structured or unstructured interviews, experiments 
or almost any type of research method. The approach followed here does not address 
those methods, but follows in the methodological footsteps of the very many research 
papers that have been produced to consider market efficiency. 
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CHAPTER FOUR THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
4.1 Position to Date 
4.1.1 Context 
The preceding chapters could be seen as separate or unique and freestanding aspects 
of finance. Market efficiency, or rational markets, or the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 
or even the slow transmogrification of efficiency into behavioural finance is a central 
part of financial economics. It is well understood, extensively researched and has 
ramifications for all types of investor as well as linking to corporate finance and 
regulation of the market. Strategic asset allocation has had lower prominence in 
finance research, although this is possibly offset to an extent by both academic 
actuarial research and vocational research by market practitioners. It has developed a 
certain focus by its use in performance measurement in that much of the research 
activities tend to be post hoc rationalisation, such as attribution analysis, rather than as 
a decision making process. Both efficiency and strategic asset allocation are pulled 
together in the Myners Review (2001), with the implication that markets are not 
efficient, or rather than certain asset classes may not be efficient and that strategic 
asset allocation decisions are possibly dysfunctional or at least driven by consensus 
due to benchmarking. Finally it is apparent that the overarching methodological 
approach to much of the US-centric research in these areas tends to be post-Vienna 
Circle logical positivism, with the development of hypotheses that generate 
meaningful predictions. 
This chapter sets out to conflate these various strands and in doing so, outline the 
research question. To an extent it is therefore a brief summary of the earlier chapters, 
but it is also an attempt to pull together the various themes that have been discussed. 
4.1.2 Efficiency 
The starting point of the synthesis of a research question or questions is market 
rationality. The Efficient Market Hypothesis has been the subject of innumerable 
research papers over the last forty years. For the first two decades there was growing 
acceptance of EMH's validity by the academic community, with the tacit assumption 
that developed capital markets were almost certainly weak-form efficient, were 
probably semi-strong form efficient and were possibly fairly strong-form efficient. 
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Tests of efficiency were even used to check on the progress of the capital markets of 
developing countries. At the same time, the hypothesis was rejected by the investment 
community. Fund management as a sector was growing in size and scale, there was an 
increase in the demand for pensions and indirect investment via mutual funds and 
investment trusts and unit-linked investment. Salaries for this sector were high and 
rising and the fund manager's competitive advantage was based around the concept 
that they could beat the market, or at least beat their competitors, by successful timing 
and stock picking. It would have been anathema for a fund manager to accept large 
bonuses whilst stating that their performance was based upon luck rather than skill. 
The second two decades saw these polarized positions begin to break down. Research 
papers began to raise doubts about the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The identification 
of anomalies such as the size effect, time effects, unexpectedly high volatility, mean 
reversion and other issues started to raise doubts about market rationality. Some of the 
doubts were rejected in terms of the asset pricing models, blaming the models and 
adding new indirect variables to remove the efficiency anomalies. The growth of 
behavioural finance gave momentum to EMH's rejection and the last few years have 
shown classic signs of a paradigm shift. In the fund management sector, over the same 
period, the opposite has happened, although this has been covert rather than overt. 
Led by the US markets, but mirrored in the UK and other developed economies, there 
has been significant growth in passive investment generally, and in tracker or indexed 
funds and benchmarked funds specifically. A switch from active management to the 
passive management of funds is tacit recognition that the fund managers could not 
consistently beat the market, or their competitors. In the same way as academics now 
cover a spectrum from full rejection of EMH, through acceptance of weaker 
efficiency to full efficiency, the fund management sector now has 80% of funds based 
upon the unstated assumption of efficiency with the unwillingness to let go of active 
management completely evidenced by the use of core and satellite funds. 
With few exceptions, the bulk of the research on market efficiency has been at the 
individual share level or with a share index that describes or acts as a proxy for the 
market. Where efficiency tests have been at a market or index level, they have still 
been performed with the intention to consider shares. Therefore, there has been very 
little research on asset classes and whether they are at the correct level. Even the 
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consideration of attribution analysis, whilst using Strategic Asset Allocation as the 
focus, has ignored efficiency in relation to asset classes in that it has had actual 
performance as its focus. Similarly, consideration of portfolios in some of the later 
tests has been within an asset class. For example the use of (say) ten portfolios ranked 
by size and rebalanced each year has reached conclusions about company level 
efficiency or size effect or fund manager performance. In all of the papers included in 
the earlier literature review and strategic asset allocation chapters and also those read 
but not included, there has been no reference to or discussion of the efficiency of asset 
classes. 
Within the fund management sector this asset class myopia is less evident. Many 
finance houses offer sector-specific funds (e. g. emerging economies, or Pacific Rim, 
or whatever). Additionally, many actively managed funds employ a structure where 
analysts specialize by sector. Despite this, the focus or intention would seem to be one 
of gaining more information about, and thus being better informed of individual 
companies, rather than asset classes. 
If academic research and the fund management sector both tend to ignore efficiency 
in relation to asset classes, then Myners' suggestion of trustees letting managers have 
the space to be active in relation to certain classes may be perceptive. Thus the 
primary research question to be addressed has asset class efficiency as its locus. 
The literature review has highlighted numerous approaches to testing stock markets 
for efficiency. These tests have been applied to a variety of `meta' asset classes such 
as shares, bonds, derivatives, currencies, real estate, cash markets and others. The 
volume of testing and published research papers has probably been the most intense in 
relation to equity markets where the large variety of tests utilise one or more aspects 
of a multi dimensional approach. For instance, there is univariate analysis, based on 
early statistical techniques such as autocorrelation or runs tests, followed later by 
ARIMA and Box Jenkins and more recently using ARCH and GARCH and the 
various manifestations such as in mean or exponential. Alternatively there are 
multivariate methods: seeking links between prices or returns and either macro 
economic variables (Gross Domestic Product or interest rates or equivalent) or micro 
level independent variables (e. g. dividends). Much has been written on event study 
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methodology as a test for semi-strong efficiency, with its extension into comparing 
speed of response and lead/lag relationships between underlying investments and their 
derivatives. 
Market efficiency has also been a major consideration when related to asset pricing 
models, the growth of the latter becoming more sophisticated and going through 
cycles of supporting the concept of efficiency, then identifying possible anomalies 
and more recently identifying those anomalies as mistakes in asset pricing models. 
Although not formally labelled as studies in efficiency, the recent focus on more 
practical issues such as attribution analysis and performance persistency, often based 
on managed investment, has added a further approach. This reflects the shift in 
definition of strong form efficiency towards that of the professional versus the 
individual investor. 
4.2 Area for Analysis 
4.2.1 Myners Review and asset allocation 
The report of the Myners Review is very clear on strategic asset allocation, as the 
following four paraphrased extracts show: 
" peer group benchmarking has no satisfactory justification; 
" only 1.5 basis points out of 47 in the value chain go to strategic asset 
allocation; 
" commonality of investment policy amongst funds; 
" asset allocation driven by historic convention. 
This strongly held view is that the strategic asset allocation process is not working; 
insufficient attention (and as a consequence, expenditure) is paid to the process of 
systematically deciding what percentage allocations are to be made to each asset 
class; advice on the allocations to pension fund trustees is chiefly from two very 
similar sources and results in very similar or even identical percentage amounts; and 
the allocations are slow to change, with trends being long and stable. In effect, the 
strategic asset allocation process evidences herding, a term normally used to describe 
share level investment activity, and results in excessive benchmarking. Many 
observers have commented on the behavioural justification for this: the fund manager 
may wish to be different so as to beat competitors, resulting in increased market share, 
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greater income, higher professional standing or increased profits, but the risk of 
getting it wrong, of being significantly worse than the herd from using some form of 
quasi-contrarian asset allocation has severe implications. The most common outcome 
of the fear of failure thus is the desire to stay in step with the crowd. The Myners 
Review recognized this, with its opening quotation from Keynes' General Theory of 
Employment, Interest and Money (1936), "Wordly wisdom teaches that it is better for 
reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally" (prefix to 
submission letter). 
Finance research shows that the strategic asset allocation process does not generate a 
great deal of interest, or rather it does generate huge interest but only at the meta asset 
class level of equities or currency or bonds. Thus the main area for consideration in 
this paper's research question will be to examine strategic asset allocation in relation 
to the concerns of the Myners Review. 
There could be numerous approaches to considering how funds decide their 
percentage mixes between asset classes. This could look at: 
" the role of advisors/consultants 
" the various models linking risk and return 
"a case study such as consideration of Boots' decision to put all of its pension 
fund assets into gilts 
" the home country bias 
" efficiency studies comparing shares, bonds, property, cash and other 
investment types. 
A second method could be based around performance attribution, in that it is here that 
research, both academic and commercial, has studied the results of the allocation 
decisions. The problem with this however, is that it does not address the process of 
decision making. The research papers for both the UK and the USA show clearly that 
allocation decisions are of high importance, but are silent when it comes to looking 
forward rather than back. 
A further focus could follow the well researched area of funds' performance 
persistence. This is topical, as seen in Charles Rivers Associates' conclusion that 
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performance persists; Blake et al's conclusion that the performance persistence only 
applies to poorly performing funds; Tonks' most recent conclusion (2005) that fund 
performance does persist. It is also of relevance to policy makers, in that the Financial 
Services Authority seeks to decide whether past performance should be displayed on 
its web site. This area of research activity will not be considered here as it is 
retrospective in the same way that performance attribution is, the focus is on the 
outcomes of fund management. Additionally it does not consider the strategic asset 
allocation decisions, only the results. 
4.2.2 Tests of efficiency 
The area of research that is of interest is market efficiency. This is particularly so in 
that it would seem that the finance research community is undergoing a change in its 
attitude to or perception of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. This is a slow, long term 
shift as EMH was so entrenched and behavioural finance is not yet its complete 
successor chiefly because there is no single unifying theory, model or hypothesis that 
replaces efficiency, other than perhaps the rejection of rationality. The vast amount of 
research that has been produced over the last four decades has tended to look at a 
market as described by a share index, or has studied either individual shares or non- 
sectoral groupings of shares. There is little evidence of any great amount of finance 
research which examines industrial sector or sub-index efficiency. This lack could 
explain why there are so many mixed messages about efficiency. If the Myners 
Review's suggestion about active management for areas where active management is 
deemed more appropriate is valid, then this means that within the equity market there 
are some investments or rather sectors, that are efficient and some not. 
There is no automatic or generally accepted definition within the investment 
community of what an asset class is. In a globally diversified portfolio the range of 
asset classes is very large, encompassing fixed interest stock, equity, cash and a wide 
range of fixed assets; all of these being a combination of domestic and overseas. The 
consideration of whether some asset classes are efficient and others not efficient 
should therefore examine all asset classes available to the global investor. Such a 
comprehensive examination would be so vast as to be well beyond the scope of this 
study but fortunately the purpose is not to identify each class that is or is not efficient. 
Instead, the approach is just to examine if there is a mixture of asset classes, some of 
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which are efficient and others that are not, thus supporting or rejecting the view of the 
Myners Review that active management should be practiced where it could be of 
benefit. 
For the majority of fund managers, we have already seen the issue of home country 
bias. Thus this study will just focus on one country's asset classes, with the domestic 
market being the UK. Within that marketplace this study will ignore markets in fixed 
interest stock, property, cash and near cash, currencies and other markets which are 
often studied as asset classes in their own right. The most common asset class 
considered by historic EMH tests in the finance journals tends to be equities. Thus the 
approach here will be to consider UK equities. Within that large asset class it is 
common for fund managers to see UK equities not as a single class but to break it 
down by industrial sectors. The best vehicle to examine equities by sector would 
therefore be a UK share index that splits the majority of the market by industrial 
sector. Hence the following analysis uses the FTSE All Share Index and its 
component sub-indices, with the desire to establish if some of the sectors are efficient 
whilst others are not. 
The fund management sector puts much effort into industrial sector classification, but 
this has not been mirrored by the finance research community. Therefore the main 
analysis will be on strategic asset allocation in relation to industrial sectors, or rather 
sub-indices that aggregate up to a single market index. The UK equity market's sub 
indices will consequently be examined for efficiency. In selecting these sub indices as 
the focus for the examination, other levels of aggregation are by definition being 
rejected. For instance, the following could all be seen as equity asset classes, 
depending on the viewpoint or requirements of the user, given that the market 
portfolio could include all assets in the world: 
9 all equities in the world, as an asset class within a global managed fund that 
may also include bonds, etc from numerous countries; 
" all equities in a region, as an asset class based on (say) the Pacific Rim or the 
European Union; 
" all equities in a type of economy, such as emerging economies; 
" all equities in an overseas country, e. g. a UK based USA fund; 
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" all equities in a domestic fund; 
" all equities in a domestic fund by style, such as UK growth or UK income; 
" all equities in a fund by sector, for instance High Tec. 
It can therefore be seen that some focus, occasionally down to the sector level is 
utilised in the production of mutual fund products that target various niches, but tests 
for efficiency or persistence or application of asset pricing models tend to be common 
at the higher levels of aggregation and then reduce in popularity as areas of 
aggregation become more and more focused. Similarly, fund managers' use of 
benchmarked or indexed funds commonly have a satellite fund to take advantage of 
perceived inefficiencies in various areas, but again these are not extensively 
researched. The focus of this research at the lowest level of aggregation, that of the 29 
sub indices within the UK market's FTSE All Share index, makes the analysis unique 
as far as the literature searches undertaken reveal. 
For the purpose of this study, efficiency in relation to equity prices (or rather UK 
equity sub-indices) will be defined as set out in Fama's 1991 review; namely: 
The market efficiency hypothesis (is) the simple statement that security prices 
fully reflect all available information. (The) strong version is that information 
and trading costs are zero (and) the weaker or more sensible version (is) that 
prices reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on 
information do not exceed the marginal costs. (p. 1575) 
There are many varied approaches to testing for efficiency. Original strong form tests 
are based around the ability of the professional manager and her performance, as 
shown in the current debate about performance persistency. If she can consistently 
beat the market or at least the competition, then there must be inefficiencies in pricing 
that are being used to achieve that superior performance that the competitor fund 
managers have failed to utilise. Unfortunately and as highlighted above, these tests are 
performed at the aggregate level and there is no consideration of the role of asset 
classes or sub-indices. 
A second set of tests have built up around the concept of event studies. This would be 
difficult to use in relation to a set of share indices as the events normally used (e. g. 
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share splits) are company specific in terms of the event date. In order to follow this., 
approach there would need to be events that impact on a variety of industrial sectors. 
That concept is feasible but the events themselves would most likely be macro 
economic in nature, such as unexpected changes in oil prices or interest rates. The 
accepted approach to this type of activity is usually a multi-factor analysis linked to 
some type of asset pricing model. There is no intention here to consider asset pricing 
and so that methodology is rejected. 
Linked to the above, but also used in comparing different countries' indices at an 
aggregate level is the use of tests to examine if individual markets are cointegrated. 
This could be a plausible approach in that, for instance, performance of (say) the retail 
sector may depend on another sector. Earlier cross correlation tests and more recent 
sophisticated techniques could identify cointegration, but if that relationship is not 
lagged then, although interesting, it would not be of great help to the fund manager, 
other than assisting diversification. Of course, if there is a lagged relationship between 
two indices, then this could possibly imply inefficiency in the dependent sector. This 
type of approach could mirror research that compares prices of underlying assets with 
those of a derivative to establish lead-lag relationships. 
4.2.3 Randomness in sector indices 
The area that is possibly the most fruitful is that of studying trends in the various 
indices. Research in market efficiency has considered this approach in numerous 
papers. These seek autocorrelation, long term trends covering a century, short term 
trends with the growth of high frequency data, mean reversion, time series with 
memory and random walks. Of the variety of tests, it is the concept of random walks 
that would seem at this stage to be of the most use. If a time series is random, then the 
next period's value cannot be forecast. If it is not random, then there may be some 
data generating process that can be identified and used to forecast the next period's 
value. In effect, if the time series for a sub-index based on an industrial classification 
does follow a random walk, then there is no point in the fund manager using active 
management for that sector as the index is strong efficient and the strategic asset 
allocation should be passive. If the time series for a sub-index is not random, but the 
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costs of taking advantage of this are greater than or equal to the benefit of having 
identified the data generating process, then there is no point in the fund manager using 
active management for that sector as the index is weakly efficient and the strategic 
asset allocation should be passive. Finally, if the index is not random and the benefits 
outweigh the costs, then that industrial sector may be inefficient and could be 
managed actively. Thus the three possible outcomes mesh well with the Myners 
Review's desire for active management where appropriate. 
It must be recognized that randomness in the sub-index's time series would imply 
efficiency but that the opposite is not necessarily true. A series may not be random but 
the values or returns of that index may still be efficient. Given this, then the tests to be 
used are in theory tests for random walks, not efficiency. Despite this, the main 
research question will be to examine the UK equity market to examine if the various 
industrial sector share indices are random, warranting passive fund management for 
that sector, or non-random and either weakly efficient or not efficient, the latter 
warranting active management. 
Tests for random walks are very much in step with the positivist or post-positivist 
school of thought described in the earlier discussion on methodology, in that the main 
tool for the various studies of randomness or data generating processes is the 
hypothesis test. The randomness or non-randomness will not be explained by the tests 
(although it might be interesting to consider if there are any common traits between 
the random indices, if any), a position that mirrors well the view of Hayek (1969) and 
his concept of the interdependence of men whose interreactions are "repercussions 
transmitted by the network of market relations" (p. 58). 
The consideration of the random walk hypothesis has been central to tests of 
efficiency from the start. Initial research tended to have runs tests or autocorrelation at 
their core. The development in the nineteen eighties of chaos theory has given rise to 
additional tools that can supplement the early methods. Similarly, the development in 
the seventies of the Box Jenkins method for time series analysis and the recent growth 
of ARCH and its manifestations give a wide range of analytical techniques to assess 
the question of randomness. The intention is to address the main research question of 
randomness in sub indices by means of these tests. For each sector sub 
index, the 
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index values will be converted into a log normal return and tests applied to establish if 
a data generating process can be identified. This will be in three stages. Firstly the 
time series of returns will be tested for stationarity and randomness. There are three 
forms of the random walk hypothesis: a pure random walk, where the next period is 
just white noise; a random walk with drift, where the next period is a non-zero 
constant plus white noise; and thirdly a random walk with trend, where the next 
period is a function of the previous period's value plus white noise. Obviously the 
final two may both be evident, resulting in a random walk with drift and trend. 
The second stage will be to seek the appropriate data generating process if the time 
series is identified as non-random. This could be multivariate, but for the purpose of 
this study, the focus will remain univariate, depending therefore on the range of 
techniques available. This will be informed by other finance research undertaken at a 
market level and hence apply the techniques to the sub indices that have been utilized 
to examine the meta asset classes via a single market index. 
The third stage will follow the method of Al Loughani and Chappel (1997) and test 
the residuals from either the random walk or the data generating process. If the 
residuals indicate that the process does not fully explain the time series, as evidenced 
by not being independent and identically distributed, then that process will be rejected 
and a further one sought. Only when randomness or an appropriate process is 
identified and the residuals are independent and identically distributed so that they 
contain no further unexplained dimensions will the particular sub index be regarded as 
being explained. To prevent duplication in later chapters `explained' will be taken to 
mean that the sample evidence supports the hypothesis that the index's returns follow 
a suitable identified process which produces residuals that are independent and 
identically distributed. 
There are two implications of this that require further reflection. One is that once a 
data generating process has been identified and has no `message' in the residuals it 
will not be considered further. Despite the tests, it may be the case that there is 
another process that better describes the data. The sheer volume of the different 
processes is such that it allows production of an almost infinite number of tests, even 
without consideration of multivariate analysis. The second implication 
is that the 
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method could be open to the criticism of data mining. To preclude this, the tests will 
follow a structured approach rather than a broadcast or scatter gun method. Secondly, 
as mentioned above, the choice of data generating processes will follow those 
identified in earlier finance research as being appropriate to the study. 
It is envisaged that once all the sub indices have been analysed, there will be three 
broad groupings. 
" Some will correspond to one of the three versions of a random walk and will 
be candidates for passive management as the randomness will infer efficiency. 
" Some will have one of the various data generating processes that could be 
regarded as the maintained regression explaining the actual data. 
" The remainder will not be random, but it may be the case that no suitable data 
generating process has been found. In which case nothing can be concluded as 
to their suitability for active or passive management. 
For the second category, namely those where a data generating process has been 
identified, it will be necessary to compare the strength of the relationship with the 
excess costs of active fund management over and above the costs of passive 
management. This should establish whether, despite the non-randomness, the index is 
weakly efficient and therefore to be managed passively, or not efficient and hence a 
candidate for active management. 
Research on efficiency has included short time horizons measured in days, through to 
long periods measured in tens of years. This paper will examine the daily sub indices 
over a period of one year. The choice of length of time will automatically have 
ramifications, for instance a twelve month period may be too short to establish 
memory of the type identified in rescaled range analysis. Thus a conclusion of 
randomness may be wrong. On the other hand, a time series may be chaotic in the 
sense of going through transitional phases from randomness to functional to 
behavioural to deterministic. The choice of one year may just pick up one of those 
phases and thus reach the wrong conclusion. Or the period may be too long: 250 days 
may `hide' a shorter period when an industrial sector becomes deterministic and 
suitable for active management. Techniques exist in time series analysis for structural 
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breaks but at this stage the size of the problem is much too large for a research study 
of that scale. 
A second problem exists, linked to both the study of efficiency and some of Hayek's 
observations about free markets. If an industrial sector's index is identified as having 
some form of deterministic relationship, then the fact that it existed historically does 
not mean that the researcher, analyst or fund manager can infer that it will continue to 
exist into the future. This should not be a major problem as the identification by many 
funds of an inefficient sector would (if other aspects of efficiency are correct) result in 
their actions bringing that particular index back towards weak efficiency. This and the 
earlier comment about trends or relationships of less than one year are of course not 
fully relevant to a study of strategic asset allocation due to their shortness of time. 
Instead they have ramifications for the more short-term tactical asset allocation 
process and as such are not considered here. 
If the previous chapters or the current chapter could be synthesized into a single 
research question, then this study's research problem would be as follows. To 
undertake univariate time series analysis examining one year's data on the various UK 
equity sector indices to establish if they are random or have a data generating process, 
so as to make inferences about their efficiency which could inform the strategic asset 
allocation decisions in terms of use of active or passive investment management. 
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CHAPTER FIVE METHOD 
5.1 Tests for Random Walks 
5.1.1 Randomness, efficiency and IID residuals 
The second section of the literature review looked at some of the tests that have been 
developed for research into market efficiency. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine in greater detail just a few aspects of this vast area of literature. This 
consideration will inform the analysis to be followed later and will be based solely on 
univariate analysis. Hence there will be no discussion of asset pricing models and no 
links with macro or micro economic factors. Similarly, the focus of attention will be 
on the random walk hypothesis, so there will be no discussion on other aspects of 
efficiency such as event study research or the various time or size effects. 
One of the triggers for the method to be followed in this thesis is the paper by Al- 
Loughani and Chappel (1997). They test the FTSE 30 index for randomness; the tacit 
assumption being that if the index is random then it will be weak form efficient. 
Their conclusion is that the time series is explained by a GARCH (1,1) model, and as 
such is not a random walk and is therefore not efficient. Whilst this is not a unique 
approach, the interesting extension to their paper is the use of the BDS test of 
independent and identical distribution (IID) in the residuals of the model, as set out in 
Brock et al (1996). The purpose of this (then) fairly new test is to examine if one of 
the assumptions of randomness is satisfied, namely that of the regression's residuals 
being independently and identically distributed. 
The random walk model is in the format 
logP1=1ogPt-1 + Ct (5.1) 
with P as the value of the FTSE 30 share index and Et a random error. Dickey Fuller 
and Augmented Dickey Fuller tests were used on the above format and its first 
difference (return equals a constant plus white noise) to establish that the series is 
non-stationary in the index value format but is stationary or 1(0) in the first difference 
or return format. The first difference return format was then regressed and the 
constant found to be (only just) not significantly different from zero at 5% 
significance. Thus far the initial assumption is of a random walk, but Al-Loughani 
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and Chappel then applied the BDS test which rejected at 5% the null of independently 
and identically distributed residuals within the regressed returns, suggesting "there is 
some further unexplained structure in the data" (p. 15). Use of a GARCH in Mean (1, 
1) format gave the results: 
A1ogPt = . 0002 -16.028h12 + ut (5.2) 
h; 2 = . 00001 + . 0816u2t_1 + . 7386 h2t_1 (5.3) 
with u as the residuals and h the conditional covariances. The constant in (5.2) was 
now significant and their conclusion was that the series was not a random walk. 
Finally, the residuals were again examined via the BDS test and this time found to be 
independently and identically distributed. 
The use of unit root tests and GARCH was not a new approach, but application of the 
BDS tests was. Unfortunately there were issues in the approach that warrant further 
consideration. Firstly, as discussed in the previous section, the paper only considered 
a single index and did not extend the analysis to a sector level: their conclusions of 
non-randomness may not be valid for all industrial sectors. Secondly, the regression 
as set out in equation 5.2 was tested for a unit root on the assumption that the time 
series was a pure random walk (i. e. the constant does not differ significantly from 
zero): a more comprehensive analysis could have considered not only the pure 
random walk but also a random walk with drift and/or a random walk with trend. 
Thirdly there is the linkage between randomness and weak form efficiency: non- 
randomness does not necessarily mean non-weak form efficient (see for instance 
Milionis and Moschos (2000)), although it is generally accepted that the opposite is 
true, namely that if the series is random then it cannot be forecasted. This random 
versus efficient issue will be considered later in relation to the use of the 1991 
definition of strong and weaker efficiency. 
The use of the BDS test by Al-Loughani and Chappell was innovative and can be 
taken further. For instance, Opong et al (1999) apply this and the Hurst test to the 
FTSE All Share Index and the 100,250 and 350 indices. Although this paper did not 
follow any unit root tests or run regressions for a random walk, the conclusions were 
that 
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the FTSE Index series examined are not IID. The results indicate that the 
FTSE stock index returns series is not truly random since some cycle or 
patterns show up more frequently than would be expected in a true random 
series. A GARCH (1,1) process appear to explain the behaviour of the index 
series. (p. 270) 
Although not of direct relevance here, an additional conclusion which supports the 
use of the BDS test was that it was much more powerful than an alternative test based 
on Resealed Range (or R/S) analysis, an earlier Chaos-derived forecast testing 
technique. 
Blasco and Santamaria (1996) followed a similar path to Opong et al in testing the 
Spanish markets for independent and identical distributions in returns, but as 
discussed above, broadened their approach by breaking the market down into nine 
main sectors. Their BDS tests strongly rejected "the hypothesis that weighted-index 
returns are IID, therefore the possibility of predictable behaviour can be allowed" (p. 
405). In effect, this and the Opong et al papers are using the BDS test differently from 
the Al-Loughani and Chappell method in that they are using the lack of III) as the 
evidence of predictability and thus non-randomness, compared to the former's 
application of the III) tests to the residuals after the regression of the random walk 
process. They did however acknowledge this in that: 
it is appropriate here to note that the rejection of IID, as Hsieh (1991) points 
out, does not contradict market efficiency directly because this fact does not 
imply the predictability of forecast errors. (p. 406) 
The 2000 paper of Hamill et al to an extent duplicates the previous example, but 
applies the tests to the single Irish Stock Exchange index. The conclusions being that 
the BDS tests reject III) in the returns series and also reject III) in the residuals of a 
GARCH(1,1) model. Rather than concluding a lack of efficiency they state that the 
evidence points to "a chaotic process, non-linear stochastic process or linear 
stochastic dependence" (p. 699). 
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5.1.2 The BDS test 
There is therefore, a small body of research that is concerned with testing equity 
markets for efficiency via a random walk process, utilizing the BDS test for 
examination of the assumption of identical and independent distributions. Its relative 
newness and the reference by Hamill et al to chaos warrant further consideration of 
this technique. A summary is provided by Brock (2000) where chaos is defined as the 
"study of deterministic difference equations that display Sensitive Dependence on 
Initial Conditions to generate time paths that look like random behaviour" (p. 1). As 
part of that body of theory, not all of which has entered the main stream financial 
economics tool kit, the BDS test was developed to examine the residuals generated 
from a predictive model less the predictor variables. If the predictive model is valid 
"then the residuals should be unforcastable using histories based upon observables" 
(p. 3). Its designated focus on residuals thus makes the above work by Hamill et al or 
Blasco and Santamaria slightly at variance with the original concept as they apply it to 
the returns directly, rather than a set of residuals. Brock draws parallels between the 
BDS test and Q-tests for ARIMA models as a measure "of the adequacy of fitted 
models and evaluating whether the evidence warrants a more costly exploration of 
alternatives to the null hypothesis might be warranted" (p. 4). 
The original test was set out by Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman in1987, hence the 
title the BDS test, but the version used in this research is based on Brock et al (1996). 
BDS is a non parametric test for serial dependence (or alternatively a non linear 
structure) in time series analysis, where the series must be stationary, with a null 
hypothesis that the data generating processes are independent and identically 
distributed (IID). The alternative hypothesis, central to its use here, is "an indication 
that the model is misspecified" (p. 198). Failure to accept the null is important for 
tests of market efficiency in that their "statistic (is) easy to interpret as a measure of 
the presence of `pockets of predictability' over the whole space" (p. 200). Much 
research in finance shows that returns, even if using log normal returns, do not 
produce a normal distribution; this should not be an issue with the use of the BDS test 
as it does not require higher moments to exist. In fact "this is important in financial 
economics because of the problems that thick tailed distributions can cause for many 
test statistics" (p. 200). One of the first uses of the BDS test in relation to efficiency 
was that of LeBaron (1992, cited in Brock et al 1996)), based on traders being more 
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concerned with finding pricing inefficiencies than econometricians, an approach that 
they refer to as a `parameterised version of the Efficient Market Hypothesis'. 
Application of the BDS test for IID is best explained by examination of its use. For 
instance, Chen and Yeh (2002) refer to "one of the most frequently used tests for non- 
linear dependence is the celebrated BDS test" (p. 228), defining the two parameters 
required as the distance parameter (ors standard deviations) and the embedding 
dimension. This is explained in Blasco and Santamaria (1996) whereby the distance 
parameter E is the distance between any pair of points in the data's time series, or 
rather the residuals. The probability that any pair are separated by less than or equal to 
that predefined distance is given by Cm, T(E), known as the correlation integral and 
based on Grassberger and Procaccia (1983) such that 
Cm, T(s) = EIE(xt', x, ') [2/Tm(Tm - 1)1 (5.4) 
where m is the embedding dimension in the m-dimensional vectors xtm=(xt,... xt+m_1). 
Al-Loughani and Chappel (op cit) view the correlation integral as "the fraction of all 
m-tuples in the series which are `close' to (within s of) each other" (p. 175). 
Opong et al (1999) refer to this as "the probability that any two points are within a 
certain length, c, apart in phase space" (p. 271). Thus as the researcher increases or 
selects higher values of c, "the probability scales according to the fractal dimension of 
the phase space" (p. 271). 
Equation 5.4 is reformulated by them to give 
Cm, 
T(s) =1 /N2 EZ(e - Ixi - 
xJ ), i :ýj (5.5) 
where "the function Z counts the number of points within a distance e of one another" 
(p. 273), as described in the m-dimensional vector above. 
The actual BDS statistic is defined as 
Wm T(£)= Tý/2[ Cm, T() - 
CI T(£)mI/ ßm T(£) (5.6) 
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which has a normal distribution if the series has at least 500 observations. Subsequent 
analysis in later chapters is based upon time series of 251 observations but that is not 
a major issue. For instance, Hseih (1991) expresses the concern that in long time 
series the BDS test may reject the null hypothesis of independent and identical 
distribution due to structural changes. Under this condition structural breaks are 
recommended so that sub-periods are tested instead. Sample size is also examined by 
Johnson and McCelland (2002) who compare results of BDS tests with a newer 
proposed version known as the GD test. Although the two tests are not identical in 
that GD "is insensitive to dependence among residuals that do not effect the 
regressors. . . 
(whereas)... BDS should have better power" (p. 3) they do show that GD 
outperforms BDS to the point that "for data sets with 250 observations, the BDS test 
detects the dependence in the residuals, while the GD test shows almost no power" (p. 
12). 
In using the BDS test to analyse residuals from a model for independent and identical 
distribution, the research has to identify the two parameters suggested above, namely 
the distance between pairs, or F, and the embedded dimension, or m. In their analysis 
of the sensitivity of the choice of c, Kocenda and Briatka (no date available) conclude 
that: 
"a range of (. 25,1.00) gives low power to the test 
" for short time series the range (. 50,1.00) is preferred 
"a range of (. 50,1.50) is better than (. 25,2.00) for dimensions m2 to 5 
"a range of (. 25,2.00) is preferred for dimensions m= 6 to 9. 
The later chapters which utilize the BDS test have a dimension of 4 so a range of 0.5 
to 1.50 is identified as the best option. Many papers, including those referred to here, 
show the BDS test statistics for a variety of c, e. g. 0.5,1.0,1.5 and 2.0 as in Opong et 
al (1999). The number of tests undertaken in the analysis of this paper invalidates that 
approach and so the default is set and statistics are only shown fors of 0.7. The 
second parameter, that of the embedded dimension in, is normally identified by 
consideration of the time series' autocorrelation lengths. For subsequent calculations 
this paper will use a range of 2 to 4 for the embedded dimensions. 
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The BDS test statistic as generated by Equation 5.6 above approaches zero as the 
residuals' distribution tends towards IID, so the null hypothesis of a series of residuals 
being independently and identically distributed is based on the statistical significance 
of the statistic being zero for non rejection or not zero for rejection. Consensus 
amongst users is that rejection of the null means that the modelled data generating 
process has not been correctly specified and that there is a non-linear but unidentified 
relationship. 
5.2 Other tests for randomness 
5.2.1 Methods of testing 
Although the technique will not be used here, it is interesting to compare the modern 
chaotic approach of BDS tests with Bartlett's goodness of fit test. This 1954 method 
is used by Lee et al (1998) to test efficiency of a variety of stock markets. The link to 
BDS is that Bartlett's test was "to examine whether the first difference of stock prices 
follows a white noise process" (p. 62). The process compares autocovariance 
functions and frequency domains, mapping a white noise model against outcomes 
from the actual time series. Thus there are resonances between Bartlett's and BDS 
tests, despite the difference of almost half a century and the major steps taken in 
univariate time series analysis. Out of interest, Lee et al studied indices in the nineteen 
twenties and found that the European markets more efficient (weak form) than those 
of North America. A conclusion possibly explained by "... the immaturity of the 
Canadian and US markets" (p. 63). Of more direct interest, they concluded that 
Bartlett's goodness of fit test for white noise "has some desirable intrinsic and 
operating properties, compared with other approaches such as the variance ratio test 
or the mean reversion test" (p. 63). 
There are many other approaches to testing for random walks. For instance, Mills and 
Jordanov (2003) examine the UK market using Markov Chains. Their interest is on 
the size effect as an indicator of inefficiency. Fictitious portfolios are generated from 
the FTSE-Actuaries All Share index and are tested via the use of Markov Chains to 
allow for the return time series to be non-linear (a methodology that will not be 
examined here). Their results do show a size effect, with smaller sized portfolios 
generating the higher returns, but of the ten categories ranked by size: 
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the returns of the two smallest and four largest size portfolios were 
predictable, but only the two largest were predictable in the direction 
suggested by the bubbles and fads alternatives to the random walk 
hypothesis 
... only the two largest portfolios rejecting the random walk hypothesis. (p. 813) 
Hence they claim that there is a size effect in the UK market, but that this is for the 
largest firms only, with the eight smaller deciles following a random walk. 
Alternatively, Summers et al (2004) examine weak form efficiency in terms of 
technical analysis by means of neural network models. Their choice of method being 
firstly, ease of programming and secondly, to allow "... for non linear relationships 
present in the data without intervention by the modeller" (p. 211). Their results show 
that trading rules from early periods can "be predictive at a later date and, rather 
unexpectedly, can even exceed the predictive power of rules derived from more 
contemporary data" (p. 214). Although unstated, this could mean the lack of strong 
efficiency, but they note that changes in particular an increase in volatility "results in 
a reduction in the signal to noise ratio, which masks the information content of the 
data" (p. 214), so a possible contender for weaker efficiency. 
A third approach utilizes the Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR). Jung and Boyd 
(1996) compare this with the Error Correction Models and the use of Kalman Filters 
as a method of forecasting share prices in the UK, using a single composite index. 
They found that Error Correction Models tend to perform best but the multivariate 
approach "... using macro economic indicators as independent variables... " (p. 284) 
did not relate to their study's univariate methodology. Vector Autoregressive Models 
are also used by Cheung (2000) to explain the transmission of shocks across various 
markets (see earlier comments on cointegration). The findings of this paper suggest 
that "US stock volatility played a leading role in the transmission of stock volatility to 
other major stock markets like.. . the 
UK" (p. 771). Cointegration was also examined 
by Han (1996) in relation to present value models, finding that there was no 
cointegration between share prices and dividends. There was however, the possibility 
that "rational bubbles might exist in the deterministic component of [a] stock price" 
(p. 267). 
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5.2.2 Data generating processes 
If it is the case that a time series of share prices or indices, or rather their returns, are 
not random, then there is a wide range of models that can be tested against the 
observable data to determine the appropriate data generating process. A useful 
summary of these is supplied by McMillan et al (2000) although it must be noted that 
the focus is on forecasting UK stock market volatility rather than returns or values. 
They analyse both the FTSE 100 and the UK FTA All Share indices (again the 
approach is at an aggregated market level rather than sectors) and compare the 
performance of a wide range of forecast methods: historic mean, moving average, the 
random walk (although only the pure version, i. e. ignoring drift and/or trend), 
exponential smoothing, exponentially weighted moving averages, regression and 
GARCH (including TGARCH, EGARCH and component-GARCH versions). The 
ability of the ten models to forecast volatility is tested by means of Mean Error, Root 
Mean Squared Error and Mean Absolute Error and additionally they apply Mixed 
Mean Error statistics to weight under-predictions more heavily than over-predictions. 
Although the McMillan et al paper is concerned with forecasting volatility, their 
conclusions can inform the selection of appropriate models for this paper. Thus it is 
interesting to note the following paraphrased quotes from their results. (To prevent 
extensive quotations it should be noted that some conclusions may only apply to part 
of a series, or one level of data frequency or one measure of error testing. Despite this 
the outcomes are of much use. ) 
" All models over-predict volatility except the random walk. 
" Random walk provides the smallest absolute Mean Error. 
" The random walk model dominates 
" The gain in performance of the random walk model over all other models is 
considerable. 
" Simple regression and historical mean perform poorly. 
" Performance of GARCH and smoothing models is similar. 
" Good performance of recursive exponential smoothing. 
" Poor performance of non-recursive GARCH and TGARCH. 
" Poor performance of exponential smoothing. 
" On the basis of Root Mean Squared Error there is far less divergence. 
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9 For daily series all models are superior to historical mean and simple 
regression. 
9 Random walk performs poorly on Root Mean Squared Error. 
It can be seen from this selection of results that there is no clear, unambiguous 
conclusion. Random walks perform well, unless tested via the Root Mean Squared 
Error, or if the data is of high frequency. GARCH type models are consistent and the 
simple models of historic mean and regression are poor. Parts of their conclusions 
state: 
For the symmetric loss case, the random walk model ... 
is vastly superior. 
... For all 
frequencies the most consistent forecasting performance is provided 
by moving average and GARCH models. (p. 448) 
The relevance of this work to the study of sector sub indices reinforces the use of the 
random walk model and indicates that the logical next step if a series is not random 
should be a member of the GARCH genre. 
Within the following analysis chapters, GARCH will be the automatic assumption for 
a data generating process if the series is stationary but not random. The method is well 
typified by Siourounis (2002) in a study of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE), where 
the following steps are followed: 
" The ASE General Price Index itself, and expressed as a log return, is tested for 
a unit root; 
" The error terms from a random walk process were found to be time dependent; 
"A GARCH process was suggested to explain the lack of a constant variance in 
the errors; 
" Consideration was given to EGARCH, Asymmetric GARCH and GARCH in 
Mean. 
5.3 Summary of the proposed method 
The previous chapter defined the research question as establishing whether sector 
indices are random or have a data generating process. This chapter can be summarized 
as utilizing a method which applies the research question to each 
industrial sector's 
index. This will be in four stages. Firstly, the time series will be tested for stationarity, 
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initially as a level series of the index values expressed as a natural log and then, if not 
stationary, as a differenced series in the format of the log return. Secondly, for those 
series that are stationary, tests will be made to identify which, if any, of the series are 
random or near random walks (pure, or with drift and/or with trend). Thirdly, for the 
sector indices that are stationary but not random walks, tests will be followed to 
consider if the time series follows an autoregressive processes. Finally the remaining 
series will be examined to try and identify any other data generating processes: 
consideration of outliers (a common time series adjustment); a Moving Average 
process; ARMA; and finally cointegration. 
Each of the above will be performed initially with a constant variance and then for an 
ARCH process. The first assumption will be of a basic GARCH, followed by an 
asymmetric version as this has close links with rational expectations. Failing this a 
GARCH in mean model will be applied, again due to the close relationship with 
finance and its link with asset pricing. Next will follow exponential GARCH, as many 
research papers find this successful. Finally component GARCH will be assumed, 
again due to its fairly widespread use in finance research. 
In all cases, the search for the data generating process or maintained regression will 
end if that process has IID in the residuals, as verified by the BDS test, but will 
continue if that process shows that there is no IID. 
All maintained regressions that seem to explain the data generating processes will 
then form the basis for forecasting out of sample values to establish if abnormal gains 
can be made from their predictive powers. 
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CHAPTER SIX STATIONARITY AND RANDOM WALKS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter forms the first of a set of three chapters that encompass the analysis of 
the equity sectors in the UK. The first examines all the series for stationarity and tests 
all time series to establish if they can be described or explained by a random walk 
process. The second of this set (Chapter 7) examines all stationary non random series 
to establish if one of the various univariate data generating processes explains the 
data. Finally Chapter 8 reviews all those series that can be explained and considers 
whether their maintained regressions identified in Chapters 6 and 7 have any 
predictive ability. 
The intention of this analysis is to allocate each the various equity sectors into one of 
three possible `states' of efficiency and thus identify possible investment management 
approaches. The successful outcomes will be as follows. 
"A data generating process has been identified which has sufficient predictive 
power to make that sector not efficient in that the abnormal gains from the 
predictions outweigh the cost of trading on the predictions and so the sector 
should be actively managed. 
"A data generating process has been identified which does have predictive power 
but the gain from those predictions is offset by the cost of trading on them, so that 
the sector is weakly efficient and should be passively managed. 
9 The process is a random walk, so the sector is strong efficient and should be 
passively managed. 
Those series identified as being in the first of these three categories will be the ones 
alluded to in the Myners Review as giving scope to the investment managers to 
outperform their peers and add value via active management. 
There is obviously a fourth category of sector, that where a suitable data generating 
process cannot be identified. No final decision will be possible for this type of sector, 
although the view could be taken that lack of a process would in itself mean that 
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predictions were not possible and so passive management would be the order of the 
day. 
6.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
6.2.1 Sample data 
The data relates to the FTSE All Share Index and its constituent industrial sector sub 
indices. All sectors were initially examined, but some were rejected where data was 
not available for the full period. For instance, FTSE A/S Steel & Other Metals and 
FTSE A/S Life Assurance Index values had gaps in the period under consideration. 
For the sector indices where all values were available, the basic data were obtained 
from Datastream* (with Sterling as the default currency), resulting in 263 observations 
of 30 variables. The choice of the period is based on current data over a time of no 
major UK political and economic change and with the UK equity market showing no 
major changes in trend. The data set is limited to one year as there is no consideration 
of seasonality (usually covered by tests for anomalies) and the number of observations 
more than satisfies the sample size requirements of the various statistical tests. (Some 
econometric texts alluding to a sample size of 200 being large. ) In addition, there is 
no assumption of any relationship of great longevity. There is a body of finance 
literature that does examine long term trends, but that is not considered here. 
The sample period is one year of daily data from 23rd April 2003 to 22nd April 2004. 
This differs from many research papers on stock market efficiency and pricing models 
which tend to use weekly or monthly data. The reason is summarized in the 
conclusion of Acker and Duck's (2004) paper: 
The choice of reference day does have important implications for key statistics 
such company betas (sic) and stock-market correlations and, as we have 
shown, it can reverse central conclusions of different types of study. (p. 18) 
Their analysis shows that, using iterative calculations of variance or beta based 
successively on each of the 28 reference days available per month, when using 
Original Datastream data was exported from Bankers TA to Excel where the natural log and returns 
transformations were made, prior to production of the E-Views worksheet. All calculations in this and 
subsequent chapters were performed in E Views Version 4, other than Table 11 where the runs tests 
were produced in SPSS. 
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monthly data a wide range of different statistical characteristics are achieved, 
depending on the day selected to represent the month. Their largest difference in 
calculated betas was a range from -0.41 through to + 3.0 and "even in the less extreme 
cases the difference across reference days was `unsettlingly large"' (p. 5). Therefore, 
although much of the calculations in this chapter follow methods used extensively in 
finance research, the choice of daily data rather than the more common monthly 
format should remove this reference day problem. This is also in step with the gradual 
shift from monthly data to more high frequency analysis generally used in academic 
finance literature. 
Daily returns at time t (DRt) were calculated using the continuously compounded 
formula: 
DRt= In (Pt / Pt-1) (6.1) 
where Pt is the value of the index at time t and In is the natural logarithm. The use of 
log-price relatives is in step with the majority of academic literature in finance. The 
application of natural logs allows the result to be treated as a continuously 
compounded return. Further calculations are performed on excess returns, after 
deduction of the risk-free rate, such that: 
Rt=DRt-Rf (6.2) 
where the risk free rate Rf, or its proxy, is the three month Treasury Bill rate, shown in 
Economic Trends (May 2004, number 606, TSO), converted to a daily equivalent. 
Where there were gaps in the data caused by bank holidays, the average of the indices 
one period each side of the `gap' was inserted. 
No account was taken of dividends, in line with Chortareas et al (2000), Nelson 
(1991) and others, on the basis that their omission does not result in any major error in 
analysis of this type. Had individual company data been analysed, then the omission 
of dividends could have given scope for error due to the differences between growth 
and value firms. The use of indices, however, when combined with the frequency of 
the data, means that exclusion of dividends should not invalidate the analysis. 
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6.2.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 10 sets out descriptive statistics of the various sub-indices and their daily 
returns. (For space reasons, subsequent tables may just use the reference number. ) 
There are 29 industrial sector indices that have daily data available over the full 
period. These have a total of 644 constituent firms compared with the 695 firms in the 
whole of the FTSE All Share index. Thus 51 firms, or rather their sectors, are 
excluded from the analysis. Three of the sector indices each contain just one 
constituent firm so their subsequent analysis is simultaneously at the firm and sector 
level. 
Although the focus of this research is on the sector indices, all calculations in this and 
the following chapters are also performed on the aggregate FTSE All Share index. 
This is for completeness rather than as a central part of the study. As a comparison 
with the sector indices in Table 10, the full index had daily return moments of 
0.000505 (mean), 0.007250 (standard deviation), -0.210953 (skewness) and 3.642532 
(kurtosis) and a Jarque-Bera (JB) normality test statistic of 6.450 (significant at 5%). 
The All Share index's kurtosis value is the closest of all the values to 3.0, indicating 
that it has the lowest skewness. 
As can be seen from Table 10, the highest mean daily return (Rt) is 0.2729% for 
Electricity, with an associated standard deviation of over 6% (well above the second 
highest of 1.59). This sub-index has only one constituent, which possibly helps to 
explain the volatility, but is not the only series with a sole member. Two of the indices 
have a negative mean daily return, those of Forestry & Paper and Insurance, all others 
are positive over the twelve month period. All of the series indicate some level of 
skewness, with 11 being negative and 19 positive. Beverages has the largest skewness 
coefficient at 10.55, followed by Aerospace & Defence at over 7, but most have a 
value for the third moment of less than one. The fourth moment, that of kurtosis, 
would be expected to have a value of 3 if there is no kurtosis with returns normally 
distributed. Table 10 shows a wide range of values, from 145 for Beverages down to 
4.03 for Speciality & Other Financials. Combining both the third and fourth moments, 
the JB test has the joint null hypothesis of no skewness and no kurtosis and is a test of 
the normality of the distribution. As can be seen, all of the indices' returns' time 
series reject this null at 5% significance; the highest statistic being (again) Beverages. 
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Table 10 Summary Data FTSE All Share sector indices 
Name Ref Value 
£m + 
Nu of 
firms 
Daily return of index 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis JB 
statistic 
Aerospace & Defence 15577 363 3 
. 
001890 
. 
012450 7.296844 87.19092 79703. * 
Auto & Parts 15579 728 9 
. 
001772 
. 
011771 
. 
305219 8.179921 296.98* 
Beverages 15581 148 1 
. 
001861 
. 
013176 10.55384 145.8802 227725. * 
Chemicals 15585 643 8 
. 
000282 
. 
009238 
. 
027135 5.49667 68.08* 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 1,834 22 
. 
001037 
. 
005988 -1.035378 7.080078 228.54* 
Electricity 19897 84 1 
. 
002729 
. 
060434 
. 
139776 14.32934 1402.05* 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 2,082 21 
. 
001090 
. 
007706 
. 
199570 4.183293 17.02* 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 1,442 24 
. 
001629 
. 
007623 
. 
043992 4.926966 40.62* 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 204 3 
. 
002216 
. 
015616 1.382192 19.19139 2945.35* 
Food Production & Processors 15599 1,113 12 
. 
000878 
. 
006638 -. 832228 7.583930 259.63* 
Forestry & Paper 15595 13 1 -. 000652 . 
015285 
. 
100493 14.26520 1385.82* 
General Retailers 15601 2,989 30 
. 
001428 
. 
005777 -. 111151 4.158158 15.18* 
Health 15603 1,673 19 
. 
001457 
. 
007474 -. 677494 14.68717 1511.15* 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 918 17 
. 
001701 
. 
009752 
. 
552424 4.915711 53.39* 
Insurance 15609 1,618 12 -. 000002 . 
007648 -2.834151 26.41625 6336.59* 
Investment Companies 15610 16,624 189 . 
001293 . 
005508 -. 267152 4.780903 37.74* 
IT hardware 15607 1,387 20 . 
002732 . 
015900 . 
546147 4.552908 39.35* 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 1,966 16 . 
001245 . 
007265 -. 365619 9.295040 438.44* 
Media & Entertainments 15615 2,757 32 . 
001604 
. 
006639 -. 277262 8.342336 314.93* 
Mining 15617 588 6 . 
000879 . 
012965 . 
241733 5.367888 63.76* 
Oil & Gas 15619 1,166 8 . 
001335 . 
009047 -. 180058 6.061961 103.77* 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 1,299 16 . 
001760 . 
011991 . 
683814 4.930607 61.11* 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 269 3 . 
002446 . 
015733 1.189468 5.855835 150.82* 
Real estate 15627 1,776 20 . 
001794 . 
003750 . 
469006 4.716184 41.76* 
Software & CPU Services 15630 3,614 43 . 
002054 . 
009265 . 
339410 5.162296 56.07* 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 2,089 24 . 
001424 . 
005661 . 
435580 4.031362 19.52* 
Support Services 15635 6,619 63 . 
001163 . 
005330 -. 502881 5.074650 58.03* 
Telecommunication Services 15641 579 6 . 
002173 . 
017238 . 
751319 6.882306 189.18* 
Transport 15639 1,858 15 . 
000960 . 
008782 . 
167542 6.192041 112.46* 
+ value as at 25' July 2005 * signitlcant at n/o 
Lack of normality can have severe adverse impact in econometric analysis, but this 
may be reduced by removal of outliers, consideration of ARCH, or sample size: 
... 
for sample sizes that are significantly large, violation of the normality 
assumption is virtually inconsequential. Appealing to a central limit theorem, 
the test statistics will asymptotically follow the appropriate distribution even 
in the absence of error normality. (Brooks, p 182.2002) 
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6.2.3 Early tests for randomness 
Early tests of the original weak form efficiency often used runs tests. These are 
produced here, but not as part of the main analysis, so the results do not inform later 
discussion. Table 11 sets out the results of the runs tests, although it should be noted 
Table 11 Non-parametric Runs Test 
Name Ref Number 
of Runs z 
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
tailed) 
FTSE All Share 5921 138 1.689 
. 
091 
Aerospace & Defence 15577 100 -3.074 . 
002 
Auto & Parts 15579 107 -1.98 . 
048* 
Beverages 15581 104 -2.844 . 004 * 
Chemicals 15585 97 -3.731 . 
000 * 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 102 -2.241 . 025* 
Electricity 19897 128 
. 
587 
. 
557 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 120 -. 557 . 
577 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 103 -2.544 . 
011* 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 113 -1.516 . 
13 
Food Production & Processors 15599 109 -1.829 . 
66 
Forestry & Paper 15595 59 -1.605 . 109 
General Retailers 15601 92 -3.482 . 
000* 
Health 15603 87 -4.449 . 
000 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 116 -. 968 . 333 
Insurance 15609 107 -2.465 . 014* 
Investment Companies 15610 100 -2.567 . 
010 
IT hardware 15607 113 -1.488 . 137 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 116 -. 845 . 398 
Media & Entertainments 15615 107 -1.625 . 
104 
Mining 15617 113 -1.702 . 
089 
Oil & Gas 15619 103 -2.863 . 004 * 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 101 -3.030 . 002 * 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 98 -3.362 . 001 
Real estate 15627 94 -2.24 . 
025* 
Software & CPU Services 15630 89 -3.996 . 
000 * 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 86 -4.495 . 
000 * 
Support Services 15635 91 -3.777 . 
000 * 
Telecommunication Services 15641 122 -. 362 . 
717 
Transport 15639 118 -. 927 . 
354 
*= non random at 511/b 
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that these have been performed not on the index values, but on the daily returns. A 
change in the sign of the return is indicative of a new run. At 5% significance, 17 of 
the returns' series reject the null hypothesis of randomness and 13 indicate that the 
data series' runs are not inconsistent with that of a random walk. 
Table 12 Pearson Correlation with lag 
Ref Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8 Lag 9 Lag 10 
5921 -. 168* . 
032 -. 040 . 
047 -. 015 -. 084 . 
069 -. 080 -. 009 -. 163* 
15577 . 
054 -. 075 . 
010 
. 029 -. 019 -. 064 -. 001 -. 005 -. 007 -. 002 
15579 . 139* . 153* . 
096 
. 108 . 026 . 170* -. 024 . 127 -. 
005 . 
094 
15581 . 
112 
. 034 . 
174* 
. 017 -. 013 . 007 . 016 -. 063 -. 005 -. 010 
15585 . 
206 * 
. 218 
* 
. 082 . 
049 -. 026 -. 040 -. 029 . 063 . 
018 . 040 
15583 . 
222 * 
. 142 
* 
. 111 . 025 . 089 . 044 . 105 -. 083 -. 
020 -. 025 
19897 . 075 -. 121 -. 041 . 
055 
. 
003 -. 096 -. 083 . 022 -. 
007 -. 021 
15593 . 242 * . 100 . 194* . 149 . 034 . 111 . 
061 
. 
005 . 032 . 
056 
15591 . 187 * . 035 . 092 . 065 -. 011 -. 001 -. 009 . 028 . 
093 -. 032 
15597 . 064 -. 112 . 
028 -. 014 -. 086 . 083 -. 
032 -. 008 -. 010 -. 014 
15599 . 
236 * -. 055 -. 096 -. 050 -. 033 -. 071 -. 052 . 045 -. 005 -. 
062 
15595 . 099 -. 
005 -. 106 -. 007 -. 025 -. 029 -. 066 -. 011 . 
035 -. 046 
15601 . 
269* . 086 . 
094 
. 
092 . 065 . 081 . 
154* . 061 . 
027 . 122 
15603 . 220* . 123* . 
081 . 054 . 
022 -. 022 . 013 -. 006 -. 
029 -. 042 
15605 -. 021 . 
091 . 
044 . 050 . 
089 -. 074 . 003 -. 032 -. 
032 . 090 
15609 . 163* . 
106 . 
027 -. 022 . 106 . 
122* . 001 . 087 -. 
064 . 035 
15610 
. 174 
* . 
082 . 110 . 
088 -. 007 . 011 . 
034 -. 112 -. 107 -. 090 
15607 . 169* -. 
002 -. 008 . 118 . 
062 -. 044 . 
025 -. 034 -. 017 -. 090 
15613 . 144* -. 
044 . 
001 . 
029 . 
031 -. 018 . 041 . 
013 -. 045 -. 054 
15615 . 156* . 
028 -. 019 . 018 . 
101 . 097 . 
099 . 073 . 
084 . 121* 
15617 . 043 . 
007 . 
047 . 058 . 
056 -. 032 -. 015 -. 080 . 026 . 
028 
15619 . 165 
* . 
061 -. 009 . 
076 . 
019 . 024 . 
008 -. 012 . 027 -. 
002 
15623 
. 128 
* -. 016 . 
115 -. 051 -. 031 . 008 -. 
057 -. 088 . 042 . 
029 
15621 
. 117* -. 
012 -. 040 -. 012 -. 046 -. 072 -. 
107 -. 022 -. 060 . 108 
15627 
. 173* . 
069 . 
099 . 070 . 
090 . 030 -. 
018 -. 090 1 -. 025 . 011 
15630 
. 
282* . 
126* . 
114 . 
120 * . 
015 -. 036 . 017 -. 
040 -. 039 -. 001 
15633 
. 417 
* . 144* . 
046 . 
010 . 
030 -. 019 . 042 . 
043 . 
001 . 002 
15635 . 341 
* . 
102 . 
176 * . 
122 * . 159 
* . 
089 . 
051 . 021 . 
001 . 
049 
15641 
. 
052 . 022 . 
132 * . 100 -. 
142* -. 058 -. 054 -. 129 -. 018 . 
051 
15639 
. 
173 * . 
054 . 047 -. 
007 . 
065 . 
068 -. 047 -. 075 -. 021 -. 010 
*correlation coefficients not equal to zero at -n/o signiucance. 
Table 12 shows the lagged correlations for the indices' returns as another fairly 
simplistic measure of randomness. Using 5% significance it is seen that 
22 out of the 
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30 series show significant non-zero correlation (with a two sided test) with one day's 
lag. All but one of these correlations are positive. As the lag length increases, so the 
number of significant correlations reduces. Again the comments can only be 
superficial, but evidence of autocorrelation could be an indicator of non randomness 
in some of the indices. 
Table 13 Ljung Box Test of Autocorrelation 
Name Ref Lj ung Box Statistic 
FTSE All Share 5921 20.8* 
Aerospace & Defence 15577 3.4 
Auto & Parts 15579 32.6 * 
Beverages 15581 4.2 
Chemicals 15585 34.3 * 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 33.0 * 
Electricity 19897 12.5 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 50.9 * 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 18.0 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 6.1 
Food Production & Processors 15599 20.9* 
Forestry & Paper 15595 6.9 
General Retailers 15601 54.7 
Health 15603 23.2 * 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 8.25 
Insurance 15609 23.0* 
Investment Companies 15610 28.9 * 
IT hardware 15607 16.1 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 12.7 
Media & Entertainments 15615 22.4* 
Mining 15617 6.82 
Oil & Gas 15619 11.6 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 12.1 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 11.9 
Real estate 15627 14.6 
Software & CPU Services 15630 41.3 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 57.0 
Support Services 15635 66.7 
Telecommunication Services 15641 20.5* 
Transport 15639 18.8* 
*=5% significance, 1U degrees of rreeaom. 
The lagged correlations in Table 12 give some support to the constancy of the 
covariances in some of the returns of the indices, but this can be tested more 
formally 
using a test of joint hypotheses that all appropriate correlation coefficients are zero. 
(For `appropriate', this is assumed to be the ten lags encompassing two weeks of 
data. ) The Ljung Box statistic assumes a chi-squared distribution with ten degrees of 
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freedom (the number of lags) and has a 5% critical value of 18.307. The results of this 
test (which are part of a set of statistics known as portmanteau tests of time series 
linear relationships) are set out in Table 13 where it can be seen that 16 indices reject 
the null hypothesis that all ten lags have no autocorrelation and could require 
differencing. (See later sections for an explanation of differencing. ) 
A comparison of Tables 11 and 13 (using 5% significance) produces: ten series that 
do not reject the null hypothesis that the series is random, as indicated by the runs test 
and also do not reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation according to the 
Ljung Box test; seven series that are not random in runs and have auto-correlation; 
and 13 with mixed messages where just one of the two tests indicates some degree of 
randomness. 
Runs test indicates randomness and LB suggests no auto-correlation 
Auto & Parts Insurance 
Chemicals Investment Companies 
Construction & Building Materials Software & CPU Services 
Food Production & Processors Speciality & Other Financials 
Health Support Services 
Runs test indicates not random and LB suggests auto-correlation 
Electricity IT Hardware 
Food & Drug Retailers Leisure & Hotels 
Forestry & Paper Mining 
Household Goods & Textiles 
Mixed Message 
FTSE All Share 
Aerospace & Defence 
Beverages 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 
Engineering & Machinery 
General Retailers 
Media & Entertainments 
Oil & Gas 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 
Personal Care & Household Products 
Real Estate 
Telecommunication Services 
Transport 
A simple or naive interpretation of this could be that the first group (not rejecting 
either of the two null hypotheses of randomness and zero correlation) show weak 
form efficiency, whereas the second group (rejecting both of the two nulls) does not 
seem efficient. The third group (rejecting one of the two nulls) give mixed messages. 
It was this type of approach that formed the early tests of efficiency. Whilst its range 
of outcomes more than validates the continuation of this analysis to establish if some 
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of the FTSE All Share component indices are random, its usage has been superceded 
by more modern and sophisticated tests, hence its inclusion here in the review of 
descriptive statistics. 
The remainder of this chapter and the subsequent analytical chapters move away from 
basic descriptive statistics and have a univariate time series econometric focus. This 
depends on or is derived from a variety of econometric texts, namely: Brooks (2002); 
Gujarati (2003); Patterson (2000); Shiryaev (1999): and Quantitative Micro Software 
(2001). These are supplemented by a variety of quantitative texts shown in the 
Bibliography. Although specific quotations will be referenced, general interpretation 
will not. 
6.3 Random Walks 
6.3.1 Autoregressive processes 
There are many tests of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, but this chapter's analysis 
will focus just on one test, that of randomness. Various forms of the random walk will 
be applied to the returns of the 30 indices to establish whether any are random. The 
overarching assumption is that if a series does follow a random walk, then it is 
efficient. Of course, the opposite does not generally apply, in that if a series is not 
random that would not automatically mean that the series was not efficient. This case 
will be followed up in the next chapter, to establish if the non-random series can be 
described by an AR(p) process of the type in equations 6.3 or 6.4 below. 
A univariate linear deterministic model is of the form: 
1't = (P i Yt-1 + (P2Yt-2 +....... 
+(PpYt-p (6.3) 
This is autoregressive AR(p) and can be converted from deterministic to stochastic by 
the addition of a stochastic term such that 
Yt = (P i Yt-i + (P2Yt-2 +....... 
+(p Yt-p + Ft (6.4) 
An autoregressive process such as equation 6.4 with one lag is 
Yt = (P i Yt-1 + £t (6.5) 
where the value of Y at time t depends on the prior period's value plus a stochastic 
error term. This data generating process is therefore AR(1). If the parameter 91 is 
equal to one then equation 6.5 becomes a pure random walk 
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Yt = Yt_i + ct (6.6) 
The interpretation of the pure random walk in relation to a share index would be that 
the best estimate of the value of the index tomorrow is today's value and that there is 
no scope for making abnormal gains. 
The pure random walk is not the only time series that can be random. A second case is 
where it is a random walk with drift, namely 
Yt=µ+Yt_i +81 (6.7) 
where µ is the drift term. A third case is that of a random walk with a deterministic 
trend 
Yt = Yt-i + ßt + Et (6.8) 
where ß is the time series trend. All versions could be combined such that 
1't=µ+Yt-i+ßt+£t (6.9) 
This final version will form the basis of the tests for randomness in relation to the 
indices' time series, with particular reference to various formats, each exhibiting 
various random walk characteristics or non-random data generating processes which 
produce trends similar to an index time series. For convenience the three versions of 
the random walk will be referred to as formats one, two and three, namely: 
format drift cp trend type 
One µ=0 cp 1=1 ß=0 pure random walk 
Two µffl q 1=1 0=0 random walk with drift 
Three µ0 91=1 ß: ý0 random walk with drift and deterministic trend 
It may be the case that the maintained regressions produce a value for the parameter 
cpl which is close to unity but significantly different to 1.00 (assumed below, or else 
the series would be explosive). In this situation the process could be viewed as a near 
random walk and the error term is best described as coloured noise. There could be no 
automatic conclusion in these cases as to randomness or efficiency. 
6.3.2 Stationarity 
A concept closely linked to auto regressive processes is that of stationarity. A time 
series that is not stationary suffers from prior error term values (st ) having an 
infinite impact on future values (in effect an infinite memory) and can give rise to 
spurious regressions This is not immediately attractive in terms of studying share 
140 
indices in relation to forecasting or testing for efficiency, so it is desirable to test the 
series for stationary before proceeding with any analysis. Examination of all of the 30 
indices shows a gradual growth over the year: positive for 28 and negative for two. 
This contradicts the requirements of stationarity, namely that stationary processes 
must have a constant mean. This condition is known as first order stationarity and can 
be extended to include variance and covariance. For a time series to be second order 
stationary, in addition to a constant mean, both the variance and all the covariances 
must also be constant. 
If this concept is applied to (say) the FTSE All Share index, with the assumption that 
it is a random walk with drift, then the index is equivalent to equation 6.7 such that: 
Y24/4/05 =9+ Y23/4/05 + E24/4/05 
Y25/4/05 = jl + Y24/4/05 + £25/4/05 
-µ +L + Y23/4/05 + E24/4/05 + 025/4/05 
= 2µ + Y23/4/05 + £24/4/05 + 025/4/05 
and additionally 
which is equivalent to 
It can now be seen that if the index's starting value on 23rd April 2003 is the constant 
4, then the mean (expected value) of 24th April is different from that of the 25th: i. e. 
the starting value plus one µ compared to the starting value plus two µ. Likewise the 
variance will be different for the two days. Similarly, although a larger example 
would be required, the covariances will not be constant. With this fairly simple 
example the conclusion would be that although the All Share index is random it is not 
stationary. If the pure random walk of equation 6.7 is differenced once it can be 
written as 
Yt - Yt-i = Et (6.10) 
Performing this operation in relation to the example results in: 
Y25/4/05 
- 
Y24/4/05 =µ+ E25/4/05 
which, as can be seen, will now have a constant mean, variance and covariance. This 
process is known as differencing to stationarity. Given that the random walk goes to 
stationarity after one differencing it is known as integrated of order one. (A series 
such as equation 6.3 above may require d differencings to achieve stationarity and 
would be referred to as integrated of order d, or I(d). ) A time series that becomes 
stationary after one differencing, I(1), is defined as having a unit root. All three 
versions of the random walk can be differenced as for equation 6.10 above, resulting 
in the following formats. 
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Format One Rt = Yt - Yt_1 = st 
Format Two Rt = Yt - Yt_1 =µ+ st 
Format Three Rt = Yt - Yt_1 = µ+ fat + et 
(6.11) 
(6.12) 
(6.13) 
The importance of the series in this analysis being stationary is such that the first step 
is to test this condition. The conversion of the index values to natural logarithms, (as 
set out above) results in the difference Yt-Yt_1 being the log normal return on the 
index. The next section of this chapter undertakes formal tests on the 30 index time 
series to examine if they are stationary, either in the level version of the indices, or 
more likely when converted to log normal returns after first differencing. These tests 
are based on those of Dickey Fuller, although there are other methods that could be 
used. The tests examine the value of cpi, given that for a random walk it should be 
equal to one, i. e. the series has a unit root. It should also be emphasized that although 
the Dickey Fuller tests are based on regressing the time series in one of the three 
random walk formats, at this stage the resulting regression equations are of no 
interest: it is only the value of cpl that is of importance. 
(As an aside it should be noted that a trend stationary process, unlike those considered 
here, cannot be differenced to stationarity; instead they require de-trending. This issue 
will be readdressed if the various data generating processes identified in subsequent 
analysis warrant it. ) 
6.4 Dickey Fuller test structure 
6.4.1 Approach 
Within time series analysis, there is much reflection on the approach to identifying the 
appropriate data generating process. Early work was heavily dependent upon visual 
consideration of graphs of the time series and autocorrelation and partial 
autocorrelation graphs. Subsequent approaches often followed the Univariate Box 
Jenkins methodology. The growth in use of time series analysis in economics and 
finance generally has also more recently produced many statistical tests and other 
tools to review a time series. For this analysis, the consideration of whether or not an 
index's time series follows a random walk model means that much of the time series 
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tests are not necessary. Instead the main approach will be the use of Dickey Fuller 
tests for unit roots. An alternative approach could be to use (say) the Phillips and 
Perron test, but this suffers from additional problems in simulating critical values. 
The earlier generation of equation 6.6 to produce a pure random walk assumed that cpi 
equals one. The test of this assumption is the basis of the Dickey Fuller tests for unit 
roots. Their purpose is not to establish via regression the detailed parameters for the 
data generating process but merely to identify if that process, when using one of the 
various formats of the random walk model has a unit root. Hence the goal is to 
discover if (p, equals one. For formats one, two and three of the random walk model, 
there is no single test for the value of (p I. Different nested tests can be used to reject or 
not reject various null hypotheses about the value of the parameters. Time series 
analysis usually assumes a starting point at the "complex" end of any proposed data 
generating process and gradually reduces down to achieve a regression that is the 
most simple or parsimonious. This will form the basis of the tests on the indices' time 
series. 
The following section describes the various tests, specifically in relation to the 
differenced formats, i. e. the returns. The actual tests in the later section are performed 
on both the level, undifferenced indices as well as the differenced returns, but the 
approaches are the same so the description is just given for differenced formats. 
6.4.2 The J3 and iß tests 
The first test will be based upon the Dickey Fuller I3 statistic which is designed to 
examine format three, does the series have a unit root if the maintained regression 
is a 
random walk with drift and trend? Equation 6.13 is used, but to allow the null 
hypothesis to state that the autoregressive parameter equals zero, it is redefined with 
y=c 1- 1 such that 
Rt = Yt - Yt-i = µ+ ''Yt-i + ßt + st 
(6.14) 
For the J3 test, which is two sided, the null hypothesis is: Ho: (4,0,0) 
but 
with three alternatives encompassing either or both y and 
ß 0. The alternative 
hypotheses being Hai: = (µ, 'Y, ß) or Ha2: (µ, 'Y, ß) = (µ, O, ß) or Ha3: (µýYýI3) = 
(µ, -y, 0). Non rejection of the (D3 null will infer a unit root and a series 
that could be a 
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random walk with drift (Format Two) or a pure random walk (Format One) as 7=0 so 
(pi =1 and ß=0. Rejection does not identify which of the alternative hypotheses is 
valid. Thus, in the case of rejection of the I3 test, the one-sided 'cß test will be used 
with the null that y=0 and alternative y<O. Non rejection of this null will give a unit 
root and a non-stationary series that is a random walk with drift and trend as if y=0 
then the (D3 rejection must have been based on (µ, 0, ß), (Format Three), although at 
this stage the drift may or may not be zero. Rejection of the iß null will infer that y<O, 
so that (p, < 1. 
6.4.3 The (D1 and iµ tests 
The second round of tests applies to those series where the I3 test's null was not 
rejected. The trend can now be dropped as ß=0 and the test is based on Format Two, 
but again with y=y, -1 so that equation 6.12 becomes 
Rt = Yt -1't-i = µ+ YYt-i + £t (6.15) 
Here, the two sided (DI test is used with the null Ho: (µ, y)=(0,0), again with three 
alternatives being either or both µ and y : t-0. Thus Hal: (µ, y)=(µ, 0) or Ha2: (µ, y)=(O, y) 
or Ha3: (µ, y)=(µ, y). Non rejection of the null results in the conclusion that the time 
series is consistent with having a unit root and could be Format One, a pure random 
walk. If the null is rejected it is necessary to establish which of the three alternatives 
apply. In this case the one-sided iµ test is employed with the null Ho: y=0 and the 
alternative y<O. Non rejection of the null will infer that the series has a unit root and is 
Format Two, whilst rejection means there is no unit root and the series is not I(l). 
6.4.4 The i test 
The final round of the Dickey Fuller tests applies if the series did not reject the (D1 
test. This could be regarded as unnecessary duplication in that non rejection of (D 1's 
null assumes a pure random walk with no drift. Unfortunately, the test is not overly 
powerful: three alternative hypotheses, a joint null and two-sided. To compensate 
for 
this the framework proceeds to the third level, the i test. The data generating process 
is viewed as: 
Rt = Yt - Yt-i = 'YYt-i + £t 
(6.16) 
In this case the r test is used, with a null Ho: y=0. Non rejection gives a unit root and a 
non-stationary random walk of Format One, rejection means stationarity. 
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This framework of testing for unit roots is displayed for simplicity in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 Test Framework 
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6.4.5 Augmented DF tests 
It is sometimes the case that non-stationarity may be caused by correlation within the 
error term rather than the main parameters. The basic Dickey Fuller test does not take 
account of this, but the errors can be examined by use of the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) test. For each of the three versions of the model, an additional factor is 
added to the regression, namely the lagged Rt. Thus the three random walk formats 
become: 
Rt is a random walk: Yt-Yt-i=Rt=byt-i+ Dai Rt-; +Et (6.17) 
Rt is a random walk with drift: 
Rt is a random walk with drift 
and a stochastic trend : 
where i is the number of lags. 
Yc-Yt-i=Rt=ff1+6yt-i+Zai Rt-i+Ct (6.18) 
Yt-Yt_ I =Rc=ß 1+ 02t+6yt-1 + Eai Rr-i +Ft (6.19) 
This augmented test can be applied to the three forms of the model as before, with the 
same critical values. Various tests can be applied to the data to recommend or give an 
indication of the appropriate number of lags to apply to the ADF test. These can 
include various information criteria or LM tests for serial correlation. Rather than 
these, the lagged correlations set out in Table 12 will be used. Where the lag is 
replicated in the second week (6-10) these will be ignored as they could be an `echo' 
of the first week, e. g. significant correlation at days one and six. Of course, where 
there is no significant lag in periods one to ten, then the ADF(0) collapses to the basic 
Dickey Fuller test. 
There is one final point which requires elaboration. All of the various versions of the 
random walk model discussed above assume a stochastic error term et. For a series to 
be random, this error term or white noise must satisfy various conditions, namely: 
E(ct) =0 for all t; 
variance is constant and independent of time; 
autocorrelations equal to zero. 
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Under these conditions the stochastic error term itself is seen as stationary. A more 
rigorous definition is for it to be an independent and identically distributed variable, 
referred to as IID. The conditions for IID are similar to white noise, namely: 
E(Et) a constant that may or may not =0; 
variance is constant and independent of time; 
st is independent of e, for all s, t, s fit. 
For the various time series to be tested for randomness via the Dickey Fuller and 
Augmented Dickey Fuller tests, the error terms must also be examined for IID. This 
will be undertaken using the Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman (BDS) statistic, the null 
hypothesis being that the residuals from the regression of the appropriate random 
walk format are IID. The implications of the rejection of this hypothesis will be 
considered later. Chapter 5 described earlier the background to the BDS test. 
6.5 Results of Unit Root Tests on level series 
6.5.1 cb3 tests on level series 
The first round of tests will be on the level time series of index values expressed as 
their natural logarithm. The underlying assumption or expectation is that the series 
will have a unit root and will not be stationary. The maintained regressions will be 
undifferenced versions of the equations shown in 6.6 to 6.8. 
Critical values for I3 are obtained from tables available in the public domain, 
typically generated by simulations as the distributions are not normal or other 
common formats. The need for simulations restricts the accuracy and no table is 
available for this particular sample size, however it can be seen from the following 
extract in Table 14 that this should not be particularly problematic. The initial (two 
sided) test is for 03 and the results from the tests are shown in Table 15 below. 
147 
Table 14 03 Critical Values 
1% 5% 10% 
Sample 
200 8.542 6.397 5.433 
500 8.326 6.238 5.321 
(Source: Patterson, Critical values of the DF test statistic 03 ) 
Given that E Views 4 is used to calculate the test statistics, then it should be feasible 
to use the critical values generated by the software, rather than relying on the above, 
but their lower values and lack of supporting explanation infer that these critical 
values may be for a single sided test, so the extract from Patterson is a safer value and 
a `view' will be taken if any test statistic lies between 6.397 and 6.238. 
Examination of Table 15 shows that none of the 30 indices reject the null hypothesis 
Ho: (µ, y, (3)= (µ, 0,0) at 5% significance, indicating that at this early stage all the time 
series could be consistent with a random walk but have a unit root and are not 
stationary. The fact that there were no rejections additionally means that there is now 
no requirement for the Dickey Fuller iß test. 
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Table 15 Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity in the level index series 
Format Three. Iz test 
Ref Lags for 
ADF 
Test statistic 
FTSE All Share 5921 1 -3.613 
Aerospace & Defence 15577 0 -1.701 
Auto & Parts 15579 2 -1.400 
Beverages 15581 3 -2.809 
Chemicals 15585 2 -2.943 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 2 -2.171 
Electricity 19897 0 -2.618 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 3 -2.457 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 1 -1.086 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 0 -2.264 
Food Production & Processors 15599 1 -2.300 
Forestry & Paper 15595 0 -2.840 
General Retailers 15601 1 -3.078 
Health 15603 2 -3.587 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 0 -2.590 
Insurance 15609 1 -1.827 
Investment Companies 15610 1 -2.349 
IT hardware 15607 1 -1.543 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 1 -2.538 
Media & Entertainments 15615 1 -0.956 
Mining 15617 0 -0.815 
Oil & Gas 15619 1 -1.540 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 1 -1.823 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 1 -2.353 
Real estate 15627 1 -2.568 
Software & CPU Services 15630 4 -2.403 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 2 -1.771 
Support Services 15635 4 -2.681 
Telecommunication Services 15641 5 -2.568 
Transport 15639 1 -2.865 
* significant at 5% 
6.5.2 11 tests on level series 
Non rejection of the 4)3 null tells us nothing about the drift parameter µ as 
in the test it was unrestricted, so it is now necessary to move to the second round. 
Critical values for the (DI two sided test are shown in Table 16. The calculated values 
of the test statistic are set out in Table 17. None of the indices reject the null of Ho: 
(µ, y)=(0,0) even at 1% significance, so the third version of the test, that of i is 
required. 
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Table 16 (D1 Critical Values 
1% 5% 10% 
Sample 
200 6.730 4.696 3.835 
500 6.387 4.646 3.803 
(Source: Patterson, Critical values of the DF test statistic (D1 ) 
Table 17 Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity in level index series 
Format Two, (D1 test 
Name Ref Lags for 
ADF 
Test statistic 
FTSE All Share 5921 1 -1.788 
Aerospace & Defence 15577 0 -0.819 
Auto & Parts 15579 2 -2.904 
Beverages 15581 3 -1.667 
Chemicals 15585 2 -2.608 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 2 -2.825 
Electricity 19897 0 -1.680 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 3 -3.440 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 1 -3.193 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 0 -1.285 
Food Production & Processors 15599 1 -2.008 
Forestry & Paper 15595 0 -1.874 
General Retailers 15601 1 -4.268 
Health 15603 2 -3.481 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 0 -3.624 
Insurance 15609 1 -1.570 
Investment Companies 15610 1 -2.807 
IT hardware 15607 1 -1.423 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 1 -2.231 
Media & Entertainments 15615 1 -3.147 
Mining 15617 0 -1.741 
Oil & Gas 15619 1 -0.994 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 1 -2.700 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 1 -1.781 
Real estate 15627 1 -2.582 
Software & CPU Services 15630 4 -2.855 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 2 -2.842 
Support Services 15635 4 -3.036 
Telecommunication Services 15641 5 -3.497 
Transport 15639 1 -3.073 
* signiticant at ro 
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6.5.3 i tests on level series 
The critical values for this are set out in Table 18. 
Table 18 i Critical Values 
sample 1% 5% 10% 
200 -2.581 -1.938 -1.619 
500 -2.536 -1.943 -1.610 
(Source: Patterson, Critical values of the DF test statistic i) 
Table 19 Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity in level index series 
Format One, i test 
Name Ref Lags for 
ADF 
Test statistic 
FTSE All Share 5921 1 1.865 
Aerospace & Defence 15577 0 2.678 
Auto & Parts 15579 2 1.881 
Beverages 15581 3 2.975 
Chemicals 15585 2 0.684 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 2 2.199 
Electricity 19897 0 0.859 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 3 1.665 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 1 3.013 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 0 2.395 
Food Production & Processors 15599 1 1.870 
Forestry & Paper 15595 0 -0.565 
General Retailers 15601 1 3.203 
Health 15603 2 2.379 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 0 3.062 
Insurance 15609 1 0.311 
Investment Companies 15610 1 3.410 
IT hardware 15607 1 2.336 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 1 2.606 
Media & Entertainments 15615 1 3.403 
Mining 15617 0 1.265 
Oil & Gas 15619 1 2.282 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 1 2.286 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 1 2.277 
Real estate 15627 1 6.181 
Software & CPU Services 15630 4 2.087 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 2 2.643 
Support Services 15635 4 1.998 
Telecommunication Services 15641 5 1.907 
Transport 15639 1 1.788 
*= significant at /o. 
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The calculated test statistics are set out in Table 19 above. The results indicate that no 
indices reject the i test's null hypothesis Ho: y=0 and are thus consistent with Format 
One, a non stationary series with a unit root. 
6.5.4 ADF tests on level series: summary 
It is no surprise that for all three versions of this test none of the indices have rejected 
the null hypotheses of the (D3 test, the (DI test or the i test. The time series were for the 
natural logarithm of the index values and it is very common for these types of series 
to be non-stationary. To summarise this process (see also Figure 1): 
" The (D3 test had the null and alternatives Ho: (µ, y, (3)= (µ, 0,0) and 
Hal: (µ'y4ß) = (µ; y, ß) or Ha2: (µ, yßß) = (µ, 0, ß) or Ha3: = (µ, y, 0) 
Non rejection of the null results in the conclusion that the time series is consistent 
with having a unit root, that there is no trend but there is no indication of the drift, 
hence the need for the (D1 test. None of the 30 indices rejected this test so none are 
stationary. 
" The (D1 test had the null and alternatives Ho: (µ, y)=(0,0) and 
Hal: (µ, 'Y)=(µ, 0) or Ha2: (µ9Y)=(O, y) or Ha3: (µý1')=(µýY)" 
Non rejection of the null results in the initial conclusion that the time series is 
consistent with having a unit root and no drift and from (D3 there is no trend. None 
of the thirty indices rejected this test so none are stationary. 
" The i test had the null and alternative Ho: y=0 and Ha: y<O. 
Non rejection gives a unit root and a pure random walk of Format One, rejection 
means no unit root and not random. None of the thirty indices rejected this test so 
none are stationary. 
6.6 Dickey Fuller Tests for first difference 
6.6.1 c13 tests on first differences 
The tests in this section follow exactly the same structured approach as for the tests on 
levels, the only change is that the tests are now performed on the first differences of 
the natural logarithms of the index values, in effect the returns. Prior to commencing 
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the Dickey Fuller tests, a small adjustment to the data is necessary. Asset pricing 
models assume that investors' expected return is a combination of the risk free rate 
and a premium for taking risk. The risk free rate could possibly `interfere' with the 
drift term of a random walk and therefore has been deducted from the raw data Yt - 
Yt_1. (See also section 6.2 above. ) 
Critical values for the 03 test of first differences are the same as for the level or 
undifferenced series (Table 14 above) but are reproduced here as Table 20. 
Table 20 (D3 Critical Values 
1% 5% 10% 
Sample 
200 8.542 6.397 5.433 
500 8.326 6.238 5.321 
(Source: Patterson, Critical values of the DF test statistic I3 ) 
All but two of the indices shown in Table 21 reject the null hypothesis and are 
therefore stationary using a maintained regression of random walk with drift and 
trend. (In the same way that financial econometrics normally expects a level time 
series not to be stationary, there is a similar expectation that a first differenced series 
will be stationary. ) The two exceptions that did not reject the null and are not 
stationary in format three are Electrical Equipment (15593) and Support Services 
(15635). 
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Table 21 Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity in the first differenced index series Format Three. b2 test 
Name Ref Lags for 
ADF 
Test statistic 
FTSE All Share 5921 1 -12. l57* 
Aerospace & Defence 15577 0 -15.248* 
Auto & Parts 15579 2 -7.783* 
Beverages 15581 3 -10.896* 
Chemicals 15585 2 -7.488* 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 2 -7.480* 
Electricity 19897 0 -14.527* 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 3 -6.126 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 1 -10.704* 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 0 -14.850* 
Food Production & Processors 15599 1 -11.116* 
Forestry & Paper 15595 0 -14.602* 
General Retailers 15601 1 -9.795* 
Health 15603 2 -7.817* 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 0 -16.759* 
Insurance 15609 1 -9.440* 
Investment Companies 15610 1 -9.896* 
IT hardware 15607 1 -10.710* 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 1 -11.321 * 
Media & Entertainments 15615 1 -10.882* 
Mining 15617 0 -15.477* 
Oil & Gas 15619 1 -9.865* 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 1 -20.590* 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 1 -10.997* 
Real estate 15627 1 -10.064* 
Software & CPU Services 15630 4 -6.421* 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 2 -8.086* 
Support Services 15635 4 -5.489 
Telecommunication Services 15641 5 -7.240* 
Transport 15639 1 -10.203* 
* significant at 5% 
6.6.2 (D1 tests on first differences 
The two time series that did not reject the null in the previous test continue to follow 
the framework for testing used earlier and having not rejected the 03 test proceed to 
the (D1 test. Critical values are as before, namely 4.696 for a sample of 200 and 4.646 
for a sample size of 500. 
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Table 22 Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity in first differenced index series 
Format Two, (D1 test 
Title Ref Lags for 
ADF 
Test 
statistic 
Electro & Electrical Equip 15593 1 -5.721 * 
Support Services 15635 0 -5.169* 
T slgniticant at 5% 
Both the series in Table 22 reject the null of a unit root, but as this test was on both a 
constant and the lagged value of format two there is no immediate conclusion, thus 
they follow the structure set out in Figure 1 and move on to the iµ test. 
6.6.3 iµ tests on first differences 
This is a one sided test and has critical values shown in Table 23 that vary with the 
regressed value of µ. 
Table 23 
5% critical values 
iµ Critical Values 
sample. µ= 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00 10.00 
200 -2.878 -2.837 -2.717 -2.156 -1.888 -1.763 -1.647 
500 -2.851 -2.763 -2.461 -1.933 -1.811 -1.719 -1.659 
(Source: Patterson, Critical values of the DF test statistic i) 
As can be seen from Table 24 below, both the series reject the null and are therefore 
assumed to be stationary when using format two of a pure random walk with drift as 
the maintained regression. 
Table 24 Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity in first differenced index series 
Format Two, i test 
Title Ref Lags for 
ADF 
Regressed µ Critical Value Test statistic 
Electro & Electrical Equip 15593 1 0.0007 -2.878 -5.721 * 
Support Services 15635 0 0.0005 -2.878 -5.169* 
* significant at 5% 
6.6.4 iß tests on first differences 
The 28 series that rejected the J3 test are now retested using the iß test, as set out in 
Figure 1. This has a one sided alternative hypothesis and critical values (Table 25) 
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that not only depend on the sample size but also on the value of the regressed 
coefficient ß. 
Table 25 iß Critical Values 
5% critical values 
sample. ß= 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 1.00 10.00 
200 -3.433 -1.729 -1.715 -1.655 -1.653 -1.667 -1.636 500 -3.424 -1.683 -1.646 -1.625 -1.643 -1.615 -1.671 (Source: Patterson, Critical values of the DF test statistic i) 
The results of this test are shown below in Table 26. 
Table 26 Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity in the first differenced index 
series, iR test 
Ref fags for 
ADF 
Regressed Critical value Test statistic 
FTSE All Share 5921 1 0.00 3.433 -12.157* 
Aerospace & Defence 15577 0 0.00 3.433 -15.248* 
Auto & Parts 15579 2 0.00 3.433 -7.783* 
Beverages 15581 3 0.00 3.433 -10.896* 
Chemicals 15585 2 0.00 3.433 -7.488* 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 2 0.00 3.433 -7.480* 
Electricity 19897 0 0.00 3.433 -14.527* 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 Not applicable 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 1 0.00 3.433 -10.704* 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 0 0.00 3.433 -14.850* 
Food Production & Processors 15599 1 0.00 3.433 -11.116* 
Forestry & Paper 15595 0 0.00 3.433 -14.602* 
General Retailers 15601 1 0.00 3.433 -9.795* 
Health 15603 2 0.00 3.433 -7.817* 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 0 0.00 3.433 -16.759* 
Insurance 15609 1 0.00 3.433 -9.440* 
Investment Companies 15610 1 0.00 3.433 -9.896* 
IT hardware 15607 1 0.00 3.433 -10.710* 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 1 0.00 3.433 -11.321* 
Media & Entertainments 15615 1 0.00 3.433 -10.882* 
Mining 15617 0 0.00 3.433 -15.477* 
Oil & Gas 15619 1 0.00 3.433 -9.865* 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 1 0.00 3.433 -20.590* 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 1 0.00 3.433 -10.997* 
Real estate 15627 1 0.00 3.433 -10.064* 
Software & CPU Services 15630 4 0.00 3.433 -6.421 * 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 2 0.00 3.433 -8.086* 
Support Services 15635 Not applicable 
Telecommunication Services 15641 5 0.00 3.433 -7.240* 
Transport 15639 1 0.00 3.433 -10.203* 
* signitwcant at -*)% 
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All 28 of the first differenced series reject the null hypothesis and are therefore 
assumed to be stationary. Thus when combined with the two series that were 
identified as stationary earlier, all 30 of the FTSE All Share indices' return time series 
are stationary 
6.7 Random Walk as the Data Generating Process 
6.7.1 BDS tests for IID in the residuals from a random walk process 
The previous section has shown that the natural logarithmic values of the indices' 
time series are not stationary in levels but are stationary in first difference (i. e. as a log 
return). This section now considers whether the data generating process is a random 
walk. Regressions are run for each time series in the format of equation 6.14 above: 
Rt = Yt - Yt-1 - µ+ yYt-i + ßt + st 
with the exception of Electrical Equipment (15593) and Support Services (15635) 
where the Augmented Dickey Fuller tests showed that there was no trend and thus 0 is 
assumed to be zero. 
The results of these regressions are not shown here, instead the BDS test is 
undertaken on the residuals from the 30 regressions. Table 27 sets out the results. The 
test is two sided and the null hypothesis is that the residuals are IID. In small samples 
the distribution of the BDS test statistic is often not normal, but with a sample of over 
250 this is not seen as a problem. Thus a normal distribution can be assumed with 
critical values of. 1%, 2.5757; 5% 1.96; and 10% 1.6449. Rejection of the null of III) 
means that the data generating process is possibly not linear, that the residuals contain 
evidence of additional processes that as yet are not included in the regression and thus 
the regressed form is not fully explaining the data generating process. The BDS test 
statistics have been calculated for two, three and four dimensions, in line with earlier 
indications of possible autocorrelation of up to five days. 
At 5% significance it can be seen that 24 of the series reject the null of the residuals 
being IID, but that six require further consideration as the BDS test statistics indicate 
that the data generating processes produced residuals that were IID (or rather did not 
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reject the null). These six indices are: FTSE All Share (5921); Aero (15577): 
Chemicals (15585); Forestry (15595); Oil (15619); and Personal (15621). For the 
remaining 24 time series, the lack of IID in the residuals means that the various 
random walk formats are not appropriate as they do not explain the data generating 
process satisfactorily. These will be examined for other processes in the next chapter. 
Table 27 BDS tests on a random walk as the DGP 
Name Ref Dimension 2 Dimension 3 Dimension 4 
Statistic Z Statistic Z Statistic Z 
FTSE All Share 5921 
. 
000610 
. 
127354 
. 
002968 
. 
390047 
. 
003639 
. 
401903 
Aerospace & Defence 15577 -. 000029 -. 063093 . 
000088 -. 085314 -. 000176 -. 102764 
Auto & Parts 15579 
. 
012241 2.181529* 
. 
019872 2.224146* 
. 
016671 1.563758 
Beverages 15581 
. 
019878 3.261489* 
. 
029987 3.081461 * 
. 
038654 3.319257* 
Chemicals 15585 -. 006273 -1.035528 -. 002101 -. 217177 . 
000282 
. 
024319 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 
. 
011907 2.117750* 
. 
020107 2.247378* 
. 
026720 2.504565* 
Electricity 19897 
. 
030648 5.039662* 
. 
053518 5.522386* 
. 
072117 6.230757* 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 
. 
010417 2.185787* 
. 
018752 2.477933* 
. 
031143 3.459436* 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 
. 
018003 3.072637* 
. 
024045 2.576349* 
. 
034065 3.057621 * 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 
. 
032070 4.089148* 
. 
062319 4.970121 * 
. 
077635 5.165011 * 
Food Production & Processors 15599 . 
018467 3.282143* 
. 
025455 2.837344* . 
026237 2.447549* 
Forestry & Paper 15595 . 
007887 
. 
904041 
. 
014253 1.019826 
. 
023663 1.409194 
General Retailers 15601 . 
011850 2.115268* 
. 
021080 2.359165* . 
028593 2.677290* 
Health 15603 . 
014406 2.698370* 
. 
021711 2.551479* 
. 
024457 2.406536* 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 . 
016054 3.170560* . 
028491 3.531979* . 
036982 3.841011 * 
Insurance 15609 . 
021138 3.341858* . 
038309 3.803387* . 
050111 4.168447* 
Investment Companies 15610 . 
014732 2.570734* . 
026453 2.891379* 
. 
034912 3.213908* 
IT hardware 15607 . 
028913 5.538803* . 
047019 5.664692* . 
054857 5.547019* 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 . 
023882 4.271881* . 
036849 4.138971* . 
039563 3.723671 * 
Media & Entertainments 15615 . 
012656 2.278745* . 
021931 2.483574* . 
034643 3.292830* 
Mining 15617 . 
034924 5.966999* . 
056166 6.020431* . 
067959 6.098194* 
Oil & Gas 15619 -. 002172 -. 404703 -. 004147 -. 485913 -. 006650 -. 653916 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 . 
005282 1.097581 . 
015140 1.980811 * . 
025058 2.754924* 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 . 
000054 -. 007520 -. 007578 -. 656797 -. 002364 -. 171269 
Real estate 15627 . 
019577 3.728815* . 
033220 3.973959* . 
043339 4.345464* 
Software & CPU Services 15630 . 
021468 3.578631 * . 
029247 3.060871 * . 
032666 2.863766* 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 . 
024992 4.625650* . 
036877 4.290028* . 
040316 3.933975* 
Support Services 15635 . 
011852 2.342277* . 
019099 2.368436* . 
025468 2.644899* 
Telecommunication Services 15641 . 
012871 2.477628* . 
031677 3.832319* . 
042548 4.317468* 
Transport 15639 . 
022929 4.169214* . 
045992 5.255945* . 
056168 5.383531* 
* signhticant at 5% 
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6.7.2 Time series with IID residuals 
The six indices that do produce IID residuals when regressed in a random walk format 
are set out below, with details of the regressions and allied statistics. 
FTSE All Share (5921) 
Rr = µ+ yYr-i + ßt + £r 
Rt, 5921 = -0.747066 + 0.098786Y1_1,5921 - 0.000065t 
t statistics -3.624993* 3.629444* -3.614008* 
F statistic (probability) 6.73 6811 * (0.001405) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
LM test (probability) 
0.049449 
3.118787 (0.210264) 
3.570853 (0.058802) 
All three t statistics are significant at 5%, indicating that they reject the null 
hypotheses of individually being zero. This is confirmed by the F statistic, (a 
simultaneous test that all slope coefficients (i. e. excluding the constant) are zero) 
which is also significant at 5%. The JB statistic is not significant at 5%, thus the null 
of residuals being normal is not rejected. Finally, the LM test is not significant at 5%, 
so the null of no serial correlation is not rejected. The BDS statistics from Table 27 
above show that the residuals are IID. Hence it is concluded that the FTSE All Share 
index (5921) is explained by the above data generating process of a near to random 
walk with drift and trend. (See Chapter 4 for discussion on an index being 
"explained". ) 
Aerospace & Defence (15577) 
Rt, 15577 = -0.169078 + 0.022591 Yt_1,15577 - 0.000034t 
t statistics -1.743082 1.763187 -1.575579 
F statistic (probability) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
LM (probability) 
1.554866 (0.213183) 
0.011864 
71334.91* (0.000000) 
1.068216 (0.301349) 
None of the regression's coefficients' t statistics are significant, a conclusion 
supported by the F statistic. The JB statistic does however reject the null of 
normality. The LM is not significant and the BDS statistics from Table 27 above 
indicate that the null is not rejected, so the residuals are IID. Hence it is concluded 
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that the Aerospace & Defence index (15577) is explained by the above data 
generating process of a random walk with drift and trend (but with the coefficients not 
significantly different from zero). 
Chemicals (15585) 
Rt, 15585 = 0.16757 - 0.002004Yt_1,15585 - 0.000016t 
t statistics . 310289 -. 265690 -2.173304* 
F statistic (probability) 2.361677 (0.096289) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
LM (probability) 
0.017910 
61.89220* (0.000000) 
17.047598* (0.000181) 
Within the regressed data generating process only the coefficient for the trend is 
significantly different from zero, a result contradicted by the F statistic which shows 
both slopes as not significant. (It is not uncommon for the F statistic to contradict the t 
or z statistics and in these cases is sometimes an indicator of collinearity. ) The LM 
test for serial correlation is significant at 5%, as is the JB test for normality. Table 27 
shows no rejection of the null of III) in the BDS test. Hence it is concluded that the 
Chemicals index (15585) is explained by the above data generating process of a 
random walk with drift, although lack of normality and possible serial correlation 
casts some limited doubt and the contradiction between the t and F statistics gives 
mixed messages as to the process being a pure random walk or a random walk with 
trend. 
Forestry & Paper (15595) 
Rt, 15595 = -0.412467 + 0.059901 Yt_1,15595 + 0.000027t 
t statistics -2.821274* 2.821498* 1.616456 
F statistic (probability) 4.060905* (0.018341) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
LM (probability) 
0.030406 
1285.766* (0.000000) 
4.108235 (0.042675) 
Lack of normality is evidenced by the JB statistic but the LM is not significant. The F 
statistic rejects the null that both slope coefficients are significantly different from 
zero, rather than just the one shown by the individual t scores. The BDS statistics all 
show that the residuals are IID. Hence it is concluded that the Forestry & Paper index 
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(15595) is explained by the above data generating process of a near to random walk 
with drift and possibly trend. 
Oil and Gas (15619) 
Rt, 15619 - -0.092434 + 0.011884Yt_1,15619 - 0.000012t 
t statistics -1.205177 1.223587 -1.000857 
F statistic (probability) 0.750933 (0.472951) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
LM (probability) 
0.005765 
93.71542* (0.000000) 
7.609340* (0.005807) 
All coefficients in the regression are concluded to be zero, based on both the F 
statistic and the individual t statistics. The residuals are not normal and show evidence 
of serial correlation. The BDS tests from above show the residuals to be IID. Hence it 
is concluded that the Oil and Gas index (15619) is explained by the above data 
generating process of a random walk with drift and trend, (but both are insignificantly 
different from zero). 
Personal Care & Household Products (15621) 
Rt, 15621 = -0.277770 + 0.039704Yt_1,15621 - 0.000122t 
t statistics -2.436796* 2.475185* -2.693107* 
F statistic (probability) 3.701514* (0.026002) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
LM (probability) 
0.027789 
116.3135* (0.000000) 
4.326653 (0.114942) 
F and t statistics confirm that all the regression coefficients are significantly different 
to zero. There is no serial correlation, but the JB statistic shows lack of normality. The 
BDS statistics in Table 27 do not reject the null hypothesis of III) residuals. Hence it 
is concluded that the Personal Care & Household Products index (15621) is explained 
by the above data generating process of a near to random walk with drift and trend. 
The three time series that are identified as having their data generating processes 
consistent with a random walk are such that their next period's values cannot be 
forecasted. Thus initially they can be regarded as exhibiting strong efficiency. These 
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particular sub indices of the FTSE All Share index could therefore warrant a passive 
investment strategy, but that conclusion is however too soon to be valid. The three 
indices that have a maintained regression that is a near random walk may or may not 
be efficient. The six indices will be further tested in Chapter 8 to assess their 
forecasting ability. It is of interest that the aggregate index is near to random, as this 
vague conclusion is in step with several efficiency studies, some finding the market 
efficient whilst others cast doubt. The difference here is that those studies did not 
examine the sub indices and tacitly assumed that if the aggregate was efficient, then 
so were the sub indices. 
6.7.3 Summary for stationarity and random walk processes 
The conclusions of this chapter are that: firstly, no series are stationary in levels (i. e. 
the log normal index) ; secondly, all series are stationary in first difference (the log 
return) and so the indices are integrated of order one; thirdly, that three indices are 
random and three near random with residuals that are IID and as such they are now 
regarded as being fully explained. 
Near random FTSE All Share 
Random Aerospace & Defense 
Random Chemicals 
Near random Forestry & Paper 
Random Oil and Gas 
Near random Personal Care & Household Products 
5921 
15577 
15585 
15595 
15619 
15621 
At this stage, although they are possibly random, but their residuals are not IID, 
nothing can be inferred about the efficiency of the remaining 24 indices. These will be 
examined in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN OTHER DATA GENERATING PROCESSES 
7.1 ARCH in the Data Generating Processes 
7.1.1 Outline 
The analysis in Chapter 6 showed that all 30 time series were stationary when 
differenced once. Six indices had a data generating process identified which gave 
residuals from the maintained regression that were III) and so are now assumed to be 
explained. The remaining 24 exhibited the characteristics of stationarity, but were not 
IID in their residuals when using one of the random walk formats for the regression, 
an indication of possible serial correlation which makes either Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedastic (ARCH) or Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedastic (GARCH) type models an obvious next contender for examination of 
these as yet unidentified processes. 
Central to ARCH processes is conditional variance, so that a basic model could be 
Yt = xt^y + st (7.1) 
and 
ßt2 = CO + as2t-1 (7.2) 
Extending this simple model, an increase in the number of lags produces: 
Gt2 = GJ + alE2t-1 +...... + aq£2t-q (7.3) 
which is an ARCH(q) model, where q is the number of lagged values. 
Its conversion to a GARCH type model is to change equation 7.2 so that 
at2 = Co + a£2t-1 + pat-12 
(7.4) 
In the same way that equation 7.2 was extended to 7.3 by increasing the number of 
lags, the basic GARCH model can likewise be extended by increasing the lags on rrt2, 
so that 
6t2 -w+ a1E2t-1 +...... + agE2t-q + 
ßl 6t-12 +... + ßP 6t-p2 (7.5) 
resulting in a GARCH(p, q) format. 
For subsequent GARCH modelling, the equations will use Rt as the dependent 
variable in the data generating process, with the prior evidence of stationarity giving 
the basic regression equations of drift and trend, apart from the two that were just 
drift. 
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7.1.2 Tests for ARCH 
Two of the main tests for evidence of ARCH are the LM and the F. The LM test has 
the null of Ho: al = a2 = ... = a9 =0 and the alternative of at least one : AO. The F test is 
analogous to the test for serial correlation. Results for both of these tests are shown in 
Table 28, where the regressions include constant and trend for all series other than 
Electrical Equipment (15593) and Support (15635) where the unit root tests indicated 
no trend. 
Table 28 ARCH Tests on random but not IID time series 
Name Ref F stat pi LM test p ARCH? 
Auto & Parts 15579 
. 
004274 
. 
947924 
. 
004307 
. 
947674 
Beverages 15581 
. 
001207 
. 
972310 
. 
001216 
. 
9722177 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 1.602923 
. 
206627 1.605366 
. 
205144 
Electricity 19897 29.14542* 
. 
000000 26.39970* 
. 
000000 Yes 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 2.743814 
. 
098842 2.736017 
. 
098109 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 1.413490 
. 
235567 1.416673 
. 
233952 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 
. 
082291 
. 
774446 
. 
082900 
. 773406 
Food Production & Processors 15599 7.283744* . 
007416 7.139216* . 
007542 Yes 
General Retailers 15601 . 
898404 
. 
344094 
. 
902212 
. 
342189 
Health 15603 . 
047055 . 
828404 
. 
047430 
. 
827597 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 8.383284* . 
004110 8.183149* . 
004228 Yes 
Insurance 15609 . 
017340 
. 
895338 
. 
017473 
. 
894838 
Investment Companies 15610 1.876233 . 
171949 1.877123 . 
170661 
IT hardware 15607 25.56094* . 
000001 23.44456* . 
000001 Yes 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 7.888333* . 
005355 7.714293* . 
005479 Yes 
Media & Entertainments 15615 . 
013259 . 
908418 . 
013360 . 
907980 
Mining 15617 15.49420* . 
000106 14.73250* . 
000124 Yes 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 . 
918959 . 
338642 . 
922782 . 
336746 
Real Estate 15627 7.623987* . 
006172 7.463172* . 
006297 Yes 
Software & CPU Services 15630 6.707431 * . 
010145 6.588599* . 
010263 Yes 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 6.864950* . 
009309 6.739331 * . 
009431 Yes 
Support Services 15635 . 
089273 . 
765342 . 
089932 . 
764264 
Telecommunication Services 15641 . 
904610 . 
342435 . 
908422 . 
340533 
Transport 15639 24.40465* . 
000001 22.47533* . 
000002 Yes 
*=significant at 5% 
Examination of the probabilities shows that for both tests, the null of no ARCH effect 
in the residuals is rejected very strongly for Electricity (19897), Food Production & 
Processors (15599), Household Goods & Textiles (15605), IT Hardware (15607), 
Leisure & Hotels (15613), Mining (15617), Real Estate (15627), Software & CPU 
Services (15630), Speciality & Other Financials (15633) and Transport (15639). 
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GARCH has become very common in recent research in time series in finance and it 
must be admitted that prior to this test, the expectation was that a majority would 
reject the null. To find only ten rejections at 5% significance is somewhat unexpected! 
With the ten series that indicate an ARCH effect, the following analysis will assume a 
GARCH(1,1) format unless the evidence suggests otherwise. Most research in 
finance indicates that p=q=1 is the most common and this can be observed in the 
following example, based on Electricity (19897), where the ARCH LM test is 
repeated for one to four lags. 
Lag LM p 
4 26.95030 
. 000000 
3 26.88417 
. 000000 
2 26.76843 
. 000000 
1 26.39970 
. 000000 
As can be seen, there is virtually no change in the test value for evidence of ARCH, 
so for the sake of parsimony the lags will be set at one. 
7.2 Results of GARCH regressions 
7.2.1 Basic GARCH format 
There are many different types of GARCH models and, as with the Dickey Fuller test 
framework of the previous chapter, there is the risk of data mining unless a structured 
approach is taken. Consequently the first consideration will be that the basic GARCH 
model applies, but it may be necessary at a later stage to expand this to encompass 
other versions. The following sets out the results of running the basic random walk 
with drift and trend in a GARCH format. The statistics follow the earlier format 
although use of GARCH precludes the LM test for serial correlation. In each 
regression the residuals are tested for III) via the BDS test. Lack of III) will mean that 
the regression does not explain the time series. 
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Electricity (19897) 
Rr, 19897 = -0.306218 + 0.046245Yt_1,19897 - 0.000133t 
z statistics -2.388231* 2.446029* -2.484873* 
F statistic (probability) 1.297686 (0.265297) 
R2 0.024719 
JB (probability) 232.9736* (0.000000) 
ßt2 = . 0000733 + . 336702E2t_l + . 427575ßt_12 
z 3.725058* 3.783790* 4.242197* 
Dimension 2 3 4 
BDS statistic . 008182 . 010655 
Z 1.497891 1.226280 1.324845 
The mean regression has z statistics that are significant, conflicting with the F 
statistic. (Earlier regressions in Chapter 6 showed t statistics, but E-Views reports z 
rather than t where normality is asymptotic. Use of z and t does not invalidate the 
analysis. ) The JB test indicates lack of normality. All the variance regression 
coefficients are significant and the BDS test does not reject the null of IID. Thus 
Electricity (19897) is assumed to be explained (as described in Chapter 4). 
Food Production & Processors (15599) 
Rt, 15599 = -0.099766 + 0.013629Yt_1,15599 - 0.000023t 
z statistics -. 962845 . 985437 -1.557010 
F statistic (probability) . 736955 (0.596362) 
R2 0.014189 
. 013723 
JB (probability) 182.9011 * (0.000000) 
ate = . 000032 + . 29136962t_I - . 0159812 
z 3.950991 * 4.343171 * -. 089262 
Dimension 2 3 4 
BDS statistic . 002624 . 003088 . 
002866 
Z . 481690 . 356078 . 
277018 
None of the mean's regressed coefficients are significant, as supported by the F test, 
whereas the first two variance regression coefficients reject the null of being zero. The 
JB test indicates a lack of normality and the BDS test indicates that the residuals are 
IID. So Food Production & Processors (15599) is assumed to be explained. 
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Household Goods & Textiles (15605) 
Rt, 15605 = -0.072584 + 0.010699Yt_1,15605 - 0.000038t 
z statistics -1.014359 1.074199 -2.027170* 
F statistic (probability) 1.691018 (0.137138) 
R2 0.031972 
JB (probability) 13.24871* (0.001328) 
2= 22 ßt . 000068 + . 267432c t_1 + . 014625at_1 
z 5.938228* 4.205914* . 118150 
Dimension 234 
BDS statistic -. 000313 . 003528 . 008426 
Z . 064249 . 454937 . 910969 
The trend's coefficient is significant in the mean equation, but is countered by the F 
test. The JB statistic indicates a lack of normality. Within the variance regression the 
GARCH component is not significant. BDS statistics do not reject the null of the 
residuals being IID. Household Goods & Textiles can therefore be assumed to be 
explained. 
IT Hardware (15607) 
Rt, 15607 = -0.288330 + 0.040534Yt_1,15607 - 0.000140t 
z statistics -3.053892* 3.066880* -2.884916* 
F statistic (probability) 1.307346 (0.261215) 
R2 0.024898 
JB (probability) 12.39836* (0.002031) 
6t2 = . 000061 + . 
210341c2t_i + . 518603at_l2 
z 2.763824* 2.440487* 3.416067* 
Dimension 2 3 4 
BDS statistic . 006669 . 
003664 -. 001523 
Z 1.459005 . 505051 -. 
176534 
All coefficients in the mean's regression are significant, but the F test is not 
significant. The JB's statistic indicates a lack of normality. All three variance 
regression coefficients are significant and the BDS statistics indicate IID in the 
residuals. IT Hardware is thus assumed to be explained. 
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Leisure & Hotels (15613) 
Dimension 2 
BDS statistic . 
015269 
3 
020249 
4 
. 018589 
z 2.866961* 2.388053* 1.837524 
The BDS test statistics for dimensions two and three reject the null hypothesis that the 
residuals from the mean regression are IID. Using the random walk with drift and 
trend with GARCH does not explain Leisure & Hotels. 
Mining (15617) 
Rc, 15617 = -0.236758 + 0.034326Yt_1,15617 - 0.000078t 
z statistics -2.566576* 2.610596* -3.557156* 
F statistic (probability) 1.661666 (0.144314) 
R2 0.031434 
JB (probability) 52.7626* (0.000000) 
ßt2 = . 
000117+ . 
395104E2t_1 - . 
074930at_12 
z 6.600005* 4.176194* -. 627213 
Dimension 234 
BDS statistic . 
002783 . 
005493 . 
010214 
z . 
505031 . 
626297 . 
976373 
Coefficients in the mean regression are all significant, but the F test indicates that the 
slope coefficients are not significantly different from zero. The JB test indicates a lack 
of normality in the residuals and the BDS test statistics for dimensions two to four 
indicate IID. Thus Mining is assumed to be explained. 
Real Estate (15627) 
Rt, 15627 = -0.014584 + 0.002296Yt_1,15627 - 0.00001 lt 
z statistics -. 188440 . 221307 -. 
546970 
F statistic (probability) 1.272626 (0.276135) 
R2 0.024253 
JB (probability) 17.87338* (0.000131) 
at2 = . 
000004 + . 207697s2t_1 + . 
534437ßt_12 
z 2.552200* 2.778255* 3.974037* 
Dimension 234 
BDS statistic . 004587 . 
008236 . 
010640 
z . 
885277 1.000953 1.086662 
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All of the mean's coefficients are zero (z statistics and F test). The JB test shows no 
normality in the residuals but BDS indicates IID. Real Estate is assumed to be 
explained. 
Software & CPU Services (15630) 
Dimension 23 
BDS statistic . 013427 017795 
Z 2.313574* 1.927411 
4 
019775 
1.796621 
The BDS test shows that the residuals from the mean regression, combined with 
GARCH in the variance, reject the null of IID. Thus Software & CPU Services is not 
explained. 
Speciality & Other Financials (15633) 
Rt, 15633 = -0.093910 + 0.014218Yt_1,15633 - 0.00038t 
z statistics -1.225264 1.267496 -2.080317* 
F statistic (probability) 3.071981* (0.010347) 
R2 0.056603 
JB (probability) 7.187624* (0.027493) 
e= 22 at . 000017 + . 197315c t_1 + . 215849ßt_1 
z 2.835528* 2.356265* . 909282 
Dimension 234 
BDS statistic . 009974 . 013417 . 012743 
Z 1.891305 1.599620 1.274662 
A lack of normality in the residuals is indicated by the JB test. In the mean regression 
only the trend coefficient is significant, compared to the lack of significance in the F 
test, which infers that none of the coefficients are significantly different from zero. 
The BDS tests show no rejection of the null of IID, so Speciality & Other Financials 
is assumed to be explained. 
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Transport (15639) 
Rt, 15639 = -0.142468 + 0.019342Yt_1,15639 - 0.000040t 
z statistics -1.749238 1.789275 -2.900383* 
F statistic (probability) 1.530154 (0.180787) 
R2 0.029019 
JB (probability) 14.80795* (0.000609) 
6t2 = . 000010 + . 227160c2t_I + . 644619cst_i2 
z 2.199725* 3.434064* 6.880248* 
Dimension 234 
BDS statistic -. 001017 . 000139 -. 002704 
z -. 196636 . 016866 -. 275485 
As with the other indices, there are mixed messages for the regression coefficients in 
the mean, but all are significant in the variance. Residuals do not reject the BDS null 
of IID. Transport is therefore considered to be explained. 
7.2.2 Extended or enhanced versions of GARCH 
Of the ten indices that showed potential for ARCH in their generating process, eight 
are now explained but two remain unexplained; those of Leisure & Hotels and 
Software & CPU Services. There are many types of GARCH models and, as with the 
Dickey Fuller test framework, there is the risk of data mining unless a structured 
approach is taken. Consequently the first model to be considered will be that where 
the conditional variance is asymmetric, i. e. there is a tacit assumption that investors 
will increase expectations of volatility if returns fall rather than rise. A fairly recent 
asymmetric model is Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle's GJR model (also known as 
Threshold GARCH or TGARCH) based upon: 
6t2 = 0) + ac2t-1 + fat-12 +y E2t-IIt-1 (7.6) 
where It-, = 1 if st-1 < 0, else =0 and with the expectation that y will be positive. Table 
29 shows the results of the GJR regressions, but only in relation to the BDS statistics 
to establish if this model is applicable 
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Table 29 BDS Statistics with Threshold GARCH 
Name Ref BDS Dimension 2 BDS Dimension 3 BDS Dimension 4 
Statistic z Statistic z Statistic z 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 
. 
020616 3.802245* 
. 
028122 3.261100* 
. 
027401 2.666238* 
Software & CPU Services 15630 
. 
002557 
. 
443717 
. 
005577 
. 
617456 
. 
008520 
. 
777377 
-a------ .......... . ... 
Leisure & Hotels is still rejecting the BDS null of IID and remains unexplained, but 
Software & CPU Services does not reject the BDS test and is detailed below. 
Software & CPU Services (15630) 
Rt, 15630 ` -0.034905 + 0.006527Yt_1,15630 - 0.000033t 
z statistics -. 726781 . 830499 -1.917724 
F statistic (probability) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
1.764701 (0.106747) 
0.039867 
55.20982* (0.000000) 
2-222 ßt . 000074+ . 301052c t_1 - . 165564ßt_1 +. 044184 6 t_iIt_1 
z 2.199725* 3.434064* 6.880248* 
Dimension 234 
BDS statistic . 
002557 
. 
005577 
. 
008520 
z . 443717 . 617456 . 777377 
None of the mean's regressed coefficients are significant, nor is the F statistic. 
Residuals are not normal and all the variance coefficients are significant. As would be 
expected, the asymmetric component's coefficient in the variance regression is 
positive. The BDS test statistics show the residuals are IID so Software & CPU 
Services is explained. 
Another version of ARCH models that finds frequent application in finance and has a 
financial rationale is that of GARCH in mean. This can be tested with the standard 
GARCH(1,1) variance equation but with the data generating process having an 
additional term (the standard deviation) reflecting the impact of risk on return (in step 
with most asset pricing models). The process thus becomes: 
Yt = Xty + Sat-i+ £t (7.7) 
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so that the conditional ßt_1 is now one of the dependent variables in the expression for 
the data generating process. Results of the BDS test with the regression in this 
GARCH in mean format are in Table 30. 
Table 30 BDS Statistics with GARCH in mean 
Name Ref BDS Dimension 2 BDS Dimension 3 BDS Dimension 4 
Statistic z Statistic z Statistic z 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 
. 
019917 3.706153* 
. 
029831 3.482934* 
. 
032100 3.138292* 
T=signincant at 'o. 
Leisure & Hotel's index yet again produces residuals from the regression that reject 
the null hypothesis of independent and identical distribution. 
The third version of GARCH to be tested is Exponential GARCH or EGARCH. In 
this version the variance equation is 
logßt2 = (0 + j3log ßt-t2 + aJ(Et-i/ 6t-i)N + 7(st-i/ 6t-1) 
Results of the BDS test with the regression in this format are in Table 31. 
Table 31 BDS Statistics with EGARCH 
Name Ref BDS Dimension 2 BDS Dimension 3 BDS Dimension 4 
Statistic z Statistic z Statistic z 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 
. 
011608 2.217220* . 
015688 1.882469 
. 
017142 1.724593 
*=significant at 5%. 
Leisure & Hotels yet again fails to achieve III in its residuals, although use of 
EGARCH produces only one dimension that is significant. 
The fourth version to be applied is Component GARCH. This includes a time varying 
volatility q which is assumed to converge in the long run to a constant o. The 
variance is expressed as 
Gt2 -qt = (a + a(s2t-i-(0) + ß(6t-i2 - (0) 
qt =o+ P(qt-1 - (o)+ 
I (E2t-1- ßt-12) 
In this format the BDS test on the residuals of the mean's regression does not reject 
the null of IID. Leisure & Hotels is set out below. 
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Leisure & Hotels (15613) 
Rt, 15613 = -0.090928 + 0.013537Yt_1,15613 - 0.000030t 
z statistics -. 906880 . 093871 -1.662146 
F statistic (probability) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
. 489524 (0.841840) 
0.013311 
504.4241 * (0.000000) 
ate -qt = (o+. 159871(E2t_1- (0) - . 306077(at_12- (0) 
z 1.177270 -. 878711 
qt = . 000051+ . 562594(gt-1- (o)+. 
028027(E2t-1' 6t-12) 
z 11.39760* . 
556996 
. 263397 
Dimension 234 
BDS statistic . 
010068 
. 
015366 
. 015852 
z 1.911966 1.835024 1.588659 
The regressed mean has no significant coefficients. The residuals are not normally 
distributed but are IID. Only one of the component GARCH coefficients is 
significant. Thus Leisure & Hotels is now explained. 
The ten indices that exhibited ARCH effects are now explained. These plus the six 
explained by a random walk type process in Chapter 6 mean that out of the original 30 
indices there remains a further 14 sub indices that are not yet explained. 
7.3 Auto Regression as the Data Generating Processes 
7.3.1 Basic AutoRegressive regressions 
This section begins with all the 30 indices that were stationary according to 
Augmented Dickey Fuller tests, less six time series that were showing evidence of a 
random or near random walk as the maintained regression and ten that had a form of a 
GARCH process. These 16 industrial sector indices are now considered to be 
explained. Thus the 14 unexplained time series must now be re-examined to consider 
the explanatory powers of other data generating processes. As with all processes so 
far explained, the residuals will be tested for III) via the BDS test. 
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One of the most common univariate time series models is auto regression, or AR(p) 
where p is the number of lags. This is now utilized, rather than say exponential or 
moving average as there is some financial justification. The basic AR(l) process is: 
Rt=c+cp1Rt-I+Et (7.8) 
where the inclusion of the lagged return could be viewed as a momentum factor. The 
statistics from the BDS tests on the residuals from running the regressions in this 
AR(1) format against the 14 time series are shown in Table 32 below. 
Table 32 BDS statistics for an Autoregressive Processes 
Name Ref BDS Dimension 2 BDS Dimension 3 BDS Dimension 4 
Statistic z Statistic z Statistic z 
Auto & Parts 15579 
. 
010765 1.970915* 
. 
016394 1.888127 
. 
014794 1.430376 
Beverages 15581 
. 
020523 3.286680* 
. 
023766 2.384202* 
. 
027492 2.305138* 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 
. 
003797 
. 
671947 
. 
006163 
. 
685474 
. 
009290 
. 
866754 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 
. 
004643 1.014312 
. 
008298 1.140202 
. 
020579 2.373925* 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 
. 
014085 2.422590* 
. 
017851 1.926895 
. 
028691 2.593579 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 
. 
032495 3.963120* 
. 
061524 4.683642* 
. 
075335 4.773762* 
General Retailers 15601 
. 
008417 1.509559 
. 
011788 1.326308 
. 
017901 1.686182 
Health 15603 
. 
016166 2.976619* 
. 
023872 2.763214* 
. 
031392 3.048350* 
Insurance 15609 
. 
025464 4.040348* 
. 
045051 4.473580* 
. 
059047 4.895856* 
Investment Companies 15610 . 
011511 1.976841 * 
. 
017585 1.896259 
. 
029704 2.683705* 
Media & Entertainments 15615 . 
007297 1.372153 
. 
012706 1.504036 
. 
022209 2.208404* 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 . 
000291 
. 
057381 
. 
006783 . 840828 . 
015965 1.661308 
Support Services 15635 . 
002773 
. 
551389 . 
006269 . 781594 . 
012520 1.306462 
Telecommunication Services 15641 
. 
014778 2.818408* . 
030247 3.627031* 1 . 
039399 3.964481* 
*= 5% significance 
Four of the time series do not reject the BDS null when the residuals are generated by 
an AR(1) process and are examined below. 
Construction & Building Materials (15583) 
Rc, 15583 = 0.000965 + 0.222377Rt_1,15583 
t statistics 2.094213 * 3.714901 * 
F statistic (probability) 13.80049* (0.000249) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
LM (probability) 
0.050588 
197.3507* (0.000000) 
2.540652 (0.280740) 
174 
F and t statistics confirm that the regression coefficients are significantly different 
from zero. There is no serial correlation, but the JB statistic shows lack of normality. 
Table 32 above shows that the residuals do not reject the null of being IID. Hence it is 
concluded that the Construction & Building Materials index (15583) is explained by 
the above data generating process of an autoregressive process. 
General Retailers (15601) 
Rt, 15601= 0.001415 + 0.268872Rt_1,15601 
t statistics 2.993489* 4.494382* 
F statistic (probability) 20.19947* (0.000011) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
LM (probability) 
0.072348 
11.27486* (0.003562) 
. 196377 (0.657661) 
F and t statistics confirm that the regression coefficients are significantly different 
from zero. There is no serial correlation, but the JB statistic shows lack of normality. 
Table 32 above shows that the residuals do not reject the null of being IID. Hence it is 
concluded that the General Retailers index (15601) is explained by the above data 
generating process of an autoregressive process. 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec (15623) 
Rt, 15623 - 0.001665 + 0.127899Rt_1,15623 
t statistics 1.978297* 2.088910* 
F statistic (probability) 4.363544* (0.037692) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
LM (probability) 
0.016569 
69.06013* (0.000000) 
731079 (0.693 822) 
F and t statistics confirm that the regression coefficients are significantly different 
from zero. There is no serial correlation, but the JB statistic shows lack of normality. 
Table 32 above shows that the residuals do not reject the null of being IID. Hence it is 
concluded that the Pharmacuticals & Biotec index (15623) is explained by the above 
data generating process of an autoregressive process. 
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Support Services (15635) 
Rt, 15635 = 0.001112 + 0.340638Rt_1,15635 
t statistics 2.367604* 5.864501 * 
F statistic (probability) 34.39237* (0.000000) 
R2 
JB (probability) 
LM (probability) 
0.117223 
73.79352* (0.000000) 
4.425275 (0.109412) 
F and t statistics confirm that the regression coefficients are significantly different 
from zero. There is no serial correlation, but the JB statistic shows lack of normality. 
Table 31 above shows that the residuals do not reject the null of being IID. Hence it is 
concluded that the Support Services index (15635) is explained by the above data 
generating process of an autoregressive process. 
7.3.2 AutoRegression with GARCH 
Four further time series are now explained. In the same way as section 7.2 above 
applied GARCH processes in those cases where there was non-linearity in the 
residuals, this has also been undertaken with the auto regressive data generating 
process and applied to the time series contained in Table 31 but excluding the four 
that were explained by AR(1) without any modification. The results of the BDS tests 
on these are set out in Table 33 below. 
Table 33 BDS statistics for an Autoregressive Processes with GARCH 
Name Ref BDS Dimension 2 BDS Dimension 3 BDS Dimension 4 
Statistic z Statistic z Statistic z 
Auto & Parts 15579 
. 
005924 1.074323 
. 
006671 . 758243 . 
003481 
. 
330969 
Beverages 15581 
. 
016499 2.608086* 
. 
014935 1.477849 
. 
019390 1.602521 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 -. 003949 -. 887658 -. 007816 -1.104448 -. 001877 -. 222620 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 -. 000086 -. 014310 -. 006698 -. 701951 -. 000791 -. 069329 
Food & Drug Retails 15597 
. 
026988 3.329464* 
. 
057140 4.402659* . 
072860 4.675791 * 
Health 15603 
. 
005737 1.140969 
. 
009515 1.188315 . 016942 1.771308 
Insurance 15609 -. 009992 -1.622480 -. 018156 -1.849639 -. 020587 -1.755801 
Investment Companies 15610 -. 000820 -. 163001 -. 004254 -. 531750 -. 003561 -. 373685 
Media & Entertainments 15615 . 
000675 
. 
132449 -. 002341 -. 288468 . 
006055 
. 
624840 
Telecommunication Services 15641 . 
005948 1.285907 
. 
011258 1.530137 . 
012357 1.409396 
*= 5% significance 
Of the ten indices, two reject the null of IID in the residuals. The remaining eight are 
expanded below. 
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Auto & Parts(15579) AR(1) and GARCH(1,1) 
Rt, 15579 = . 001806 +. 165311 Rt_1,15579 
+Et 
z 1.827521 2.334336* 
F 1.221291 (. 302183) 
R2 =. 037958 
JB 216.4582* (. 000000) 
ate = . 000016 + . 060666c2t_1 + . 8295236t_i2 
z (2.559848*) (3.276289*) (16.79411*) 
In the mean generating processes the constant coefficient is not significant, but all the 
coefficients in the variance are significant. There is a lack of normality as shown by 
the JB statistic. Results from the BDS test are shown in the table above and are not 
significant, indicating IID. Auto & Parts is therefore explained. 
Electro & Electrical Equipment (15593) AR(1) and GARCH(1,1) 
Rt, 15593 = . 000940 + . 24554Rt_1,15593 
+Et 
z 1.624598 3.134275* 
F 4.032724* (. 003444) 
R2 =. 059276 
JB 3.890909 (. 142922) 
ate = . 000005 + . 
203432z2t_1 + . 727884ßt_12 
z (1.496077) (3.171054*) (8.782747*) 
In the mean generating processes the constant coefficient is not significant whereas 
the auto regressive slope is. This later conclusion is supported by the F test. The 
residuals are shown by the JB statistic to be normal. All the slope coefficients in the 
variance are significant, but not the constant. Results for the BDS test are shown in 
the table above and are not significant, indicating residuals that are IID. Electro & 
Electrical Equipment is therefore explained. 
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Engineering & Machinery(] 5591) AR(1) and GARCH(1,1) 
Rt, 15591: --. 001316 + . 235637Rt_1,15591 
+Et 
z 2.171594* 3.295522* 
F 2.703740 (. 069043) 
R2 = . 033287 
JB 40.98675* (. 000000) 
ßt2 = . 000017 + . 
163103F, 2t_1 + . 539561ßt_12 
z (1.665579) (2.390939*) (2.512002*) 
In the mean generating processes the constant coefficient is significant, as is that of 
the slope. This is not supported by the F test. The JB statistic shows the residuals not 
to be normally distributed. All the slope coefficients in the variance are significant, 
but not the constant. Results for the BDS test are shown in the table above and are not 
significant, indicating residuals that are IID. Engineering & Machinery is therefore 
explained. 
Health (15603) AR(1) and GARCH(1,1) 
Rt, 15603 = . 001717 + . 328685Rt_1,15603 
+£t 
z 2.279932* 4.305996* 
F 2.409369 * (. 049803) 
R= . 036281 
2 
JB 2385.7070* (. 000000) 
ate = . 000059+ . 
126017s2t_1 - . 
230828at_12 
z (4.121450*) (1.066804) (-. 818278) 
In the mean generating processes the constant coefficient is significant, as is that of 
the slope. The latter is supported by the F test. The residuals are shown by the JB 
statistic not to be normal. Only the constant's coefficient in the variance are 
significant. Results for the BDS test are shown in the table above and are not 
significant, indicating residuals that are IID. Health is therefore explained. 
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Insurance (15609) AR(1) and GARCH(1,1) 
Rt, 15609 = . 000835 + . 291945Rt_1,15609 
+Et 
z 1.880535 4.997219* 
F . 217578 (. 928512) 
R2=. 003388 
JB 257.1803* (. 000000) 
ate = 000015+ 1.317049s2t_1 + . 0424536t_12 
z (6.715601*) (9.461652*) (. 836820) 
In the mean generating processes the constant coefficient is not significant, but that of 
the slope is. This is not supported by the F test. The JB statistic shows the residuals 
not to be normal. The constant and the ARCH slope coefficients in the variance are 
significant, but not the GARCH. Results for the BDS test are shown in the table above 
and are not significant, indicating residuals that are IID. Insurance is therefore 
explained. 
Investment Companies (15610) AR(1) and GARCH(1,1) 
Rt = . 000934 + . 
261451 Rt_1 +Et 
z (2.092969*) (3.987443*) 
F 1.448235 (. 218559) 
R2= . 022128 
JB 53.06800* (. 000000) 
ate = . 
000000 - . 02626 
2t_1 + 1.006336ßt_12 
Z (5.406668*) (-3.272240*) (122.2961*) 
Both of the mean generating process's coefficients are significant, (but not the F) as 
are all coefficients in the variance. The JB indicates a lack of normality in the 
residuals but BDS shows IID. It can therefore be concluded that Investment 
Companies is now explained. 
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Media & Entertainments (15615) AR(1) and GARCH(1,1) 
Rt, 15615=. 001385+. 171305Rt_1,15615+Et 
z 3.151765* 2.621229* 
F 1.645258 (. 163338) 
R2 =. 025063 
JB 25.28089* (. 000003) 
ate = . 000003 - . 004329c2t_1 + . 9094106t_12 
z (3.865358*) (-. 262976) (35.33143* 
In the mean generating processes the constant coefficient is significant, as is that of 
the slope. This is not supported by the F test. The JB statistic rejects the null of a 
normal distribution. The constant and the GARCH slope coefficients in the variance 
are significant, but not the ARCH. Results for the BDS test are shown in the table 
above and are not significant, indicating residuals that are IID. Media & 
Entertainments is therefore explained. 
Telecommunication Services (15641) AR(1) and GARCH(1,1) 
Rt, 15641 = . 000434 + . 006077Rt_1,15641 
+F-t 
z . 454926 . 113806 
F not available 
R2 = -. 008524 
JB 2.225295 (. 328688) 
ate = . 000003 - . 026301c2t_1 + 1.0015429ßt_12 
z (6.362058*) (-2.489175*) (98.66585*) 
In the mean generating process neither the constant nor the slope's coefficient is 
significant. (E-Views could not calculate the F statistic but there is no apparent reason 
for this lack. Neither the manuals nor the help desk cast any light on this. ) The 
residuals are shown by the JB statistic to be normal. All the coefficients in the 
variance are significant. Results for the BDS test are shown in the table above and are 
not significant, indicating residuals that are IID. Telecommunication Services is hence 
assumed to be explained. 
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It can be seen that of the remaining ten indices, eight have been explained by an AR 
process with GARCH. Two indices remain unexplained. 
Thus far 28 of the indices have been explained, with two remaining unexplained; 
those of Beverages (15581) and Food & Drug Retailers (15597). Tests on these two 
have repeated the earlier use of modified versions of GARCH with an AR process, 
but to no avail in that the residuals were not IID. Test results are not shown here. 
7.4 Other Approaches 
7.4.1 Outliers 
A possible cause of the failure to identify a suitable univariate model could be the 
existence of outliers. This is common in time series analysis. Graphs of these two 
series of returns are set out below. 
Figure 2 Return on Beverages 
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The natural log return on Beverages shows abnormally high returns immediately at 
the start of the series. By reducing the sample frame to exclude the first four days' 
values there should be no great impact on the validity of the various statistical tests, 
nor should their removal invalidate any potential forecasts as these occur after the 
series ends, almost a year away. 
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Unlike Beverages, there is no obvious adjustment to make for outliers with Food & 
Drug Retailers. 
Figure 3 Return on Food & Drug Retailers 
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The application of a random walk with drift and trend to the reduced sample frame of 
Beverages produces a regression equation (detail not shown here) that strongly rejects 
the BDS null hypothesis of IID. Use of GARCH however, does produce valid results. 
Beverages (15581) GARCH(1,1) with outliers removed 
Rt, 15581 = . 356941 - 0.047434Yt_1,15581 + 0.000044t 
z statistics 3.932400* -3.922683* 3.779138* 
F statistic (probability) 
R2 
1.580636 (0.165980) 
0.030408 
JB (probability) 50.92742* (0.000000) 
ate = . 000031+ . 
408421c2t_1 - . 2233376t_12 
z 11.20059* 6.638863* -6.820539 
Dimension 2 
BDS statistic -. 007234 
3 
-. 012900 
4 
-. 010278 
Z -1.155630 -1.292070 -. 861257 
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Coefficients in the mean regression are all significant, but the F test indicates that the 
slope coefficients are not significantly different from zero. The JB test indicates a lack 
of normality in the residuals and the BDS test statistics for dimensions two to four 
indicate IID. Thus Beverages is assumed to be explained, albeit with a slightly 
reduced sample. 
7.4.2 MA or ARMA as the maintained regression 
One index remains unexplained, that of Food & Drug Retailers. There are two fairly 
basic time series approaches that have not yet been fully tested, namely those for 
Moving Averages and Auto Regressive Moving Averages. There is no indication that 
these should be for greater than one lag, so the results of the BDS test with 
regressions that are respectively MA(1) and ARMA(1,1) are shown in Tables 34 and 
35 below. 
Table 34 MA(1) Process 
Name Ref Constant MA(1) BDS(2) 
prob 
BDS(3) 
prob 
BDS(4) 
prob 
BDS(5) 
prob 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 
. 
002233 
. 088296 . 
0000* 
. 0000* . 
0000* 
. 
0000* 
*=significant at 5%. 
Using a simple MA(1) process, the remaining index does not display acceptance of 
the BDS null hypothesis of the residuals being IID. The BDS probabilities are shown 
here rather that the more usual statistic, just to emphasise how far from non-rejection 
all the dimensions are. 
Table 35 ARMA(1,1) Process 
Name Ref Constant AR(1) MA(1) BDS(2) 
prob 
BDS(3) 
prob 
BDS(4) 
prob 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 . 
002137 -. 403401 . 
517583 . 
0022* 
. 
0000* 
. 
0000* 
*=significant at 5%. 
As with just MA(1), the ARMA(1,1) results indicate that again there is extreme 
rejection in the BDS probabilities of IID. Hence there still remains the last 
unexplained index. 
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7.5 Cointegration 
7.5.1 The Engle Granger method 
Cointegration is not so much a data generating process as a relationship between two 
separate stochastic processes. Typically it would be used in a multi-variate analysis 
between two variables (if bivariate) which share a fairly common long term trend but 
deviate in the short term. The application of cointegration in this case would logically 
be to examine the sub index for cointegration with the main FTSE All Share Index, 
although the approach must be suspect in that the sub index is by definition a part of 
the main index. A more normal use would be to examine the relationship between 
(say) spot and future rates in currency, earnings and share price or similar pairs (or 
more than two variables) where some type of equilibrium might be hypothesized. 
Cointegration can be considered or defined as when the variables are 1(1) and their 
combination is 1(0) or stationary. This is not a full definition as it could equally apply 
to variables integrated to order greater than 1, but the previous chapter's Augmented 
Dickey Fuller tests show that all the indices are I(1) in the time series of the index and 
1(0) in the first differenced return series. Thus the series of pairs, if cointegrated, are 
of the order CI(d, b), where d is the integration order (in this case 1) and b is the 
differencing, so giving CI(l, 1). 
Tests for cointegration often follow the Engle Granger approach (EG) which has as its 
null the hypothesis of non-cointegration between the two variables. In much financial 
analysis based on cointegration it is not important which of the variables is/are 
dependent or independent, but in this case it would be logical for the sub index to be a 
function of the All Share Index and thus the EG regression can be normalized on the 
time series for the sub index. A constant may be included so the basic EG regression 
is: 
yti - (P 1+ 92 Yta + Et (7.9) 
where yti is the log normal value of the currently unexplained sub index, yta the 
equivalent for the All Share Index and Et the error term. The EG approach assumes 
that (P2 will equal zero if there is no relationship between the two series and tests if the 
residuals Et are also I(1). In step with the Dickey Fuller method for testing for unit 
roots, the residuals are formatted such that: 
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AE ='yEt-, + ut (7.10) 
In this case there is no constant and, as in the Dickey Fuller process, y= (DI - 1. 
Rather than following the full framework for testing for unit roots, the assumption 
will be that the tests are all Augmented Dickey Fuller, so that equation 7.10 becomes: 
AEt = yEc-i + Eai AEr-i + ut (7.11) 
a format referred to as the Cointegrating Augmented Dickey Fuller regression or 
CRADF. ADF lags will follow those of earlier tests. 
Critical values for the one sided hypothesis tests will be based on the MacKinnon 
response surface, derived from the following: 
C((x, T) = k, o + k1/T + k2/T2 (7.12) 
where T is the sample size and k., kl and k2 are the 5% response surface estimates 
(Patterson 2000, reprinted from Long Run Economic Relationships, edited by RF 
Engle and CWJ Granger, 1991, OUP). Resulting values are T=261, (after allowing for 
the ADF lags), k,, = -2.8621, kl = -2.738 and k2 = -8.36 with the test statistic more 
negative than C(a, T) = -2.8621 - 2.738/245 - 8.36/2452 = -2.874 indicating rejection 
of the null of no cointegration. 
7.5.2 Test results for cointegration 
As mentioned above, the results of the initial tests for unit roots show that the sole 
remaining unexplained time series is I(1), as is the All Share Index, so the next step is 
to run the EG regression in the Equation 7.9 format. Results of this are set out in 
Table 36, although the statistics for R2 and t are `suspect' as no knowledge of 
Table 36 EG Basic Regression of Equation 7.9 
Name Ref Coeff t p R2 / dw 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 (D1 
12 
-15.06906 
3,047629 
-25.82854 
39.98649 
. 
0000 
. 
0000 
. 
860134 
. 
168676 
cointegration or its lack is available at this stage. Following the basic regression, the 
residuals are saved, converted into differences and regressed in the form of equation 
7.11 above. These results are displayed in Table 3 7. 
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Table 37 EG Auxiliary Regression of Equation 7.11, statistics for y 
Name Ref coeff t P R2 dw 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 
. 
915812 36.71003 
. 
0000 
. 
83820 2.063222 
-Z, lr, l«ii%, allL M J70 
The conclusion from Table 37's results for the auxiliary regression of the residuals is 
that the index time series does not reject the null of no cointegration at 5% 
significance, hence Food & Drug Retailers is not consistent with cointegration in 
relation to the FTSE All Share Index. This is not the end of the process however, as 
the EG approach has a final stage via an Error Correction Model (ECM), (also known 
as Equilibrium Correction) in that the basic EG regression in equation 7.9 is assumed 
to be a long term equilibrium. The typical ECM for equation 7.9 is: 
Dyti = ®i Dyta + ®2Et -1 + Et (7.13) 
where use of A converts the relationship back from log series of index values to 
returns and Et _1 
is equation 7.9's error term, factored by an error correction coefficient 
02 
. 
Although this is not required, as Food & Drug Retailers are not cointegrated with 
the FTSE All Share index, the process is continued just for completeness, so this final 
stage is now run for the non cointegrated sub index, followed by the BDS test for IID 
of the residuals et. 
Food & Drug Retailers (15597) Cointegrated (1,1) with the All Share Index 
Rt, 15597= . 
337978Rt, 5921 + . 020249Et_1 + ct 
s. e. (. 135871) (. 015938) 
t (2.487754*) (1.270455) 
P (. 0135) (. 2051) 
Dimension 2 
BDS statistic . 
028723 . 05540 
4 3 
. 071335 
z . 
0002 . 0000 . 
0000 
R2 = . 
005712 
dw=-1.790671 
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The BDS statistics are not significant so the residuals could be assumed to be IID. 
Despite this, Food & Drug Retailers is not explained due to the absence of 
cointegration. 
7.6 Summary of Data Generating Processes 
These two chapters have applied many of the more finance-specific data generating 
processes to all 30 of the time series. The results show that 29 are explained in that 
there is both a statistically significant data generating process and residuals from that 
process that are independent and identically distributed. Additionally it has not been 
possible to identify a suitable process that explains Food & Drug Retailers. In 
summary the processes are: 
" III) with Random or Near Random Walk 
FTSE All Share Index (5921) 
Aerospace & Defence (15577) 
Chemicals (15585) 
Forestry & Paper (15597) 
Oil & Gas (15619) 
Personal Care & Household Products (15621) 
'" IID with Random Walk format and GARCH 
Electricity (19897) 
Food Production & Processors (15590) 
Household Goods & Textiles (15605) 
IT Hardware (15607) 
Mining (15617) 
Speciality & Other Financials (15633) 
Telecommunication Services (15641) 
Transport (15639) 
Real Estate (15627) 
Software & CPU Services (TGARCH) (15630) 
Leisure & Hotels(C GARCH) (15613) 
Beverages (less outliers) (15581) 
" IID with Auto Regression 
Construction & Building Materials (15587) 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec (15623) 
Support Services (15635) 
General Retailers (15601) 
" IID with Auto Regression and GARCH 
Auto & Parts (15579) 
Electro & Electrical Equipment (15593) 
Engineering & Machinery (155 91) 
Health (15603) 
Insurance (15609) 
Investment Companies (15610) 
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Media & Entertainments (15615) 
9 Unexplained 
Food & Drug Retailers (15597) 
The next chapter uses the 29 maintained regressions that produce IID in the residuals 
to forecast values of the indices to establish if any deterministic components generate 
abnormal gain. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT FORECASTING 
8.1 Introduction 
The results from Chapters 6 and 7 are set out in Table 38. 
Table 38 Coefficients from IID regressions 
Name Ref F sig? Data Generating Process coefficients 
FTSE All Share 
Aerospace & Defence 
5921 
15577 
yes 
constant 
-, 747066 
-. 169078 
Yt_1 
. 
098786 
. 022591 
Trend 
-. 000065 
-. 000034 
Rt-a 
Auto & Parts 
Beverages 
15579 
15581 
. 
001806 
. 356941 -. 047434 . 
000044 
. 165311 
Chemicals 15585 
. 
167570 -. 002004 -. 000016 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 yes . 000965 . 222377 
Electricity 19897 -. 306218 . 046245 -. 000133 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 yes . 
000940 
. 245540 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 
. 001316 F . 235637 Food & Drug Retailers 15597 unexplained 
Food Production & Processors 15599 -. 099766 . 
013629 -. 000023 
Forestry & Paper 15595 yes -. 412467 . 059901 . 
000027 
General Retailers 15601 yes . 001415 . 268872 
Health 15603 yes . 001717 . 328685 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 -. 072584 . 
010699 -. 000038 
Insurance 15609 
. 
000835 
. 291945 
Investment Companies 15610 . 000934 . 261451 
IT hardware 15607 -. 288330 . 040534 -. 000140 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 -. 090928 . 
013537 -. 000030 
Media & Entertainments 15615 . 001385 . 171305 
Mining 15617 -. 236758 . 034326 -. 000078 
Oil & Gas 15619 -. 092434 . 
011884 -. 000012 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 yes . 001665 . 127899 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 yes -. 277770 . 039704 -. 000122 
Real estate 15627 -. 014584 . 
002296 -. 000011 
Software & CPU Services 15630 -. 034905 . 
006527 -. 000033 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 yes -. 093910 . 
014218 -. 000038 
Support Services 15635 yes . 001112 . 340638 
Telecommunication Services 15641 . 
000434 
. 
006077 
Transport 15639 -. 142468 . 
019342 -. 000040 
Bold = coefficients are significant as measured by z or t statistic (intercept) or F (slopes). 
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The previous two chapters have identified regressions of various types that explain the 
time series relationships for 29 of the 30 indices and have used the BDS test to 
confirm that the residuals from the regression do not carry any further messages or 
relationships. The potential random walks derived from that process are summarized 
below. Where the various coefficients are significant at the 5% level (F statistic for 
slopes, t statistic for intercept) these are indicated by *. 
Random Walk Format: 
FTSE All Share Index 
Aerospace & Defence 
Chemicals 
Forestry & Paper 
Oil & Gas 
Rt= -. 747066* + . 098786*Yt_1- . 000065*t 
Rt = -. 169078 +. 022591 Yt_1-. 000034t 
Rt = . 16757 - . 002004 Yt_1- . 000016t 
Rt = -. 412467* + . 059901 *Yt_1 + . 000027t 
R=-. O92434+ 
. 011884 Yt_1 - . 000012t 
Personal Care & Household ProductsRt= -. 27777O* + . 039704*Yt_i -. 000122*t 
As can be seen, Aerospace & Defence, Chemicals and Oil & Gas have no coefficients 
significantly different from zero, so these can be dropped and the processes become 
pure random walks. Thus: 
Aerospace & Defence Rt = et 
Chemicals Rt = et 
Oil&Gas Rt=Et 
In these three cases there is no point in attempting to forecast the next period's return 
as it is just white noise. These can therefore be classed as strong efficient, their 
management should be solely passive, there is no scope for active management. 
8.2 Goodness of Fit and the Cost of Active Management 
8.2.1 Coefficients of determination 
The 26 indices that may be considered as possibly of use in forecasting are set out in 
Table 39 below, showing the coefficients of determination or R2. In theory R2 can be 
viewed as a measure of goodness of fit, as it is the square of the correlation coefficient 
between the index's actual return and the values generated by the regression. Its 
typical use is to give a view of how `good' the data generating process is. 
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Table 39 Coefficients of determination 
Name Ref R2 Constant ARCH Coint 
FTSE All Share 5921 
. 
049449 
Aerospace & Defence 15577 Not applicable as random walk 
Auto & Parts 15579 No Yes 
Beverages 15581 
. 
030408 Yes 
Chemicals 15585 Not applicable as random walk 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 
. 
050588 
Electricity 19897 
. 
024719 Yes 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 
. 
059276 No Yes 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 
. 
033287 Yes 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 No explained process 
Food Production & Processors 15599 
. 
014189 No Yes 
Forestry & Paper 15595 
. 
030406 
General Retailers 15601 
. 
072348 
Health 15603 
. 
036281 Yes 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 
. 
031972 No Yes 
Insurance 15609 
. 
003388 No Yes 
Investment Companies 15610 
. 
022128 Yes 
IT hardware 15607 
. 
024898 Yes 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 
. 
013311 No Yes 
Media & Entertainments 15615 
. 
025063 Yes 
Mining 15617 
. 
031434 Yes 
Oil & Gas 15619 Not applicable as random walk 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 
. 
016569 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 
. 
027789 
Real estate 15627 . 
024253 No Yes 
Software & CPU Services 15630 
. 
039867 No Yes 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 . 
056603 No Yes 
Support Services 15635 . 117223 
Telecommunication Services 15641 -. 008524 No Yes 
Transport 15639 . 
029019 No Yes 
Const No = regression does not have a significant (5%) constant 
ARCH Yes = R2 possibly not valid as ARCH and no regressors 
Coint Yes = cointegrated with another index 
As an example, from Table 39 it can be seen that the equation for Support Services 
(15635) has an R2 of 0.117223, or that the regression equation in theory explains 
11.7% of the value of Support Service's return. 
In a simple world any of the 26 identified equations' coefficients of determination 
could be compared with the cost of active management and where the R2 is greater, 
then there is possibly scope for active management to make abnormal gains. 
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Unfortunately the coefficient suffers from a variety of problems that preclude use of 
the coefficient as an identifier of management styles. 
Issue One: R2 is the sample's coefficient, not that of the population. It may be invalid 
for out-of-sample forecasts. 
Issue Two: Even if the population's coefficient of determination is known, its 
decomposition into signal and noise could invalidate a superficially strong 
relationship. 
Issue Three: R2 is not valid if the regression equation does not have a constant. 11 of 
the above have a constant that is not significantly different from zero at 5% and so the 
R2 must be replaced with the series' uncentred R2, which makes inter-index 
comparison difficult. The uncentred R2 can be derived by dividing the serial 
correlation LM test value by the number of observations, however there is no real 
point in this adjustment for the affected indices as they are GARCH regressions with 
no regressors and suffer from Issue Seven below. This adjustment is therefore not 
appropriate for any of the indices. 
Issue Four: As with regression coefficients, the value of R2 can vary if x is regressed 
on y rather than y on x, although this is not of particular relevance in time series 
analysis. 
Issue Five: R2 will be random if a variable is not stationary. This does not apply here 
as all return series were shown to be stationary. 
Issue Six: Use of additional variables in a regression can spuriously increase R2 with 
no recognition of loss of parsimony. This can be countered by use of Adjusted R2 but 
the approach taken in this analysis, of accepting the first and most parsimonious 
equation that is III) removes this problem. 
Issue Seven: If the process is ARCH and there are no regressors, then the R2 may be 
meaningless, hence the negative or missing values in the table above and the query 
against those that are not negative. This applies to 19 of the indices. 
Issue Eight: Food & Drug Retailers was not identified as being cointegrated with the 
FTSE All Share Index. Even if it had been cointegrated, with III) residuals, the 
resulting effective coefficient of determination would be the product of the two 
individual coefficients. A value that would be so low as to be of no use. 
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The net effect of the above is that using R2 as a measure of how good a forecast might 
be can only apply (and then with many caveats) to the seven indices in Table 40 
where their coefficient of determination is acceptable. 
Table 40 Applicable Coefficients of determination 
Name Ref Original 
R2 
FTSE All Share 5921 
. 
049449 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 
. 
050588 
Forestry & Paper 15595 
. 
030406 
General Retailers 15601 
. 
072348 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 
. 
016569 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 
. 
027789 
Support Services 15635 
. 
117223 
8.2.2 Fund management costs 
If the cost of active management, or rather its excess over the cost of passive 
management is known, then the indices with a percentage coefficient of determination 
above the excess cost could be classed as not efficient. Knowledge of the data 
generating process will allow the investor to make profits in excess of the cost of 
trading actively. Likewise those where the percentage coefficient of determination is 
less than or equal to the excess costs will be weakly efficient. The Myners Review 
(2001) suggests that average annual costs in the investment value chain are: 
Activity Basis Points 
Consultant 1.5 
Investment Manager 27.0 
Broker 15.0 
Custodian 3.0 
Performance Measurer 0.5 
Total 47.0 
In trying to establish those costs that are specific to active management (excess cost) 
it can be assumed that Custodian and Performance Measurer apply to both active and 
passive management styles and as such can be ignored. That leaves 43.5 basis points 
or 4.35% per annum as the excess cost of active management within fund 
management. In addition, Myners (p. 82) suggests that Fund Managers' costs in the 
UK for equities are: 
193 
Upper quartile 
Median 
Lower quartile 
48 basis points per annum 
40 basis points per annum 
30 basis points per annum. 
These costs are for a £100 million mandate and can be assumed to be relatively lower 
for a larger fund and commensurately higher for a smaller fund. Taking the median 
value could be excessive as the costs are an average covering both styles. If one 
assumes the 30 point lower quartile value is for passive and 48 is for active, then 
active management accounts for an additional 18 basis points. Combining these two 
elements (43.4 and 18) then active management's excess costs are 6.15% per annum, 
or approximately 0.023% per trading day. 
An alternative view is taken by Barber et al (2001) who suggest "an estimated round- 
trip transactions cost of 4.12 percent" (p. 553). Barber et al's data is for the US 
market, but a similar study by Goodacre et al (1999) for the UK market utilizes round- 
trip costs of up to 2%. Taking the 2% for the UK as the average round-trip costs and 
halving it for typical non-round trip, single way transactions and assuming that these 
would only apply to active management, then the excess cost over and above passive 
management is . 023% per day plus 1% trading costs. The regressions are on a daily 
basis, so if all indices are traded every day (an extreme case) the costs would be 
1.023% per day for one way transactions. If these estimates of costs have any validity, 
then a superficial conclusion might be that the excess of the coefficient of 
determination over the estimated excess costs of active management indicate excess 
return from active management. This is shown in Table 41. 
Table 41 Potential Excess Return from Active Management 
Name Ref Applicable 
R2 
Excess 
Costs 
Excess 
Return 
FTSE All Share 5921 
. 
049449 
. 
01023 
. 
039219 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 
. 
050588 
. 
01023 
. 
040358 
Forestry & Paper 15595 
. 
030406 
. 
01023 
. 
020176 
General Retailers 15601 
. 
072348 
. 
01023 
. 
062118 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 . 
016569 
. 
01023 
. 
006339 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 . 
027789 
. 
01023 
. 
017559 
Support Services 15635 117223 
. 
01023 
. 
106993 
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None of the excess returns are negative but that of Pharmacuticals & Biotec is 
virtually zero. This index could be classed as weakly efficient, in that although there 
is scope for forecasting an abnormal return, the cost will approximately equal the 
potential gain. The other six indices that have a valid coefficient of determination 
could be viewed as not efficient and warrant active management. This type of 
conclusion is of course subject to errors generated firstly by the issues surrounding the 
interpretation of the coefficient of determination and secondly by the estimates of the 
excess costs of active management. In addition, the conclusion can only be applied 
where the index's regression produces a valid R2. Consequently, no further 
consideration of the coefficient of determination will take place. Instead an alternative 
approach will be followed, one often promulgated in economic forecasting, where the 
success or usefulness of the forecasts from a model is examined. If the forecasts 
produce benefit, then the model can be regarded as useful, irrespective of issues 
surrounding statistics or logic that may cast doubt on the model. 
8.3 Forecastable Regressions 
8.3.1 Forecast error statistics 
In-sample forecasts, i. e. the filling in of gaps in the actual data, is of little or no use in 
the world of forecasting share or index values as the whole point is to estimate 
tomorrow's values. Thus for this exercise the forecasts are out of sample. Similarly, 
given that an investor can make a buy, sell or hold decision each day, based on the 
latest data, then the forecasts will be one step ahead (i. e. t+l) rather than multi step. 
For the following, a rolling window will be used, allowing ten recursive forecasts 
where t+l is forecast at time t, t+2 is forecast at time t+l using actual t+l values 
rather than the forecast value of t+l from time t. The use of ten forecast periods is 
partly pragmatic (equivalent to two weeks) but is not dissimilar to other work on stock 
price forecasting. For instance, Jung and Boyd (1996) forecast 18 periods out of 
sample, based on 288 sample periods. McMillan et al (2000) study the FTSE and use: 
Months Weeks Days 
Sample 132 574 2869 
Forecast 20 83 413. 
In tests of the Finnish Option Index, Maukonen (2002) utilized monthly data such that 
"the length of the rolling window.. . varied 
between 99 and 130 observations" (p. 818). 
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Thus the use of 250 observations in this study to generate ten forecast periods is fairly 
cautious. The regressions were based on daily observations for the year 23rd April 
2003 to 22nd April 2004, so the forecasts are for the ten days 23rd April 2004 to 6th 
May 2004. 
The forecasts will be based on the regression equations that produced III) in the 
residuals, as confirmed by the BDS tests. As an example, returns for the FTSE All 
Share Index series are regressed using the equation format above, for the survey 
period of one year ending on 23d April 2004. The forecast is performed and Figure 4 
below shows April 2004, with the actual returns through to 23d followed by the out of 
sample actual returns and the forecast returns. As can be seen, the forecast correctly 
follows that period's downward trend but fails to display the volatility experienced by 
the actual series. A visual comparison of the actuals and forecast gives some 
indication of the success of the model but is somewhat subjective. A more accurate or 
objective method of appraising the success of the forecast is by means of a variety of 
forecast error statistics. 
Figure 4 Forecast (RAF) and Actuals (RA), April 2004, FTSE All Share Index 
. 
012 
. 
008 
. 
004 
. 000 
-. 004 
-. 008 
-. 012 
%\ i 
---- 
\y- S. 
4/5/04 4/12/04 4/19/04 4/26/04 5/3/04 
RA -----RA--F] 
196 
There are four main measures of a forecast: 
Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) (also referred to as Mean Squared Error) is the 
square root of the average of the squared forecast errors. A benefit specific to RMSE 
is that it can be split into three component parts: bias, variance and covariance. 
Mean Absolute Error (MAE) is the average of the absolute forecast errors. 
Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) is an extension of MAE where the absolute 
forecast differences are each divided by the actual value and expressed as a percent. 
This can be adjusted by dividing by the forecast plus the actual, to give the Symmetric 
MAPE to correct for asymmetry in the differences. Unfortunately this measure cannot 
be used here as it cannot cope with changes in signs: it could be a test of forecasting 
the index but not the return. 
Thiel's U statistic (also referred to as Thiel's Inequality Coefficient) which compares 
the model in question with a naive benchmark (typically a random walk). The lower 
the value, the better the forecast, which allows an inter index forecast comparison as it 
is not relative 
Although all but MAPE will be considered in subsequent forecasts, RMSE and MAE 
tend to be of more benefit in relative comparisons of the same data across various 
models, whereas this analysis is solely a single model per time series. Actual forecast 
error statistics are given in Table 42. Of particular benefit is the breakdown of RMSE 
where the (albeit) relative error is decomposed into its component parts of: bias, or 
difference between means of actual and forecast; variance, or difference between 
variances of actual and forecast; and covariance, which is really a balancing item. The 
covariance proportion is thus a measure of the success of a forecast and should be as 
large as possible. 
8.3.2 Error statistics from identified data generating processes 
Initial observations on these error statistics are: 
i) as expected, MAE is of little use; 
ii) all of the U values from the TIC are less than one, indicating that the regression is 
more useful than a naive model, but in many cases only just so. Using the Thiel 
Inequality Coefficient, the five most successful forecasts are: IT Hardware, Transport, 
Mining, the All Share and Forestry & Paper. 
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iii) the breakdown of the RMSE into its three components shows poor ability of the 
regressions to forecast the mean, with the highest being 38% and a third below 20%. 
The largest errors are in the variance with many over 90%. Covariance, where a high 
value is desirable, only has General Retail and Health above 50%. 
Table 42 Forecast Error Statistics 
Name Ref MAE TIC RMSE of which 
bias var covar 
FTSE All Share 5921 
. 
003378 
. 
625168 
. 
004539 
. 
056722 
. 
796001 . 147277 
Aerospace & Defence 15577 Pure random walk so not applicable 
Auto & Parts 15579 
. 
007097 
. 
918848 
. 
009930 
. 
287758 
. 
461522 
. 250720 
Beverages 15581 
. 
006335 
. 
918052 
. 
009550 
. 
013805 
. 
964970 
. 
021225 
Chemicals 15585 Pure random walk so not applicable 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 
. 
002294 
. 
866997 
. 
002940 
. 
337340 
. 
388309 
. 
274351 
Electricity 19897 
. 
074249 
. 
839905 
. 
102877 
. 
070594 
. 
812060 
. 117346 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 
. 
004588 
. 
872400 
. 
005946 
. 
040807 
. 
954089 
. 
005104 
Engineering & Machinery 15591 
. 
002142 
. 
689393 
. 
003045 
. 
015366 
. 
645680 
. 338954 
Food & Drug Retailers 15597 Unexplained so not applicable 
Food Production & Processors 15599 . 
002007 
. 
659126 
. 
002656 . 
137598 
. 
805167 
. 057235 
Forestry & Paper 15595 . 
004527 . 
648779 . 
005417 
. 
126181 
. 
783308 . 090511 
General Retailers 15601 . 
002618 
. 
801215 
. 
004152 
. 
075257 
. 
415208 . 509535 
Health 15603 . 
003605 . 753024 . 
004409 
. 
077941 
. 
401920 
. 520139 
Household Goods & Textiles 15605 . 
004924 . 
818562 . 
005792 
. 
312951 
. 
658689 . 028361 
Insurance 15609 . 
004873 . 
839162 . 
005845 . 
324130 
. 
339117 . 336753 
Investment Companies 15610 . 
003375 . 
760607 . 
003847 . 
381913 
. 
434181 
. 183905 
IT hardware 15607 . 
014625 . 
550704 . 
017573 . 
186124 . 
690784 
. 123092 
Leisure & Hotels 15613 . 
003588 . 
779006 . 
005621 . 
077993 . 
893094 
. 
028914 
Media & Entertainments 15615 . 
002813 . 
838935 . 
004708 . 
219653 . 
546927 
. 
233421 
Mining 15617 . 
009506 . 
619027 . 
010443 . 
450672 . 
484236 . 065092 
Oil & Gas 15619 Pure random walk so not applicable 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 . 
013514 . 
937687 . 
018488 . 
339831 . 
453512 
. 
206657 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 . 
013792 . 
682786 . 
016190 . 
000294 . 
833316 
. 
166391 
Real estate 15627 . 
002149 . 
759404 . 
002828 . 
001268 . 
995912 
. 
002820 
Software & CPU Services 15630 . 
007131 . 
910379 . 
010480 . 
064616 . 
922769 
. 
012615 
Speciality & Other Financials 15633 . 
003855 . 
665405 . 
004784 . 
092326 . 
894159 
. 
013515 
Support Services 15635 . 
002455 . 
859718 . 
003177 . 
289079 . 
247646 
. 
463274 
Telecommunication Services 15641 . 
009851 . 
982082 . 
012722 . 
300103 . 
695021 
. 
004876 
Transport 15639 . 
003751 . 
595512 . 
004260 . 
254117 . 
695664 
. 
050219 
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Whilst there are mixed messages from these error statistics, there is no strong 
indication that the forecasts would be successful and it is not possible to draw 
inferences about efficiency. 
8.3.3 Maintained regressions with just significant coefficients 
The forecasts were performed on the 26 regression equations, using all regressed 
coefficients, irrespective of their significance. An alternative approach would be to 
drop those coefficients that are not significantly different from zero. For forecasting 
purposes the equations can be grouped as: Near Random Walks; a variety of formats 
but all with GARCH; and Auto Regressive. 
" Near Random Walks 
FTSE All Share Index Rt = -. 747066 +. 098786Y, -, - . 000065t + Ft 
Forestry & Paper 
Personal Care & Household Products 
R, =-. 412467 - . 059901 Yt_1 + Et 
Rt = -. 277770 + . 039704Yt_1 - . 000122t + Ft 
where all three have drift, but only Forestry & Paper has no trend. 
" GARCH 
For those processes that had GARCH in the variance, removal of the non-significant 
coefficients gives the following mean equations (at this point the variance regression 
is not given), irrespective of whether a) the mean process was based on a random 
walk or AR(1) and b) ignoring various versions of GARCH. The GARCH process 
means that the error term st no longer has a constant variance, so adding an additional 
factor to the forecasting. 
Food Production & Processors Rt = st 
Household Goods & Textiles Rt = st 
Real Estate Rt = ct 
Transport Rt = et 
Software & CPU Services Rt = st 
Leisure & Hotels Rt = ct 
Auto & Parts Rt = st 
Insurance Rt = ct 
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Telecommunication Services 
Electricity 
IT Hardware 
Mining 
Beverages 
Engineering 
Investment Companies 
Media & Entertainments 
Speciality & Other Financials 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 
Health 
Rt = Et 
Rt=-. 306218+ct 
Rt=-. 288330+st 
Rte-. 236758+st 
Rt 
. 356941 + Ft 
Rt-. 001316+st 
Rt = . 000934 + st 
Rt=. 001385+et 
Rt = -. 00003 8t + Ft 
Rt = . 245544 Rt_1 + Ft 
Rt . 001717 +. 328685 Rt_1+ st 
Apart from the last two which are autoregressive, the others have the basic `look' of a 
random walk, with or without drift and trend, but the conditional variance of the error 
term precludes the conclusion that they cannot be forecast and so they cannot be 
viewed as being efficient at this stage. 
" Auto Regressive 
The four non-GARCH AR(l) series all have significant coefficients, but a constant 
variance in the error term. 
Construction & Building Materials 
General Retailers 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 
Support Services 
" Unexplained 
Rt = . 000965 + . 222377 R1_1 + ct 
Rt=. 001415 +. 268872Rt_l+st 
Rt = . 001665 +. 127899 Rt_1 + Ft 
Rt = . 001112 + . 
340638 Rt_1 + ct 
The final index Food & Drug Retailers is unexplained. 
8.3.4 Forecast error statistics with just significant coefficients 
Seventeen of the above are now seen as random walks, the majority pure random 
walks, one a random walk with trend and a further seven being a random walk with 
drift. As with the earlier removal of the first three, these can now be dropped as there 
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is no benefit from attempting to forecast random walks. Of the remaining nine, seven 
have not changed their coefficients as all were significant, but two have dropped 
coefficients and are reforecast to assess the impact on the forecast error statistics of 
dropping the non-significant coefficients. A comparison of the results is shown in 
Table 43, with the proportions expressed as percentages for ease of comparison. 
Table 43 Comparative Forecast Error Statistics for non-random regressions 
Name Ref TIC Bias Var Covar* 
% % % 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 With all coefficients . 
872400 4 95 1 
Just significant coeffs . 
707470 45 37 19 
Forestry & Paper 15595 With all coefficients . 
648779 13 78 9 
Just significant coeffs . 
269527 78 18 6 
*May not sum to 100% due to rounding. 
The error statistics are now of marginally more use as a comparison can be made 
between the errors with all regression coefficients in the forecast and those with just 
the 5% significant coefficients. With Electro & Electrical Equipment there is some 
improvement in both the TIC and the increased covariance proportion: for this index 
the reduced equation would be more suitable for forecasting. Secondly, in the case of 
Forestry & Paper there is a large improvement in the TIC but the covariance 
proportion has fallen slightly and is at a very low level; based on the TIC the reduced 
form may be a slightly better forecast equation. Therefore the subsequent forecasts 
will use the following formats: 
FTSE All Share Index 
Construction & Building Materials 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 
Forestry & Paper 
General Retailers 
Health 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 
Personal Care & Household Products 
Support Services 
Rt = -. 747066 + . 098786Yt_1- . 
000065t 
R= . 000965 +. 
222377 Rt_1 
R= . 245544 
Rt_1 
Rt = -. 412467 + . 059901 
Yt_1 
R= . 
001415 +. 268872 Rt_1 
Rt = . 001717 + . 
328685 Rt_1 
Rt = . 
001665 +. 127899 Rt_1 
Rt = -. 277770 + . 
039704Yt_1 - . 000122t 
Rt= . 001112 +. 
34063 8 Rt_1 
All other indices' return time series are pure random walks, random walks with 
drift 
and/or trend or, in one case, unexplained, albeit the majority have GARCH. 
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8.4 Forecasts 
8.4.1 Forecasting approach 
It is unfortunate that Monday 3rd May 2004 was a Bank Holiday in England and 
Wales, as this is within the ten day period for forecasting. Earlier analysis, as 
discussed, `filled' gap days with average index values. An alternative would be to 
forecast just for the six days to 30th April 2004, giving limited data for consideration. 
The following calculations of forecasts will continue with ten day forecasts but will 
not fill the gap on the Bank Holiday, so avoiding any spurious results from treatment 
of days when the London Stock Exchange was closed. The initial comments are made 
just for one of the nine forecastable regressions, in this case the FTSE All Share 
index, so as to consider various factors relating to forecasts. This is then extended to 
the other eight. 
Table 44 shows the basic data resulting from the regression equation 
Rt = -. 747066 + . 098786Yt_1- . 000065t 
Over the ten working day forecasting period a passive manager who held the whole 
index would have achieved a return of the sum of the daily returns (log normal returns 
are additive), giving the sum for 23rd April to 7th May of -. 031063 or -3.1063%. An 
active manager with a one day forecasting horizon, at the end of each day having run 
the next day's forecast, and holding the index, would logically go liquid if the next 
day's forecast indicated a negative return. This could be adjusted using Goodacre et 
al's (1999) 1% costs, so the forecast of a return more negative than -1 % would be a 
sell indicator. Similarly, a liquid active manager would buy the index if the forecast 
return was greater than 1 %. 
Table 44 FTSE All Share Index Forecasts 
Date Forecast Actual Trade Active 
Return Return Manager 
23rd April 2004 -0.000483 0.000797 0 
6th April 2004 -0.000454 0.000327 0 
27th April 2004 -0.000471 0.000331 0 
28th April 2004 -0.000487 -0.010727 0 
29th April 2004 -0.001596 -0.002551 0 
30th April 2004 -0.001897 -0.006722 0 
4th May 2004 -0.002610 -0.000160 0 
5th May 2004 -0.001591 0.003472 0 
6th May 2004 -0.001297 -0.011122 0 
7th May 2004 -0.002445 -0.004708 0 
Total -0.013331 -0.031063 00 
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Examination of the forecasts shows that, on 22nd April, a liquid manager would stay 
liquid for the 23rd and also on each of the subsequent nine days as the next day's 
forecast was always negative. The net return would thus be 0%, compared to a fully 
invested passive manager's loss of 3.1063%. Alternatively, a fully invested active 
manager would logically decide each day to stay invested as the negative forecast was 
always less than the 1% dealing cost, producing a loss of 3.1063%. If, however, the 
trading costs are ignored, then the decision would be to liquidate immediately and 
stay liquid, giving a return of 0%. This approach suffers from the use of one day 
forecasts: if on 22nd April a ten day forecast is performed, with a negative return of 
. 
I% per day, then the decision may be made to go liquid, based on two weeks rather 
than the more incremental daily decision. There are two immediate problems with 
this: firstly, the longer the forecast period the greater the forecast error; secondly, why 
ten days rather than (say) five, or 20? To get round this, subsequent assumed 
decisions will be based on gross return, i. e. ignoring trading costs, and will be on a 
daily basis irrespective of the size of the forecast return. To narrow the number of 
outcomes it will also be assumed that any manager is fully liquid or not invested in 
the index at the end of 22nd April 2004. On this basis the active manager will 
outperform the passive manager by 3.1063% by being liquid at the start and staying 
liquid for all ten days. 
8.4.2 Forecasts of non random sectors' data generating processes 
For the Construction & Building Materials index, the passive manager would lose 
1.3455% (Table 45). The initially liquid active manager would buy the index at the 
end of 22d, sell for 29th, buy for 30'', sell for 4th May and then buy and hold for the 
rest of the period. The effect being to achieve the actual return on days of positive 
forecasts and nil returns on days of negative forecasts, irrespective of the actual 
return. A return over the ten days of -1.0532% which is better than the passive result 
by 0.2933 percentage points due to removal of the actual losses on the two days of 
negative forecasts, but achieved at the cost of five trades. 
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Table 45 Construction & Building Materials Index Forecasts 
Date Forecast Actual Trade Active 
Return Return Manager 
23rd April 2004 0.001117 -0.001889 Buy -0.001889 6th April 2004 0.000545 0.002241 0.002241 
27th April 2004 0.001463 0.002040 0.002040 
28th April 2004 0.001419 -0.004607 -0.004607 29th April 2004 -0.000060 -0.002763 Sell 0 
30th April 2004 0.000351 -0.005124 Buy -0.005124 
4th May 2004 -0.000174 -0.000160 Sell 0 
5th May 2004 0.000929 -0.001688 Buy -0.001688 
6th May 2004 0.000590 -0.000001 -0.000001 
7th May 2004 0.000965 -0.001504 -0.001504 
Total 0.007145 -0.013455 5 -0.010532 
The same approach for Electro & Electrical Equipment is more successful, with the 
active manager being liquid for five days, four of which experienced negative actual 
returns. Table 46 shows that the passive strategy generates a loss of 0.8759% 
compared to an active gain of 1.1741 %, after trading three times, a gross abnormal 
return of 2.05%. It is the case, in this and all other of the nine forecastable indices, 
that the assumed trade happens seconds before close on the day the forecast is 
undertaken. Thus changes in the index post trade are ignored in the decision making 
process, an assumption that could be seen as casting doubt on the validity of the 
process. The tables show this buy or sell decision on the day it takes effect, i. e., at the 
end of 22nd April the next day's forecast is positive so the Trade colum shows "buy" 
for the 23rd 
Table 46 Electro & Electrical Equipment Index Forecasts 
Date Forecast Actual Trade Active 
Return Return Manager 
23Id April 2004 0.000374 0.008329 Buy 0.008329 
6th April 2004 0.002045 0.010074 0.010074 
27th April 2004 0.002474 0.001278 0.001278 
28th April 2004 0.000314 -0.001442 -0.001442 
29th April 2004 -0.000354 -0.005256 Sell 0 
30th April 2004 -0.001291 -0.006328 0 
4th May 2004 -0.001554 -0.000160 0 
5th May 2004 -0.000039 -0.009958 0 
6th May 2004 -0.002445 0.001203 0 
7th May 2004 0.000295 -0.006498 Buy -0.006498 
Total -0.000181 -0.008759 3 0.011741 
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For Forestry & Paper, Table 47 sets out the forecast and actual returns. The forecast 
performed late on 22nd April shows an expected negative return for 23rd so the active 
manager would stay liquid. All other forecasts are negative so there are no further 
trades. Over the ten days the passive manager would show a loss of 0.1601 % 
compared to a nil return by the active manager. Ignoring costs, active management 
outperforms passive. 
Table 47 Forestry & Paper Index Forecasts 
Date Forecast Actual Trade Active 
Return Return Manager 
23rd April 2004 -0.009606 -0.000160 0 
6th April 2004 -0.009606 -0.000160 0 
27th April 2004 -0.009606 -0.009697 0 
28th Apri12004 -0.010178 -0.000160 0 
29th April 2004 -0.010178 -0.000160 0 
30th April 2004 -0.010178 -0.009789 0 
4th May 2004 -0.010754 -0.000160 0 
5th May 2004 -0.010754 -0.000160 0 
6th May 2004 -0.010754 0.009469 0 
7th May 2004 -0.010178 0.009377 0 
Total -0.101793 -0.001601 00 
For the General Retailers index, Table 48 shows the active manager undertaking three 
transactions, so as to be liquid just for 30th April. This was a correct decision as that 
day's actual performance was negative and resulted in an excess return over the 
passive manager of 0.1665%. 
Table 48 General Retailers Index Forecasts 
Date Forecast Actual Trade Active 
Return Return Manager 
23rd April 2004 0.002062 0.002896 Buy . 
002896 
6th April 2004 0.002194 0.001867 . 
001867 
27th April 2004 0.001917 0.000427 . 
000427 
28th April 2004 0.001530 0.007276 . 
007276 
29th April 2004 0.003371 -0.007972 -. 007972 
30th April 2004 -0.000729 -0.001665 Sell 0 
4th May 2004 0.000967 -0.000160 Buy -. 000160 
5th May 2004 0.001372 -0.001716 . 
001716 
6th May 2004 0.000954 -0.000977 -. 000977 
7th May 2004 0.001152 0.003675 . 
003675 
Total 0.014791 0.003651 3 . 
005316 
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Table 49 indicates that with Health, the active manager will go liquid for two non- 
adjacent days, resulting in four trades and an excess return over passive management 
of 0.0791%. 
Table 49 Health Index Forecasts 
Date 
23Id April 2004 
6th April 2004 
27th April 2004 
28th April 2004 
29th April 2004 
30th April 2004 
4th May 2004 
5th May 2004 
6th May 2004 
7th May 2004 
Total 
Forecast Actual Trade Active 
Return Return Manager 
0.004228 0.000101 Buy 
. 
000101 
0.001750 -0.002496 -. 002496 
0.000896 0.000007 
. 
000007 
0.001719 -0.000133 -. 000133 
0.001673 -0.003747 -. 003747 
0.000486 -0.006952 -. 006952 
-0.000568 -0.000160 Sell 0 
0.001664 0.000254 Buy 
. 
000254 
0.001800 -0.005429 -. 005429 
-0.000067 -0.000631 Sell 0 
0.013582 -0.019186 4 -. 018395 
Table 50 shows that for Pharmacuticals & Biotec the active manager is very active, 
trading on seven of the ten days to generate a return above that of the passive manager 
of . 007993 or 
0.7993%. 
Table 50 Pharmacuticals & Biotec Index Forecasts 
Date 
23rd April 2004 
6th April 2004 
27th April 2004 
28th April 2004 
29th April 2004 
30th April 2004 
4th May 2004 
5th May 2004 
6th May 2004 
7th May 2004 
Total 
Forecast Actual Trade Active 
Return Return Manager 
0.002104 -0.011952 Buy -. 011952 
0.000126 -0.044779 -. 044779 
-0.004072 0.007841 Sell 0 
0.002658 -0.004205 Buy -. 004205 
0.001117 -0.015625 -. 015625 
-0.000343 -0.015542 Sell 0 
-0.000333 -0.000160 0 
0.001635 -0.021682 Buy -. 021682 
-0.001118 -0.000132 Sell 0 
0.001638 0.005787 Buy . 
005787 
0.003411 -0.100448 7 -. 092455 
The penultimate forecastable index is that of Personal Care & Household Products. 
Forecast and actual returns are given by Table 51. As can be seen, the active manager 
stays liquid for the whole period, giving a zero return which is 6.0739 percentage 
points better than the tracker. 
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Table 51 Personal Care & Household Products Index Forecasts 
Date Forecast Actual Trade Active 
Return Return Manager 
23rd April 2004 -0.003769 -0.003481 0 
6th April 2004 -0.004023 -0.016933 0 
27th April 2004 -0.004811 0.009938 0 
28th April 2004 -0.004532 -0.023882 0 
29th April 2004 -0.005596 -0.027983 0 
30th April 2004 -0.006822 -0.025985 0 
4th May 2004 -0.007970 -0.000160 0 
5th May 2004 -0.007656 0.024584 0 
6th May 2004 -0.006796 -0.000160 0 
7th May 2004 -0.006918 0.003325 0 
Total -0.058893 -0.060739 00 
Support Services, the final index under question, also has a fairly active manager 
(Table 52), avoiding two negative returns but missing out on one day with a positive 
return. The net effect being to outperform the passive manager by 0.035 percentage 
points. 
Table 52 Support Services Index Forecasts 
Date Forecast Actual Trade Active 
Return Return Manager 
23rd April 2004 0.001322 0.002405 Buy . 
002405 
6th April 2004 0.001931 -0.000614 -. 000614 
27th April 2004 0.000903 -0.001629 -. 001629 
28th April 2004 0.000557 -0.004160 -. 004160 
29th April 2004 -0.000305 -0.000272 Sell 0 
30th April 2004 0.001019 -0.003725 Buy -. 003725 
4th May 2004 -0.000157 -0.000160 Sell 0 
5th May 2004 0.001057 -0.006274 Buy -. 006274 
6th May 2004 -0.001025 0.000082 Sell 0 
7th May 2004 0.001140 -0.001815 Buy -. 001815 
Total 0.006442 -0.016164 7 -. 015814 
8.4.3 Use of historic regressions in forecasting 
These forecasts must be viewed with some caution. Earlier in this chapter concern 
was expressed about the accuracy or validity of the coefficient of determination and 
its applicability in deciding whether a regression was of any use. A similar concern 
exists with use of historic regressions in forecasting. These are best expressed by two 
papers. The first is that of Gordon and Kammen (1996) who argue that models where 
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there is some form of assumption as to normality of distribution of forecast errors 
suffer from leptokurtosis. This can be particularly so in the case of overconfidence 
which in some cases they view as being systemic in the forecasting of returns. For 
ease of presentation, the forecasts in this chapter have been point rather than interval, 
i. e. they have not been accompanied by confidence intervals. Gordon and Kammen 
suggest that had interval forecasts been made, then "processes correcting for 
stationarity may describe stock levels and variances, but the resulting confidence 
intervals (will) continue to underestimate the probability of shocks to returns to a 
significant degree" (p. 196). This could, for example, be a reason why in forecasts of 
the'All Share Index shown in Figure 4 the trend is correctly identified, but extreme 
values are not forecast. Their proposed solution (not followed up here) is that a 
correction should be applied based upon the Shlyakhter, Kammen et al model (1994, 
cited in Gordon and Kammen, 1996) which uses compound exponential distributions 
to generate confidence intervals. 
The second area of concern in relation to forecasting sector index returns is that 
expressed by Timmermann and Granger (2004). This paper is less to do with 
forecasting per se and is more focused on issues surrounding market efficiency, in 
particular, issues surrounding model specification, non stationarity in the return series 
and choice of approach. The problems of `model specification' are well exemplified 
by the method used in this thesis, namely a univariate time series with or without 
GARCH, which has by definition ignored all other model types (event studies, high 
frequency data, exponential modelling, long term mean reversion, panel data, cross 
sectional analysis and many others). Selection of any one model (which raises further 
questions about the selection method) leads to their suggestion of "a market.. . 
being 
efficient locally in time" (p. 20). Linked with the identification of new forecasting 
models is the concept of a `honeymoon period' where, for a short time, the model is 
successful prior to its wider use, at which point the temporary inefficiency is 
arbitraged away. In support of the Efficiency Hypothesis, they posit that even if a 
model had predictive powers, but was one of several competing models, then its ex 
post success would not have been evident ex ante and as such does not invalidate 
EMH. 
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The second problem of Timmerman and Granger is that use of a model may cause a 
stationary series to break down and become non stationary, thus invalidating the 
model. This is viewed as the market `learning' how to use a new model such that 
predictable returns models will probably have their parameters updated on a rolling 
basis, generating ex post serial correlation and loss of stationarity. Thirdly there are 
issues surrounding the "choice of approach' including: size of the time series (which 
may not be opimal for stationarity); thick versus thin modelling (where decisions are 
based on the outputs of many models, not just the best) or use of one modelling 
technique versus "all techniques... applied to all returns at all times" (p. 23) (a method 
identified as costly). 
Whatever the view of these two papers, it is obviously the case that forecasting with 
univariate time series regression should be viewed with caution. 
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CHAPTER NINE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 The Sector Regressions and their Forecasts 
9.1.1 Industrial sectors where passive management is appropriate 
The sample evidence supports the conclusion that three of the sector indices are pure 
random walks. These are: 
Aerospace & Defence (15577), 
Chemicals (15585), 
Oil & Gas (15619). 
If they are random walks, then it is not possible to forecast the next day's return or 
index value, their best estimate for time t+1 is that of the value at time t, in that the 
error term is white noise. Earlier mention has been made of the point that lack of 
randomness does not automatically mean inefficiency, but there is general acceptance 
that evidence of randomness does indicate efficiency. The conclusion for these three 
UK equity industrial sector indices is that they are strong efficient and as such there is 
no point in using active management; they should be managed passively. 
9.1.2 Industrial sectors with GARCH and no management conclusion 
The previous chapter on forecasting dropped the non significant regression 
coefficients. This showed that nine indices became pure random walks in the mean 
equation but had GARCH in their variance processes. These are: 
Auto & Parts (15579), 
Food Production & Processors (15599), 
Household Goods & Textiles (15605), 
Insurance (15609), 
Leisure & Hotels (15613), 
Real Estate (15627), 
Software & CPU Services (15630), 
Telecommunication Services (15641), 
Transport (15639). 
It is tempting to conclude that their random processes result in the same conclusion as 
above. Unfortunately the GARCH process in their variances could theoretically give 
scope for trading decisions based on the regressions. For instance, an increase in 
variance may be a sell signal for a low risk investor. Alternatively, changes in 
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variance may feed into a derivatives model, indicating a price change in the derivative 
that could have a commensurate impact on the underlying. On the other hand, the 
current UK derivatives market does not have industrial sector products, so any actions 
would need to be via the over the counter market, a process that would increase both 
risk and transaction costs. There can be no formal conclusion as to efficiency and 
likewise there can be no formal conclusion with regard to management style. 
Similarly there were seven sector indices where their logarithmic returns were random 
walks with drift and there was GARCH. These are: 
Beverages (15 5 81), 
Electricity (19897), 
Engineering (15591), 
Investment Companies (15610), 
IT Hardware (15607), 
Media & Entertainments (15615), 
Mining (15617). 
Three of these regressions' constants were negative and four positive. Had all of the 
random processes had consistently positive or negative coefficients, then it could have 
been the case that the earlier adjustment for the market's risk premium was at the 
wrong value. This is not so here, but it may be considered that these seven series have 
`unique' equity sector risk premiums with their constants being the `adjustment' to the 
full market equity risk premium. Whatever the cause, they are random walks, but the 
drift in all three of the negatives and one of the positives is of a size such that, when 
combined with the GARCH points from above, could cast doubt on their efficiency in 
that the drift may be greater than the white noise of the error term. The conclusion is 
as above, or rather there is no conclusion, but the possible existence of a sector risk 
premium makes inefficiency more likely and thus active management more feasible. 
One index was a random walk, not with drift but with trend. This also had GARCH in 
the residuals. The index was: 
Speciality & Other Financials (15633). 
The trend is negative and small but significantly different from zero. Whilst its 
negative trend could act as a deterrent to a risk averse investor and the existence of 
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GARCH raises the same issues as above, its conclusion is as above, that inefficiency 
is probably more likely and active management is possibly feasible. 
9.1.3 Industrial sectors with management style based on forecasts 
Two sector indices are close to random walks. These are: 
Forestry & Paper (15595), 
Personal Care & Household Products (15621). 
Although lack of randomness does mean there is no automatic conclusion of 
efficiency, it does not have the corollary that they are not efficient. The Thiel 
Inequality Coefficient error statistics are 0.269527 and . 
682786 respectively, 
indicating that Forestry & Paper is possibly more likely to be inefficient than Personal 
Care & Household Products. The forecasts result in active management's abnormal 
gains over passive management of 0.1601 % for Forestry & Paper and a much larger 
6.0739% for Personal Care & Household Products. A contrary and stronger 
conclusion is that Personal Care & Household Products is possibly more likely to be 
inefficient than Forestry & Paper. 
Four indices are autoregressive without GARCH and two with GARCH (indicated by 
G). The index, Thiel Inequality Coefficient and forecast abnormal gains from active 
management are: 
Construction & Building Materials (15583): 
General Retailers (15601): 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec (15623): 
Support Services (15635): 
Electro & Electrical Equipment (15593) G: 
Health (15603) G: 
0.864482 0.2933% 
0.801215 0.1665% 
0.937687 0.7993% 
0.859718 0.035% 
0.707470 2.05% 
0.753024 0.0791% 
For the processes without GARCH, the existence of such data generating processes in 
theory means rejection of the conclusion of efficiency but the Thiel Inequality 
Coefficients are all relatively high and the results of the forecasts show either negative 
or very low positive gains. Strong efficiency must be rejected, but the sector indices 
are either weakly efficient or not efficient. The same view cannot be taken for Health, 
as the existence of GARCH makes inefficiency more likely, so no immediate 
conclusion. For Electro & Electrical Equipment the forecast shows scope for a fairly 
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large gain that is likely to be above excess costs of active management. This sector 
index cannot therefore be viewed as strongly efficient. 
These last two groups of two and eight industrial sectors respectively may be weakly 
efficient or not efficient. The previous chapter suggested that the excess cost of active 
management over passive was 0.023% per day plus 1% for each trade and Tables 44 
to 52 indicated the number of trades over a ten day period. Table 53 below uses this to 
calculate the excess costs if these forecasts are acted on, where excess cost equals 1% 
times number of trades plus tens days' active management costs at . 023% per 
day 
(. 2302%). 
Table 53 Net Gains from Active Management 
Name Ref Trades Forecast's 
Excess Return 
Excess 
Costs 
Net Gain 
% 
Construction & Building Materials 15583 5 
. 
2933 5.2302 -4.9369 
Electro & Electrical Equipment 15593 2 2.05 2.2302 -. 1802 
Forestry & Paper 15595 0 . 1601 
0.2302 -0.0701 
General Retailers 15601 2 . 
1665 2.2302 -2.0637 
Health 15603 3 . 
0791 3.2302 -3.1511 
Personal Care & Household Products 15621 1 6.0739 1.2302 4.8437 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec 15623 6 . 7993 
6.2302 -5.4309 
Support Services 15635 6 . 
0350 6.2302 -6.1952 
Only Personal Care & Household Products has a positive net gain and can be viewed 
as not efficient and therefore suitable for active management. The other seven have 
costs in excess of the gain and can be viewed as weakly efficient and not suitable for 
active management. 
Finally there is one index that is unexplained, namely: 
Food & Drug Retailers (15597). 
No conclusion can be drawn with regards to efficiency, but the lack of a forecastable 
data generating process would make active management problematic. Thus it should 
be passively managed. 
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9.1.4 Summary of management style by sector 
Sectors where the log normal index returns are pure random walks or the mean 
process is unexplained and there is thus no scope for forecasting, so the sectors can be 
assumed to be efficient are: 
Aerospace & Defence (15577) 
Chemicals (15585) 
Oil & Gas (15619) 
Food & Drug Retailers (15597). 
Sectors where the log normal index returns have a deterministic mean process but the 
costs of active management outweigh the benefits, making them weakly efficient are: 
Construction & Building Materials (15583) 
Support Services (15635) 
Health (15603) 
Pharmacuticals & Biotec (15623) 
Forestry & Paper (15595) 
General Retailers (15601) 
Electro & Electrical Equipment (15593). 
The only sector where the log normal returns are not efficient and there is scope for a 
net gain from active management is: 
Personal Care & Household Products (15621) 
The other sectors do not have a conclusion. The existence of GARCH means that they 
may or may not be efficient and they may or may not be forecastable. Thus, from the 
29 individual industrial sector share indices: four are efficient and candidates for 
passive management; five are weakly efficient and candidates for passive 
management; one is inefficient and could be managed actively; and 19 are such that a 
decision cannot be made. Figure 5 displays these results graphically. 
The majority of the sector indices fall under the diagram's heading of "No decision as 
GARCH" where they can be viewed as being in one of two categories. Firstly, a pure 
random walk for the mean process, but with GARCH in the variance, in which case it 
is difficult to reach a firm conclusion as to their suitability for active or passive 
management. Secondly, those where there is a random walk with drift or trend for the 
means' data generating processes but the variances are again conditional. 
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Figure 5 Suggested Management Styles 
Maintained Passive No decision Active 
regression Management as GARCH Management 
Unexplained Food & Drug 
Pure random Aero 
walk Chemicals 
Oil & Gas 
Auto 
Food PP 
Household 
Insurance 
Leisure 
Real Estate 
Software 
Telecom 
Transport 
Random walk 
with drift/trend Beverages 
Electrical 
Engineering 
Investment 
IT 
Media 
Mining 
Speciality 
Autoregressive Health 
Electro 
Construction 
Support Services 
General Retail 
Pharm & Bio 
Close to 
random walk 
Forestry 
Personal Care 
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9.2 The FTSE All Share Index 
Section 9.1 above discusses the results of the tests on the sector specific sub indices. It 
is worth considering the All Share index in more detail, even though this is not the 
main focus of this research. The outcomes from the analysis for the main index are 
that the data generating process is a near random walk with drift and trend, there is no 
evidence of GARCH, the coefficient of determination is 4.9%, the Thiel Inequality 
Coefficient is 0.6 and the excess return from active management over passive 
management is calculated as 3.1063%. With the regression explaining almost 5% of 
the relationship, and a gross excess return of over 3%, then the All Share cannot be 
described as efficient and is a logical candidate for active management. 
The main index contains some sub indices that are random, some with GARCH, some 
that are deterministic and one that is unexplained. This is not paradoxical, nor 
unexpected. The random indices have white noise as the error term, as have the 
deterministic processes, so their aggregation will still produce a white noise error term 
with a deterministic process. Similarly, the aggregation of various different 
deterministic processes may be expected to produce a new deterministic process. The 
interesting case is that many of the sub indices exhibit GARCH but this is not 
aggregated up to the main index. Although this has not been examined, it is assumed 
that the various impacts of the individual conditional variance processes either 
`cancel' each other out, or are of sufficiently small magnitude so as not to reject the 
null of no ARCH at the market level, even though the null is rejected at the sector 
level. 
This does give the investor an additional factor to consider, in that the Myners Review 
is recommending active management where appropriate. Should a fund manager 
therefore be active in just a few sectors, whilst being passive in the other sectors (e. g. 
a tracker fund with satellites) or should the whole market be defined as applicable for 
active investment? It is assumed that costs would suggest the former and not the 
latter. 
The same issue, but viewed from a different angle, casts doubt on much research into 
efficiency. The Literature Review chapter highlighted many papers where a wide 
range of efficiency tests have been applied to markets as measured by their aggregate 
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or market index. It is highly possible that the same position as applies in this research 
applies to those papers; namely that certain sectors of those markets are efficient 
(weakly or strong) and the non-efficiency of the market index as a whole is a function 
of some of the sectors being inefficient. 
9.3 Conclusions 
The `trigger' for this thesis was the Myners Review of Institutional Investment in the 
United Kingdom (2001), in particular the suggestion that passive management is a 
free ride, that more effort/cost should be put into strategic asset allocation and that 
each asset class should have "sufficient freedom for active management to occur" (p. 
22) if active management is appropriate. The definition of that `appropriateness' has 
been based upon the concept of market efficiency; specifically, the format which 
assumes that prices fully reflect all available information, either strongly in the case 
where information and trading costs are zero, or weakly where benefits do not exceed 
costs. The concept of asset class has been viewed as the 29 FTSE All Share Index 
industrial sector sub indices. Finally, the tests of market efficiency on these sectors 
have been based upon univariate time series analysis, attempting to establish if they 
are random or not, forecastable or not, and if forecastable, capable of excess returns 
from active management. 
The use of univariate time series analysis is not new, it is a well established method of 
finance and economics research. The factors that do make this thesis unique and a 
contribution to our understanding of finance are threefold. Firstly, the study of 
industrial sector indices is a very under-researched area; the literature review shows 
many studies at the firm level or market level, but only a small number that give some 
limited consideration at the sector level, and even then there is a fairly high 
aggregation into just a few sectors. Secondly, the use of the BDS tests to establish 
whether a possible data generating process produces residuals that are IID is a rarely 
utilized technique in the vast majority of papers on tests of efficiency. Failure to apply 
this test must cast doubt on many conclusions in papers that have sought to identify a 
mean process, but not established if there were further `messages' in the residuals. 
Thirdly, the tests for stationarity and random walks have been comprehensive, 
considering all three types of random walks. This contrasts with many papers where 
the tests are solely on a pure version with neither drift nor trend. 
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The immediate conclusion of this thesis is that the Myners' suggestion is valid. There 
is scope for active management to take place in terms of strategic asset allocation. 
Unfortunately that is only appropriate for one of the 29 sectors, that of Personal Care 
& Household Products. The other sectors are shown as being efficient (in either form) 
or not capable of being identified as 'appropriate'. 
number of non-efficient sectors appropriate for active management 1 
number of strong efficient sectors appropriate for passive management 4 
number of weakly efficient sectors appropriate for passive management 5 
number of sectors where no decision can be made 19 
The UK equity market, as measured by the All Share Index, is also shown to be 
inefficient, so it can be concluded that if this level of aggregation is used to define an 
asset class, then it should be actively managed. The logical way to proceed, however, 
would be to manage it passively as a `core' apart from a `satellite' which focused on 
Personal Care & Household Products. 
A further conclusion is that if the UK market is inefficient in aggregate, but many of 
the sectors are strong or weakly efficient, then previous research on market level 
efficiency should have considered sectoral differences. The literature on efficiency is 
vast, with hundreds of published papers addressing market efficiency for many 
countries, over many different periods, using a variety of tests, so it is possibly the 
case that some of these macro level tests hide the sector level differences. The 
aggregation of sectors up to a total market, when some are efficient and some are not 
could be hypothesised as the cause of the tension in the intersubjective consensus in 
relation to efficiency: the debates about mistakes versus anomalies or the `yes 
performance persists' versus `no it doesn't' discussions could be viewed as 
manifestations of testing the sum of the sectors rather than each one in turn. Causes of 
the sectors' impacts on the differences in total market efficiency test conclusions are 
likely to be varied but three are proposed. It may be that a sector is "efficient locally 
in time" (p. 20) rather than the market as a whole, as suggested by Timmerman and 
Granger (2004), so that over one period the efficient sectors combine to produce an 
efficient market whereas in a later period shifts in certain individual sectors produce 
an inefficient `whole'. Secondly, the cause could be more pragmatic, with just 
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different returns by sector increasing the weighting of an inefficient sector to the point 
where its size then dominates the aggregation, so tipping the market from efficiency 
to inefficiency. Thirdly, although the method used in this thesis has been univariate, 
there may be state variables or cross-sectional data indicating common attributes 
among the efficient sectors, so that as the independent variables change, they drive 
certain sectors to change their efficiency status. These three possible causes could of 
course be interlinked: an inefficient sector may be identified, resulting in trading 
activity which over time arbitrages away the inefficiency. 
There are obviously many caveats that should be considered in relation to the 
conclusions. Some of these are considered below, as areas for further research, but it 
is worth some final reflection of Type I and II errors. As discussed in the chapter on 
methodology, the approach taken in this thesis is quantitative, derived indirectly from 
the Austrian School and utilised extensively in American finance research generally, 
and at the University of Chicago particularly. Virtually all of the analysis is dependent 
upon hypothesis testing and so the conclusions must be viewed in the light of Type I 
errors, the situation where the null hypothesis was true but the test statistic indicated 
its rejection and Type II errors, the case where the null hypothesis was not true but 
test statistic did not indicate its rejection. 
In common with much research in this area, the hypothesis tests have been performed 
using 5% significance. This could have been replaced with (typically) 10% or 1%, 
with a commensurate impact on the conclusions and the power of the tests. 
Unfortunately there is no specific process for setting the level of significance or 
confidence limits. The power of the tests could also have been increased by using a 
larger sample size, compared to the 252 used here. This could be achieved by a longer 
period or higher frequency data. The former would then suffer from loss of accuracy 
if the time series had short term trends and the latter was not possible as the 
appropriate data was not available at a frequency greater than daily. Thus, as with all 
hypothesis test-based research the process is a compromise and the results or 
conclusions suffer from Type I and II errors. 
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9.4 Further Research 
The use of BDS tests and the breakdown of a country's equity market into industrial 
sectors give very wide scope to the application of this approach to other equity 
markets, but that would be a huge exercise encompassing most of the world's capital 
market places. Its use would be relevant, however, not only to fund managers and 
consultants in advising on strategic asset allocation decisions, but also to capital 
market regulators who seek to ensure that their markets are efficient. 
Similarly, the approach could be used with other types of efficiency tests. The focus 
here has been on a time series being random or deterministic, whereas the Literature 
Review shows numerous different types of tests. A sectoral analysis using filters 
(trading rules) or mean reversion or speed of reaction between derivatives and 
underlyings or time effects or size effects all could be revisited at the sub index level. 
It would be problematic to attempt event study analysis with sectors, as the need to 
identify the `event' would preclude any meaningful study. 
In the realms of this thesis, there are a variety of areas for consideration in taking the 
research further. Firstly, the analysis has been univariate, which is possibly acceptable 
for those indices where the results showed randomness in the log returns. For the non 
random sectors the extension of the regressions to multivariate analysis could be a 
fruitful area. This could be at the macro level, where the variables are economic 
indicators such as GDP growth or inflation, or a more micro-based review. The latter 
would be interesting for all sectors, to test if there are various attributes that determine 
randomness or its lack. A second consideration may be to revisit the many sector 
indices where the mean generating regression was random but the variance was 
conditional, as evidenced by GARCH. Chapters 7 and 8 on the analysis did briefly 
utilise the various forms of GARCH, but greater consideration could be given to tests 
for (say) GARCH in mean. The algorithm followed in the analysis has been to stop 
when a data generating process has been identified that has nothing left in the 
residuals, hence the numerous GARCH solutions that make firm conclusions difficult. 
It may be the case that further examination shows a later version of GARCH also not 
rejecting the BDS null but having a much greater forecasting ability, so allowing a 
conclusion of inefficiency and scope for active management. Alternatively, the 
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forecast method could be amended so as to estimate changes in volatility, which could 
be of benefit to the active manager. 
The third major consideration for further research is of course to revisit the size and 
location of the sample. This could be extended to include many years, so seeking 
those sectors where efficiency is a long term attribute. It could be duplicated on (say) 
an annual basis, but over a long period to establish if, as time passes, the various 
sectors `drift' into and out of efficiency and if indeed this is forecastable. Fourthly, it 
could be interesting to follow up the possibility of sector specific equity risk 
premiums. This would logically seek factors, both macro and micro, that attempt to 
explain the premium. 
9.5 Endnote 
Chapter 3 on methodology gave some consideration to the work of Hayek, in 
particular the subjective interpretation by economic players of new information and 
the unknown rules about how it should be interpreted. This is central to discussion on 
the efficient market hypothesis and had interesting adumbrations for the growth of 
behavioural finance. The following reflections are based on "Roads to Freedom: 
essays in honour of Friedrich A von Hayek" (1969); all references are to its 
contributors. 
Hayek viewed growth in economic understanding as subjectivism (in contrast to 
formalism). Lachmann saw this as "Spontaneous action ... 
(being)... transformed into 
a response to stimulus" (p. 96). This viewpoint meshes well with efficiency, in that it 
is new information that triggers a possible change in investors' expectations about 
index values. If the market or rather a sector is efficient, then it is only changes in 
those expectations that generate movement away from the mean value, so generating 
the random walk. Lachmann took this further, linking Hayek's thoughts with those of 
Keynes whereby it is "the unfathomable subtlety, complexity and mutability of the 
influences which bear upon the decision to invest" (p. 99). The strategic asset 
allocation decision of fund managers, when examined from this philosophical 
viewpoint, makes passive investment much more attractive than attempting to cope 
with unfathomable subtlety. This can become paradoxical however, for he argues that: 
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The market is a process of continuous change, not a state of rest. It is clear that 
what keeps this process in continuous motion is the occurrence of unexpected 
change as well as the inconsistency of human plans (but) ... 
it is likely that 
plans would gradually become consistent as men come to learn more about 
their environment. " (p. 91) 
If this is the case, then the move towards passive management due to strong or weakly 
efficient markets will remove one of the causes of the market's continuous change. If 
this study has found only one sector that warrants active management, and if all 
investors took the view to manage passively in all other sectors, then the UK equity 
market would slowly move towards this (undesirable? ) state of rest. 
Buchanan similarly discusses Hayek's use of subjectivism in relation to economic 
behaviour, where "in the logic of choice, choosing becomes a subjective experience" 
(p. 52). The Myners Review discusses the role of the trustee and the trustees' reliance 
on consultants or peer benchmarking in the strategic asset allocation decision. In 
effect, reliance on peer grouping or consultants is a way of removing the subjective 
experience by transferring the choice to someone else. If the majority of the sectors in 
the UK equity market should not be actively managed because they are strong or 
weakly efficient, then this removes the domestic equity market decision's 
subjectiveness and the trustee can recommend passive management. Yet again, as 
with Lachmann's logic, this removes one of the drivers that make the equity market 
dynamic. It may therefore be the case that even if the market were to be totally 
efficient, the strategic asset allocation decision should be encouraged towards active 
management, if only to prevent stultification and to make it dynamic, changing and 
vibrant. 
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